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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Supreme Court Case No. 42242
Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO
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Date: 8/21/2014

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 11 :22 AM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 3

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CV-PC-2013-00248 Current Judge: Michael McLaughlin
Christopher A Pentico, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Christopher A Pentico, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

1/4/2013

NCPC

CCSWEECE

New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief

Magistrate Court Clerk

PETN

CCNELSRF

Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Magistrate Court Clerk

APPL

CCNELSRF

Application for Public Defender

Magistrate Court Clerk

1/7/2013

CERT

CCNELSRF

Certificate Of Mailing

Magistrate Court Clerk

1/10/2013

ORPD

TCEMERYV

Order Appointing Public Defender

Kevin Swain

3/26/2013

MOTN

JVWARDCM

Motion for summary dismissal

Magistrate Court Clerk

BREF

JVWARDCM

Brief in support of motion for summary dismissal

Magistrate Court Clerk

ANSW

JVWARDCM

Answer

Magistrate Court Clerk

NOTC

TCEMERYV

Notice of Intent to Grant Summary Dismissal

Kevin Swain

CERT

TCEMERYV

Certificate Of Mailing

Kevin Swain

MISC

CCOSBODK

Petitioners Response To States Motion For
Summary Disposition

Magistrate Court Clerk

RQST

CCOSBODK

Request For Judicial Noticfe

Magistrate Court Clerk

6/11/2013

ORDR

TCWEGEKE

Order Granting Request for Judicial Notice

Michael McLaughlin

6/13/2013

ORDR

TCEMERYV

Order Granting Summary Dismissal

Kevin Swain

CERT

TCEMERYV

Certificate Of Mailing

Kevin Swain

CDIS

CCWATSCL

Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho,
Other Party; Pentico, Christopher A, Subject.
Filing date: 6/13/2013

Magistrate Court Clerk

STAT

CCWATSCL

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Magistrate Court Clerk

7/5/2013

APDC

CCNELSRF

Notice of Appeal

Magistrate Court Clerk

7/8/2013

AMEN

CCNELSRF

Amended Notice of Appeal

Magistrate Court Clerk

CAAP

CCNELSRF

Case Appealed:

Magistrate Court Clerk

STAT

CCNELSRF

STATUS CHANGED: Reopened

Magistrate Court Clerk

CHGA

CCNELSRF

Judge Change: Administrative

Michael McLaughlin

4/30/2013

5/20/2013

7/9/2013

CCNELSRF

Judge

Notice of Reassignment

Michael McLaughlin

ORDR

TCLYCAAM

Order Governing Procedure on Appeal

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

TCLYCAAM

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
01/23/2014 02:00 PM)

Michael McLaughlin

8/16/2013

PROS

PRSMITTJ

Prosecutor assigned Brian Naugle

Michael McLaughlin

9/11/2013

PROS

PRFLEMSM

Prosecutor assigned Christopher C Mccurdy

Michael Mclaughlin

9/23/2013

BAAT

PDPRECJR

ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH
PROCESSING (batch process) Heidi M Tolman,
8478 removed. PD GARDUNIA #32 assigned.

BAAT

PDPRECJR

ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH
PROCESSING (batch process) PD GARDUNIA
#32 removed. Lance L Fuisting, 7791 assigned.

11/25/2013

BREF

CCOSBODK

Petitioners Brief

Michael Mclaughlin

12/23/2013

BREF

CCNELSRF

Respondent's Brief

Michael McLaughlin

1/8/2014

BREF

CCHOLMEE

Petitioner's Reply Brief

Michael McLaughlin

7/17/2013
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Date
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Judge

1/14/2014

CONT

TCEDWAAM

Continued (Oral Argument on Appeal
02/06/2014 04:00 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

TCEDWAAM

Notice of Hearing
[unable to locate document]

Michael Mclaughlin

2/4/2014

MOTN

CCMARTJD

Motion to Continue

Michael Mclaughlin

2/6/2014

HRVC

TCEDWAAM

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 02/06/2014 04:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

2/11/2014

ORDR

TCEDWAAM

Order to Continue

Michael McLaughlin

HRSC

TCEDWAAM

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
02/13/2014 03:30 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

2/13/2014

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 02/13/2014 03:30 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: SUSAN GAMBEE
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: LESS THAN 100 pages

Michael Mclaughlin

2/19/2014

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision and Order

Michael Mclaughlin

CDIS

CCNELSRF

Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho,
Other Party; Pentico, Christopher A, Subject.
Filing date: 2/19/2014

Michael Mclaughlin

STAT

CCNELSRF

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Michael Mclaughlin

3/10/2014

PETN

CCNELSRF

Petition for Rehearing RE: Memorandum
Decision & Order

Michael Mclaughlin

3/14/2014

HRSC

TCEDWAAM

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/24/2014 02:00
PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

TCEDWAAM

Notice Of Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

3/24/2014

MEMO

CCNELSRF

Memorandum In support of Petition for Rehearing Michael Mclaughlin
RE: Memorandum Decision and Order

3/28/2014

CONT

TCEDWAAM

Continued (Motion 05/01/2014 02:00 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

TCEDWAAM

Notice Of Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

4/29/2014

RESP

CCRADTER

State's Response to Petitioner's Memorandum in
Support of Petition for Rehearing

Michael Mclaughlin

5/1/2014

HRHD

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
05/01/2014 02:00 PM: Hearing Held
Court reporter Dianne Cromwell less than 50
pages

Michael McLaughlin

5/20/2014

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on Motion for
Reconsideration

Michael McLaughlin

CDIS

CCNELSRF

Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho,
Other Party; Pentico, Christopher A, Subject.
Filing date: 5/20/2014

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCMURPST

Notice of Appeal

Michael McLaughlin

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Michael Mclaughlin

6/20/2014
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NOTC
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Judge
(2) Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court
Docket No. 42242
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Christopher A. Pentico
120 N.W. Carrie Circle
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone No.: (208)587-7322
Email: pentico@mindspring.com

CHRISTOPf1ER D. RICH, Clerk~,- By CHRISilNE SWEET ,~·
DEPUTY---

394SWAlN

Pro Se Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
...P,l~

vs.

l!tt-.spo11Jen t

ell,

CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Petitioner.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV PC 1300248
CASE NO.:CR MD 2008-0005321

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
I.

Petitioner, Christopher A. Pentico, currently resides at 120 N.W. Carrie Circle
Mountain Home, Idaho, 83647.

2.

In Ada County, Magistrate Court Number CR MD 2008-0005321, Mr. Pentico was
charged with criminal trespass. The charge arose from a citation issued on April 2, 2008,
after Mr. Pentico was stopped, handcuffed and detained at the comer of State and 8th
Street in Boise, Idaho.

3.

On April 21, 2009, Mr. Pentico was convicted of criminal trespass in violation ofl.C.
§ 18-7008(8) based upon the allegation that "on April 2, 2008, he willfully trespassed
upon property of the State ofldaho, by returning to and entering the Governor's Office in
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the Borah Building, without permission or invitation, after being verbally notified within
the previous year not to do so by Trooper Pattis, an authorized agent of the State."
4.

While prosecution was pending, Mr. Pentico was prejudiced by being illegally placed at
risk of facing additional charges if, at any time prior to March 25, 2009, he made an
attempt to visit his legislator at the Capital Annex (the seat of the Idaho Legislature in
2008-2009) or to visit any other public official at either the Governor's Office or the
Idaho State Department of Education.

5.

On Mayl l, 2009, despite the State's request that he be sentenced to 90 days of jail (with
85 suspended) and a $500 fine (with $300 suspended), ordered to pay Court costs and
placed on probation for two years with no right to visit the public property at issue, Mr.
Pentico was placed on probation for 30 days, ordered to pay Court Costs of $75.00 which
were then waived, and, though it was not requested, placed at risk of losing any future
ability to secure a withheld judgment by being granted a withheld judgment in this matter
(which he has never sought to pursue).

6.

Mr. Pentico was represented at throughout the proceedings in the Magistrate Court by
Allen Derr., Esq.

7.

Mr. Pentico appealed from the judgment and sentence to the District Court.

8.

On May 13, 2010, District Judge Kathryn A. Sticklen affirmed the judgment of
conviction.

9.

Mr. Pentico appealed from the determination of the District Court.

10.

On October 17, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.

11.

Mr. PenticC? filed a timely Petition for Review in the Idaho Supreme Court.

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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12.

On January 5, 2012, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review and the
matter was remitted to the District Court.

13.

Acting on a pro bono basis, Attorney Bruce S. Bistline and legal intern and eventually
Attorney Heidi Tolman represented Mr. Pentico at all stages of appeal.

14.

With respect to this conviction, Mr. Pentico has not filed any other petitions for postconviction relief nor has he filed, in State or Federal Court, any Petitions for Habeas
Corpus or any other petitions or motions other than the appeals noted above.

15.

That, as demonstrated by the Application for Public Defender, filed herewith, Petitioner
does not have the resources to retain counsel nor to pay the costs of prosecuting this
matter and requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis and that counsel be appointed to
represent Petitioner.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
A Conviction For a Violation of Idaho Code §18-7008(8) Which Is Premised Upon the
Demand That a Citizen Leave Public Property Which Is Otherwise Open To the Public
for the Same Purposes for Which It Is Being Used by the Citizen in Question and
Which Is Made in the Absence of Evidence of any Inappropriate Conduct, Is a
Violation of Due Process Protections Afforded by Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution and the 5 111 Amendment of the United States Constitution.

16.

The record in the trial of this matter contains not a scrap of evidence to suggest that Mr.
Pentico was engaged in any inappropriate conduct on public property on March 25, 2008,
nor that he was doing any activity for which the Capital Annex property was not, on
March 25, 2008, otherwise open to the public.

17.

To the extent that Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) can be read as permitting a citizen to be
ordered off of public property when the citizen is appropriately engaged in the very
activity for which the property is otherwise open to the public, it is facially overbroad and

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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vague. It allows law enforcement officers to order citizens off of public property for any
reason or no reason at all, and thus necessarily empowers law enforcement to engage in
arbitrary and discriminatory behaviors. The statute fails to provide any apparent limits or
constraints to guide law enforcement or the Courts or to provide citizens with meaningful
guidance so that they can conform their conduct to the standards of the law and be free to
use public property without fear of discriminatory or arbitrary law enforcement.
18.

The Court of Appeals' decision, while holding that the statute is not overbroad or vague
because it makes clear that a citizen must leave the property once he is ordered to do so
and must not return within one year, never addressed or resolved the question of whether
it is Constitutional to read that statute as affording law enforcement officers the power to
order a citizen off of public property for any reason or no reason at all.

19.

The Court of Appeals concluded that on it face the statute permitted Mr. Pentico to be
ordered to leave the Capital Annex for any reason or no reason at all, and that this
interpretation was supported by State. v Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003).

20.

Neither the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho nor the Court of Appeals of the State of
Idaho has ever held that Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) can properly or constitutionally be read
as permitting a citizen to be ordered off of public property when the citizen is
appropriately engaged in the very activity for which the property is otherwise open to the
public.

21.

As Mr. Pentico's conviction is, based on the evidence in the record, premised upon the
fact that on March 25, 2008, he was, for no apparent reason, ordered off of public
property which was otherwise open to the public and that the only authority offered to

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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justify that conviction is Idaho Code § 18-7008(8), that conviction is unconstitutional and
should be set aside.

Why Relief Should Be Granted.
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(1) affords a convicted person the right to seek to set aside an
conviction which was entered in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State
of Idaho. Petitioner was convicted of a violation of a statute, I.C. § 18-7008(8), which cannot be
constitutionally applied to criminalize his actions and which has never been applied to permit a
prosecution such as the one to which Petitioner has been subjected.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
A Conviction/or a Violation of Idaho Code §18-7008(8) Which Was Premised Upon
The Fact That A Citizen, Having Been Ordered to Leave Public Property Which Was
Otherwise Open to the Public/or the Same Purposes/or Which it Was Being Used by
the Citizen in Question and Which Was Made in the Absence of Evidence ofAny
Inappropriate Conduct, Subsequently Reentered Public Property is a Violation of Due
Process Protections Afforded by the Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution
and the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
22.

The record in the trial of this matter contains not a scrap of evidence to suggest that Mr.
Pentico was engaged in any inappropriate conduct on public property on March 25, 2008,
nor that he was engaged in any activity for which the Capital Annex property was not, on
March 25, 2008, otherwise open to the public.

23.

To the extent that Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) can be read as permitting a citizen to be
ordered off of public property when the citizen is appropriately engaged in the very
activity (including constitutionally protected activity) for which the property is otherwise
open to the public and then to be prosecuted for, at any time during the following one (1)
year period, using that property in a otherwise lawful and constitutionally protected

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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manner, it is facially unconstitutional. It allows law enforcement officers to deprive
citizens of the right to engage in lawful and constitutionally protected conduct for a
significant period of time without affording those citizens any meaningful procedure or
process to challenge either the exclusion or the duration of the exclusion.
24.

Neither the Idaho Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho has ever
held that Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) can properly or constitutionally be read as permitting a
citizen to be barred from the lawful and constitutionally protected use of public property
for a full year regardless of the reason that the citizen was asked to leave the public
property in the first place.

25.

As Mr. Pentico's conviction is based on a statute which deprives him of significant
liberty rights and which affords no meaningful or adequate due process procedures in
association with the deprivation of those rights, that conviction is unconstitutional and
should be set aside.

Wlty Relief Sltould Be Granted.
Idaho Code § 19-4901 (1) affords a convicted person the right to seek to set aside a
conviction which was entered in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State
ofldaho. Petitioner was convicted of a violation of a statute, I.C. § 18-7008(8), which cannot be
constitutionally applied to criminalize his actions and which has never been applied to permit a
prosecution such as the one to which Petitioner has been subjected.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Petitioner was Denied tlte Rigltt to fully Cltallenge tlte Constitutionality of Ida/to Code
§ 18-7008(8) as Applied to /tis Conduct.

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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26.

Trial Counsel's performance was deficient because:
a.

He failed through testimony or offer of proof to develop an adequate record to
demonstrate that Mr. Pentico had entered the grounds of the Capital Annex on
March 25, 2008, for the purpose of finding and speaking to Representative Lenore
Barrett in hopes of securing her advise and assistance with a matter of
governmental action which was of concern to Mr. Pentico.

b.

He failed through testimony or offer of proof to develop an adequate record to
demonstrate that prior to being confronted by officers on the grounds of the
Capital Annex, on March 25, 2008, Mr. Pentico had done nothing more than cross
the street and start to walk in the direction of the entrance to the building with the
intent of speaking to a legislator in hopes of securing her advise and assistance
with a matter of governmental action which was of concern to Mr. Pentico.

c.

He failed through testimony or offer of proof to develop an adequate record to
demonstrate that Mr. Pentico's chose to visit the public reception area of the
Governor's Office on April 2, 2008, to hand deliver his letter to the Governor (as
opposed to mailing it) for the specific purpose of making a statement both about
the importance of the matters addressed in the letter to Mr. Pentico and about his
opposition to what he perceived was an unconstitutional attempt to bar him from
accessing public property in the same manner as and for the same reasons (some
of which are constitutionally protected rights) that the property in question was
open to all other members of the public.

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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d.

He failed to inquire into the specific basis upon which Officer Partis relied for
contending he was the authorized agent of the owner of the property and to
determine whether there was any basis in fact to support a conclusion that Officer
\

Partis even knew about let alone had been vested with sufficient authority to
override, the Governor's standing invitation for Mr. Pentico to visit the
Governor's office.
e.

He failed to timely raise a claim that Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) could not
constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's entry into the Governor's
office on April 2, 2008, because:
1.

there was no constitutionally sufficient basis for asking Mr. Pentico, on
March 25, 2008, to leave the traditional public forum of the seat of the
legislature (the "ask to leave") where he is entitled to go to speak, observe,
and to petition his government for the redress of grievances, and, if the
"ask to leave" is not lawful, then the "do not return for 1 year" prong of
the statute cannot be triggered and the visit to the public reception area of
Governor's office on April 2, 2008 cannot be treated as a trespass under
LC. §18-7008(8);

11.

even if the "ask to leave" was itself not constitutionally defective, the
statute could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's
subsequent entry on to property other than the property upon which he was
standing at the time that the "ask to leave" occurred. The language of the
statute provides no sufficient notice that it could be applied to criminalize

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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a subsequent entry on to property other than the property upon which an
individual was standing at the time that an "ask to leav~" occurred. Given
the inherent vagueness of the statute relative to its application to Mr.
Pentico' s conduct, using it to criminalize his visit to the public reception
area of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008, would violate the
procedural due process protections afforded to Mr. Pentico by Art. I, Sec.
13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5th Amendment of the United States
Constitution;
111.

even if the "ask to leave" was itself not constitutionally defective and the
statute could be permissibly extended to criminalize a visit to the property
other than the property on which the "ask to leave" occurred, the statute
could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to
the public reception area of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008,
because that visit was, based upon facts not placed in the record, more
than mere conduct and was thus constitutionally protected speech; and,

1v.

even if the "ask to leave" was itself not constitutionally defective, and the
statute could be permissibly extended to criminalize a visit to the property
other than the property on which the "ask to leave" occurred, the statute
could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to
the public reception area of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008. The
statute works an impermissible deprivation of rights by precluding any
person and Mr. Pentico in particular, who has not done anything more than

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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approach the functioning Capital Building for the purpose of speaking to a
legislator, from thereafter exercising substantial rights and liberties
(including constitutionally protected rights) available to all other citizens
for a period of one year and provides no meaningful remedial process for
challenging either the exclusion or the duration of the exclusion. Given
the lack of any meaningful due process to provide protection from
arbitrary, unreasonable and material exclusions from public property, the
statute in general and as applied to Mr. Pentico, violates procedural due
process protections afforded to citizens, including Mr. Pentico, by Art. I,
Sec. 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5th Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
27.

The failure to make an adequate evidentiary record precluded Mr. Pentico from
demonstrating that his communications with the Governor were in fact relevant to the
proceeding because, if Officer Pattis was not aware of the standing invitation for Mr.
Pentico to visit the Governor at his office and was not vested with the authority to
override that invitation, then, he was in fact not the "authorized agent for the owner" with
respect to his direction that Mr. Pentico stay away from the Governor's office.

28.

The failure to make an adequate evidentiary record precluded Mr. Pentico from
demonstrating to the Trial Court and the Appellate Courts that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Pentico.

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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29.

The failure to raise all constitutional defenses precluded Mr. Pentico from demonstrating
to the Trial Court and the Appellate Courts that the statute could not constitutionally be
applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to the Governor's office on April 2, 2008.

Why Relief Should Be Granted.
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has been
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal
defendant's right to effective counsel. Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13; LC. § 19-852.
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance;
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id.
Here, Trial Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to create a sufficient
factual record to support a demonstration that Officer Pattis was not in fact authorized to direct
Mr. Pentico's activities with respect to visits to the Governor's office.
Trial Counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to create a sufficient
factual record to support critical constitutional defenses to the charge and he failed to raise
critical constitutional defenses so that they were before the Trial Court for consideration and

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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..
preserved for appeal. Trial Counsel focused on the constitutionality of the prosecution for the
trip to the public reception area of the Governor's office but never presented available evidence
that demonstrates that the trip itself was intended as a form of speech. Trial Counsel does not
appear to have realized, until perhaps at sentencing proceeding, that there was nothing wrongful
about the trip to the Governor's office if there was no valid "ask to leave" in the first instance
and that the "ask to leave" was not and could be treated as valid because it was itself a violation
of Mr. Pentico's constitutionally protected rights. Moreover, Trial Counsel never framed and
presented the obvious due process challenges. In the absence of any available evidence of
inappropriate conduct on March 25, 2008, the "ask to leave" was arbitrary and capricious and the
statute, to the extent it permits such an exclusion, is unconstitutional. Even if the drafters
intended for the statute to permit an "ask to leave" one parcel of property to be extended to other
separate parcels, this intent is in no manner made clear by the clear and unambiguous language of
the statute, and the statute, to the extent it intends such an extension, is void for vagueness.
Finally, the application of the statute to permit even a lawful "ask to leave" to prevent a return to
public property for up to one (1) year generates a deprivation of substantial rights without any
meaningful procedural due process and renders the statute facially unconstitutional and
unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Pentico.

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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...

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Petitioner requests the following relief
A. That counsel be appointed;
B. That the judgment be vacated and either the matter should be dismissed or a new trial
be granted; and/or
C. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of January, 2013.

Pro Se Petiti()ner

~

~a
VERIFICATION OF PETITION

I, Christopher A. Pentico, being duly sworn under oath, state:
I know of the contents of the foregoing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and that the
matters and allegations set forth are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

~-a~

christopher.entico

fA..
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this_!!_ day of January, 2013

c~ cJnavu2cf

Notary Public for the State ofldaho
Residing at: 623 W. Hays, Boise, Idaho 83702
My commission expires: ~ a~ .;?O Jg
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(If defendant is a minor, a form must also be completed
by parent or legal guardian)

JAN O4 2013
APPLICATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER

By CHRISTINE SWEET
DEPUTY

lhri
sbf?lher IL fe11.tl,o
fpJ)fi~t·s Mam , /t ~ f
!..cLlJ L-& r: r: Le,__

stw.,yt AddrEJSS •

,__

//

I aa.no
I

Driver's License Number

j

7

City

State

Zip Code

Mailing Address (if different from above)
State'

City

Zip Code

Home Phone

thri .s toeher Afe11!t
ti to 587-7322.

Nj1,i!e of C!rrept~ J.pstEmployer

i

ity

tJPJ1U?e , I1t..an o

~o

elrl)r(i!M
in flate

o. .

State
End Date

Time on the Job

Hours Per Week

~Q~()~-

Paid by the month D hour D

Rate of Pay $_~/~~~---·

-D-at_e_U-ne_m_p-lo_y_m-en_t_ -Da-te_U_n_e_m_p-lo-ym_e_n_t
Benefits Began
(or will begin)

z~Code

s Monthly Unempl. (or

Benefits Terminate

~)f\~6,1~
Name of Spouse's Current or Last Employer
City

Phone

State

Begin Date

Paid by the month D hour D

Ia.trt a.fl

Zip Code

Time on the Job

End Date

Hours Per week

Rate of Pay$_ _ _ _ _ __

,1tde1et1de11,t

J.L.e.,

vf"

codrie...tt> r tJJ :t/1

J.

IQ""Amount in Arrears$_ _ _ __

.,,.1-o{I ~,,

ITlf..t..,,"lflce

I

_fl_ Monthly Support$_ _ _ _ N f~ildre!

Child Support Current? YesD No

_Of_~n Qt r

ti.-/fA ].. . . a.m. 1,ra.d"1,(15 S.C>fll.€, ,,,
.h1a·
vn.so,ne~k uJ ;t:"),t /111 f ZLren ~~ _.FoY"' ro o r,1 cl.lld J:u,a:rd,
1 hot,e. tn_, S c...la..n t1e~ e/ie. exf_en Ge 5
11
t5 ()) It
i~ "if£:. /I a . e

(anticipated income)

FINANCIAL
No. Children You Are Supporting

Work Phone

M~1\~ L

EMPLOYMENT

rr, ounr.a. t II.

Birth Date(Month/DayNear)

Social Security Number

t r c, e.

ru,unr;a..al 11(>111.e..

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clark

: t ~You

A~

a

No. Adults Living With You __ Relationships _ _ _ _ __

ASSETS
Rent Dor OwnD

Your Home

Equity in Home
Equity in Other Land or Property

:±

0

Mortgage Loan Balance

$

Property Loan Balance

$

{)

Vehicle Loan Balance

$

()

Year and Make of Vehicle(s) _ _ _ _ __
Equity in Vehicle(s)

$

Cash on Hand

$

Cash in Checking Accounts
Name of Bank _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Cash in Savings Accounts
Name of Bank _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

$

Other Assets _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

$

APPLICATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER-1

J

$

D
2.6 .(Ji)_

-----~(}/J.OD

Checking Acct. No.
Savings Acct. No.

J~ {)b:2 {J

{)_
'30Diw

---··--·"

000018[REV 3-2000)

•

•

HOUSEHOLD MONTHLY INCOME

Continued on Reverse

HOUSEHOLD MONTHLY DEBTS

Your Wages (Take-home, Before Garnishments)

s 2.~D. D.D.~~

Rent or Mortgage Paid By You

$

()

Spouse's Wages (Take-home)

$

Car Payment

$

l>

Other Household Member Wages

$

Food

$

I)

A.F.D.C.

$

Utilities

$

()

Social Security

$

Transportation

$

()

S.S.I. I S.S.D.

$

Auto Insurance

$

Unemployment Insurance

$

Day Care

$

()
D

Veterans Benefits

$

Educational Loans

$

{)

Retirement/Pension

$

Credit Cards

$

6

Child Support/Alimony

$

Medical

$

Other

$

Child Support/Alimony

$

0
3

Court Fines

$

0

Other

$

0

Total Monthly Debts

$

Total Monthly Income

$

---

-

-----

--

----···

2. ~D. oD.11,t15

6

Amount of money remaining at the end of each month $_ _ _ _ _ __

If you are under legal age, who is your parent or guardian?

Who will assist you financially?

Phone

Name
State

City

Zip Code

Phone

Name
City

Zip Code

State

STATE OF IDAHO
ss.
County of Ada
I am requesting that a lawyer be appointed to represent me, and I understand that I may be required to reimburse the public defender at the end
of my ca . I swear under penalty of erjury that the answers above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge .

.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me o n ~ : \ ~ ' ( ) .

APPLICATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER - 2

000019

FILED
Monday. January 07. 2013 at 10:40 AM
CHRISTOPHER D. RI

, CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-00248

CHRISTOPHER A PENTICO, PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff(s)
vs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT
Defendant(s)

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I
have mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the: VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST

CONVICTION RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77 (d) I.R.C.P. to each of the parties
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D STRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

)

CASE NO. CV PC 1300248

)
)

vs.

~

ACHRISTOPHER A PENTICO
Defendant.

ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER

)

This matter having come before this court as to the Application for Public Defender of , and
good cause appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, That an attorney be appointed
through the;

Public Defender's Office
200 W. Front Street Rm. 1107
Boise ID 83702, (208) 287-7400

for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby
appointed to represent the above named applicant in all proceedings pursuant to I.R.C.P. 75(L)(1),
of the in the above entitled case.
The Defendant is further advised th.at he/she may be required to reimburse the Court for all
or part of the cost of court appointed counsel.

Date:

J-

JD -

/3

Clerk will provide copies to:
2C_Public Defender

k_Plaintiff

ftC-

ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER
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MAR 2 6 2013

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By CHR:ssv WARDLE

Stacy L. Langton
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Juvenile Division
6300 Denton Street
Boise, Idaho 83 704
(208) 577-4900

D21-'UTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CVPC 2013-00248

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through STACY L. LANGTON, and moves
for summary disposition of Christopher A. Pentico's (hereafter "Petitioner") petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) on the general basis that, in light of the
pleadings, answers, admissions, and the record of the underlying criminal case, the petition fails
to raise a genuine issue of material fact and should be summarily dismissed.
Petitioner's constitutional claims have previously been addressed and found to lack merit
on direct appeal. Additionally, Petitioner's constitutional claims fail to raise a genuine issue of
material fact.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 1
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Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail to raise a genuine issue of
material fact regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
The specific grounds for dismissal of each of Petitioner's allegations are as set forth in the
Brief in Support of the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal. The Brief in Support and the
State's Answer are incorporated herein.
DATEDthis

I,~ day of March 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

2~

day of March 2013, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Ada County Public Defender
200 W. Front St.
Boise ID 83702
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MAR 2 6 2013

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By CHRISSY WARDLE
Dl:PUTY

Stacy L. Langton
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Juvenile Division
6300 Denton Street
Boise, Idaho 83704
Telephone: (208) 577-4900

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO. CV-PC 2013-00248

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Stacy L. Langton, provides this brief
in support of the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal of Christopher A. Pentico's (hereafter
"Petitioner") petition for post-conviction relief.

I.
Factual And Procedural History

On April 2, 2008, Petitioner was cited for Trespass, which citation was later amended to
allege Trespass pursuant to LC. § 18-7008.
On November 12, 2008, Petitioner filed his Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint
raising constitutional issues regarding the application of LC.§ 18-7008. On January 6, 2009, the

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 1
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Trial Court held a hearing regarding the Petitioner's motion and denied the same, finding no
constitutional infirmities.
On April 21, 2009, a court trial was held where the Petitioner was found to have
committed the crime of Trespass pursuant to LC. § 18-7008 and was pronounced guilty.
Petitioner was sentenced on May 11, 2009.
Petitioner filed his appeal with the District Court on June 22, 2009. The District Court
affirmed the Trial Court's decision in a Memorandum Decision and Order filed on May 13, 2010.
Petitioner filed an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on June 24, 2010. The Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's affirmation of the Trial Court when it issued its
Remittitur on January 10, 2012.
Petitioner filed his Verified Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief on January 4, 2013.

II.
Applicable Legal Standards

The Court of Appeals of Idaho set forth the standard of review relating to post-conviction
relief proceedings as follows:

An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in
nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark
v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho

918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.App.1992). Summary dismissal of an
application pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent
of summary judgment under LR.C.P. 56. Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the
applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which
the request for post-conviction relief is based. LC.§ 19-4907; Russell v. State, 118
Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct.App.1990). An application for postconviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, for
an application must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the
claim" that would suffice for a complaint under LR.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an
application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within
the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records.or other evidence
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 2
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supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such
supporting evidence is not included with the application. LC. § 19-4903. In other
words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for
post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own
initiative. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence
has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's
favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho
759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct.App.1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145,
146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct.App.1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741
P.2d 374, 376 (Ct.App.1987). Summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the state does not
controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,
647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App.1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159,
715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct.App.1986).

Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 330-331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1154-1155 (Ct. App. 1998).

III.
Petitioner's Claim Should Be Summarily Dismissed

Petitioner raises three general reasons why he believes that his petition for relief should
be granted. Petitioner's allegations 16-21 which form his basis for his "First Cause of Action"
reference the same constitutional argument that allegations 22-25 raise in his "Second Cause of
Action." Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief at 3-6. Because the "causes of actions" are
identical in the sense that both challenge the constitutionality of the law under which Petitioner
was charged and convicted, the State will address them as one "cause of action."
Petitioner's allegations 26-29, on its face, allege that Petitioner was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his counsel "was denied the right to fully challenge the
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constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) 1. Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief at 6.
However, the State asserts that this label is disingenuous, and a closer reading of Petitioner's
"Third Cause of Action" reveal that it is simply an attempt to reassert the constitutional
challenges that Petitioner has made and remade at every stage of this proceeding.
Because all of the allegations are redundant and do not raise an issue of material fact, the
State respectfully asks this Court to summarily dismiss Petitioner's request for post-conviction
relief.
A. Petitioner Fails to State Any Ground Upon Which Relief Can be Granted

Petitioner reasserts that his conviction occurred in violation of his rights under both the
Idaho and the U.S. Constitutions. By reasserting his previous arguments and by relying solely on
a constitutional argument, Petitioner has failed to raise any facts whatsoever, much less raise
facts that would give rise to an issue of material fact. Where there are no factual allegations, the
Petitioner is unable to take advantage of the presumption that case law requires a court "to accept
the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions."
Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (Idaho 2010).

Petitioner's request for relief is rife with conclusion and contains no facts to assert that
there exists a question of material fact. Accordingly, the State respectfully asks this Court to
summarily dismiss Petitioner's request as it fails to state any ground upon which relief can be
granted.

1 Petitioner's assertion that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on the Court's ruling that
his constitutional challenge was infirm is more accurately characterized as a general constitutional
challenge to I.C. § 18-7008, which is simply a restatement of his other two "causes of action.".
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B. Petitioner's Allegations Are Bare and Conclusory and Raise No Issue of Material Fact

Petitioner's request for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory allegations
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence as required by LC. § 194906(c). As previously stated, the Court "need not accept the petitioner's conclusion." Kelly v.

State, supra. Because the Petitioner raises no new facts, but instead uses unsubstantiated
pronouncements and erroneous conclusions of law as his basis for his requested relief, the State
respectfully asks this Court to summarily dismiss Petitioner's request for relief.
C. Petitioner Had Previously and Unsuccessfully Raised These Issues Both with the Trial
Court and On Appeal

Petitioner's claims were heard and rejected on direct appeal and were deemed
unactionable under the principle of Res Judicata. Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 833, 780
P.2d 153, 155 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989). In Whitehawk and while addressing the scope of a postconviction relief action the Court of Appeals of Idaho stated, "A convicted defendant may not
simply relitigate the same factual questions in his application, in virtually the same factual
context already presented in a direct appeal." Id. See also, Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 745
P.2d 300 (Ct.App.1987); State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct.App.1985). Because
Petitioner is attempting to relitigate the constitutional issues previously decided at Trial Court
level and on direct appeal, the State respectfully asks this Court to dismiss Petitioner's request
for relief as it contrary to both established case law and not permitted by Idaho statute.
D. To the Extent that Petitioner's Constitutional Claims are Different than Those
Previously Asserted Before the Trial Court and On Appeal, Petitioner Has Defaulted His
Right to Assert Those Issues

Petitioner raises three reasons that his conviction was unconstitutional. Petitioner's "First
Cause of Action" focuses on the argument that a citizen cannot be trespassed from public
property during the civic exercise of the right the freedom of speech. Petitioner's "Second Cause
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 5
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of Action" focuses on Petitioner's perception that there was no evidence of his inappropriate use
of the public property from which he was trespassed. Petitioner's "Third Cause of Action" argues
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the Trial Court refused to allow his
attorney to illicit sufficient testimony or make an adequate evidentiary record. Each of these
allegations focuses on the same general constitutional issues that have previously been heard on
direct appeal. To the extent that these new constitutional claims differ in nuance from the claims
previously raised, the State asserts that these new constitutional arguments have not been
persevered for consideration because they have been procedurally waived as each of these issues
could have been raised on direct appeal.
LC. § 19-4901(b) states, "Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but
was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears
to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or otherwise
that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of
guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier." Because the
request for relief asserts no factual basis for relief and because the Petitioner has previously
raised and was unsuccessful with his constitutional challenges to the Trial Court's rulings, the
Petitioner's request for relief is barred by LC.§ 19-4901(b).
Because the Petitioner's constitutional claims have previously been raised on direct
appeal and even if there are subtitle nuisances distinguishing these claims from the previous
claims, the State respectfully asks this Court to summary dismiss Petitioner's request for relief
because Petitioner's claims have been waived under LC.§ 19-4901(b).
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E. Petitioner's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Is Not Cognizable Under I.C. §
18-4901(a)
Petitioner fails to state claim that is cognizable under I.C. § 19-4901(a) because his
assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is merely the reassertion of the same constitutional
challenges paired with a different name. Petitioner has consistently reasserted his perceived
constitutional defects. His insistence on asserting this challenge lead to one telling exchange
between the Trial Court and his trial counsel during the trial held on April 21, 2009.
THE COURT: ... That's a legal question and I've ruled. We're not going
to have a testimony about whether Mr. Pentico's actions were justified
under the First Amendment.
MR. DERR: I see. And, of course, the Court understands we've ordered
that before. We think that's the basic element of this case, is the --THE COURT: Well, Mr. Derr, I'm very concerned. You don't have to
agree with my ruling.
MR. DERR: I know.
THE COURT: But you have to follow it. You can appeal. But we're not
going to have testimony about the First Amendment in this trial.
Transcript at 5-6.
The record indicates that Petitioner's trial counsel reluctantly complied with the Trial
Court's ruling. Equating trial counsel's compliance with a Trial Court's order and terming it
ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim not cognizable under I.C. § 19-4901.
In the alterative, the application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), leaves
the Petitioner a legally insufficient claim. Petitioner's claim that his legal counsel was ineffective
is bare and conclusory, and contradicted by clear evidence in the court record. Accordingly, the
State respectfully asks this Court to summarily dismiss the Petitioner's requested relief as it is
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not an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but simply reasserts the previously adjudicated
issues dealt with on appeal.
IV.
Purpose of State's 30 Day Filing Requirement

While the State notes that its Answer is not in compliance with the 30 day filing
requirement as set forth in LC. § 19-4906, the State has taken steps to remedy the delay and to
timely frame the issues presented to this Court for consideration in light of Bjorklund v. State,
130 Idaho 373, 941, P.2d 345 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997). In Bjorklund, the State had filed an
untimely Answer to a petitioner request for a post-conviction relief action. Id. at 378, 941 P.2d at
350. The petitioner in that case asserted that the delay should have prevented the district court
from summarily dismissing the application. Id. The Court of Appeals of Idaho disagreed and
stated:
"The question is whether the district court was satisfied, based on the documents before it, that
there was no right to relief. . ... This determination would have to be made with no regard to the
state's counter-assertions of fact or its argument contained in its response." Id.
The Court of Appeals continued, "The Idaho Supreme Court, in Fetterly v. State, 121
Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991), stated that the purpose of the thirty-day requirement of LC.§
19-4906(a) is to 'properly frame any factual and legal issues before the district court so that it can
make an intelligent ruling.' Id at 418, 825 P.2d at 1074, citing Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho
128, 578 P.2d 244 (1978). In Fetterly, the Supreme Court declined to deem the failure to respond
in a timely fashion reversible error."
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CONCLUSION

Petitioner's claims fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice. The State respectfully asks this Court to dismiss Petitioner's
request for relief as it contrary to both established case law and not permitted by Idaho statute.
The State is therefore entitled to summary dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) and the
State respectfully asks this Court grant the state's motion for summary dismissal..

DATED this

~~

day of March 2013.
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StL.Langt

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

::?~ day of ·~ 2013, I caused a true

and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Ada County Public Defender
200 W. Front St.
Boise ID 83702
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GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

MAR 2 6 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By CHR:ssv WARDLE

Stacy L. Langton
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Juvenile Division
6300 Denton Street
Boise, Idaho 83704
(208) 577-4900
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO. CVPC 2013- 00248

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ANSWER

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Stacy L. Langton, and answers
Christopher A. Pentico's (hereafter "Petitioner") petition for post-conviction relief in the aboveentitled action as follows:

I.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S GENERAL POST-CONVICTION
ALLEGATIONS

1. The State admits that Christopher A. Pentico is the petitioner in the above-referenced
matter. As to Petitioner's current address, the State is without knowledge and therefore denies the
same.
2. The State admits this allegation.
ANSWER-1
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3. The State admits this allegation.
4. The State is without knowledge and therefore denies the same.
5. The State admits that Petitioner was sentenced as listed in his allegation. Regarding
arguments at sentence hearing, subjective perceptions of the Petitioner, and the potential for
prejudice, the State is without knowledge and therefore denies this allegation in part.
6. The State admits this allegation.
7. The State admits this allegation.
8. The State admits this allegation.
9. The State admits this allegation.
10. The State notes that the Registry of Action is silent on this claim, therefore the State
is without knowledge and denies this allegation.
11. The State admits that the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, however is without
knowledge as to its timeliness, and therefore denies this allegation in part.
12. The State admits this allegation.
13. The State acknowledges that the Petitioner was represented by the parties mentioned,
however the State is without knowledge as to fee arrangement and, therefore, denies this
allegation in part with respect to fee arraignment.
14. The State is without knowledge and therefore denies the same.
15. The State is without knowledge and therefore denies the same.

II.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
16. The State denies this allegation.
17. The State denies this allegation.

ANSWER-2
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18. The State denies this allegation.
19. The State denies this allegation.
20. The State denies this allegation.
21. The State denies this allegation.

III.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

22. The State denies this allegation.
23. The State denies this allegation.
24. The State denies this allegation.
25. The State denies this allegation

IV.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S TIDRD CAUSE OF ACTION

26. The State denies this allegation.
27. The State denies this allegation.
28. The State denies this allegation.
29. The State denies this allegation.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted. Idaho Code § 194901(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

ANSWER-3
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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's request for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory allegations
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore fails to raise a
genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner claims were heard and rejected on direct appeal and were deemed unactionable
under the principle of Res Judicata. Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 780 P .2d 153 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1989).

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent Petitioner's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, the claims are
procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b).

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner fails to state claim that is cognizable under LC. § 19-4901(a) and Petitioner's
claim is legally insufficient.
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•

•

WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows:
a)

That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be denied;

b)

That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be summarily dismissed;

c)

For such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case.

DATED this .!l!!.._ day of March 2013.

~ifcy~

L. Langton
e p ~ t t o r n e y for Ada County

VERIFICATION
The Respondent, by and through

-~----=~,(..._~~-e--~~_.....,.=.w,ly~---·'

being

first duly sworn under oath, deposes and says:
1)

I am the attorney for the Respondent in the above-entitled matter.

2)

That the facts contained in the foregoing Answer to Petitioner's Petition for Post-

Conviction Relief are true and correct to the best of my information and belief.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
)

County of AoA

I hereby certify that on this .;7&,
day of ~
2013, personally
appeared before me Jonathan E. Roundy who, being first duly sworn, declared that he is
representing the Respondent in this action, and that the statements contained in the foregoing
document are believed to be true to the best of my information and belief.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal on
the day and year first above written.
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.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .;7~

day of ';?k~

2013, I caused a true

and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to be placed in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, addressed to:
Ada County Public Defender
200 W. Front St.
Boise ID 83702
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF _THE FOU~.TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Of0THE
STAT~ OF IDAH~:·~.AND FO~ THE COUNTY OF ADA

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

APR 3 a2013

Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248

)
)
)
.)
)
)
)

CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Petitioner,

A~======-~FrLCei:~~i""JT/tri£qr-ro-A--:
CHRISTOPHER D RI

By VICKY EMER~H, Clerk
DEPUTY

NOTICE OF INTENT TO GRANT
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

The court hereby gives notice to the parties pursuant to Idaho Code sec. 19-4906(b) of
its' intent to grant the Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal for the reasons that
the Petition attempts to re-litigate issues previously heard and decided on direct appeal,
and for failing to state claims upon·':"hich relief can be granted.
•'·,
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Kevin Swain - Magistrate Judge ·.
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IN THE DISTui~T COURT OF THE FOURTu. ., UDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
NO. _ _ _""i:iii:~-,-.-+-r.-

COUNTY oF ADA

"-"'"

FIL~~-

1;4o =.

APR 3 0 2013
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
Vs. Christopher A. Pentico,

Defendant.

)
CHRtSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By VICKY EMERY
)
DEPUTY
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-00248
)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
)
)

I, Vicky Emery, the undersigned Court Clerk do hereby certify that I
have mailed, postage prepaid, by United States Mail, one copy of the notice
of intent to grant summary dismissal, to each of the parties of record in this
cause in envelopes addressed as follows:
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interoffice Mail
Ada County Public Defender's Office
Interoffice Mail

Dated this 30th day of April, 2013.
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:

____
Flleo..r
.• M

i:A}~

MAY 2 0 2013

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By SARA WRIGHT
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER PENTICO,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
.)

Criminal No. CV-PC-2013-248

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO
STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

Respondent.
_______________

Petitioner Christopher Pentico submits the following in opposition to the State's

motion for summary disposition.
A. INTRODUCTION

It is well known that an application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. While an
applicant for post-conviction relief must eventually prove the allegations upon which the
application is based, summary disposition is not appropriate unless the applicant's evidence
raises no genuine issue of material fact. This Court should determine whether a genuine issue of
fact exists based upon the record of the criminal case along with the pleadings, and together with
any affidavits on file. In doing so, it must liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences
in favor of the non-moving party. Only if the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the
applicant to relief may the trial court dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary

PETITIONERS RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
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hearing. Kelly v. State,_ Idaho_,_ p.3d _ , 2010 WL 2901795 *2 (2010). Here, as
will be demonstrated below, Mr. Pentico has presented evidence which if true would entitle him
to relief. Therefore, the State's motion must be denied and the matter should be set for an
evidentiary hearing.
B. ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION
There was a court trial in this case which ended in a conviction. Mr. Pentico filed an
appeal. He then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Pending before this Court is
the State's motion for summary dismissal. This brief is in opposition to the State's motion
1. Petitioner's asserts three causes of action for which relief can be granted.
(a) Substantive Due Process.
Mr. Pentico asserted on direct appeal that the initial ask to leave on March 25, 2008 was a
violation of his substantive due process rights. The initial "ask to leave" was never addressed
and the Courts concluded that the issue was not preserved for appeal. In essence the record was
inadequate because no facts were put forward which would tend to corroborate or substantiate
that on March 25, 2008 Mr. Pentico was engaging in constitutionally protected conduct when he
was asked to leave the Capital Annex for apparently no reason at all.
Idaho Code § 19-4901 (1) affords a convicted person the right to seek to set aside a
conviction which was entered in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the State of
Idaho. LC. 18-7008(8) cannot be constitutionally applied to criminalize his actions and the facts
are now before this Court to establish that his conduct was protected on March 25, 2008. See
Affidavit of Christopher Pentico Attached hereto as Exhibit A.
(b) Procedural Due Process
Mr. Pentico asserted on direct appeal that the initial ask to leave on March 25, 2008 was a

PETITIONERS RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
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violation of his procedural due process rights. Because Mr. Pentico was engaged in appropriate
behavior on March 25, 2008 the one year absolute ban on his return is facially overbroad because
his is being banned from public property for a full year without recourse and without a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. Because Mr. Pentico's conviction is based on a statute
which deprives him of significant liberty interests and which affords him no meaningful or
adequate due process the conviction is unconstitutional and should be set aside.
Idaho Code § 19-4901(1) affords a convicted person the right to seek to set aside a
conviction which was entered in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the State of
Idaho.

LC. 18-7008(8) cannot be constitutionally applied to criminalize his actions.

Furthermore, this issue was raised on direct appeal but the Court of Appeals never addressed the
issue of procedural due process.

Whether it was an oversight or unintentional is unclear,

however, Mr. Pentico is entitled to have the .issue addressed. See Affidavit of Heidi Tolman
attached hereto as Exhibit B; and The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Pentico Docket
No. 37834.
(c) Ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Sixth Amendment has been

incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13; LC. § 19-852.
Trial Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to create a sufficient factual record
and he failed to raise critical constitutional challenges and defenses which were then not
addressed by The Court of Appeals because they were not preserved for appeal.
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'
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Pentico must show that the
attorney's performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). To establish deficiency, the applicant has the burden

of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988) The Idaho courts have long

adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second
guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho
231,233, 880 P.2d 261,263 (Ct. App. 1994).
Trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately traise constitutional
challenges to the statute as it applied to him on March 25, 2008. The Court in its opinion held
that the record was inadequate to allow review for claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The record has now been made clear and Mr. Pentico is entitled to a hearing regarding his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Please see Affidavit of Alan Derr attached hereto as Exhibit
C and Affidavit of Bruce Bistline attached hereto as Exhibit D. The facts contained within the
affidavits, if looked at in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, raise genuine issues
of material fact that should at the least be addressed at an evidentiary hearing.
2.

Petitioner's allegations are not bare and conclusory.

As stated above the petitioner has supplemented the record with the affidavits of trial
counsel Alan Derr and appellate counsel Bruce Bistline. While it is true that this Court does not
need to accept the petitioner's conclusions this Court must address the facts that have now been
introduced which when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party raise a
genuine is~ue of material fact that must be addressed at an evidentiary hearing.
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Page 4

000044

3.

Petitioner Has Previously Raised The Constitutional Issues With The Court On
Appeal However His Claims With Regard To Substantive And Procedural Due
Process Were Not Addressed In The Court's Opinion.

The state asserts that the petitioner is attempting to re-litigate the constitutional issues
previously decided at the trial court level and on direct appeal and that this Court should
summarily dismiss the petitioner's request for relief as it is contrary to both established case law
and not permitted by Idaho statute. However it is Mr. Pentico's position that with respect to the
first and second cause of action he is not attempting to re-litigate the issues, he is attempting to
have the issues decided. On appeal Mr. Pentico raised procedural and substantive due process
issues specifically with respect to March 25, 2008. Those issues were not decided by the trial
court, nor were they addressed by the court on appeal. Mr. Pentico is entitled to have those
claims addressed. (see Affidavit of Heidi Tolman, Exhibit A). Mr. Pentico never waived these
issues as the State claims because they were raised on appeal, they just were never addressed by
the court in its decision. (see Affidavit of Heidi Tolman, Exhibit A; and The opinion of the Court
of Appeals in State v. Pentico Docket No. 37834).
4.
Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel at trial in violation
of the Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v.
Washington.
The petitioner has supported this section with affidavits demonstrating the evidence
which was available at the time of trial, its significance and the failure of the courts to address
them on direct appeal because the issues were not preserved for appeal by trial counsel. The
Court of Appeals in its decision held that the record on appeal was not adequate to allow it to
review Pentico's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and it declined to do so.

The

affidavits provided to this Court with regard to March 25, 2008 and the Motion in Limine state
that it was not a tactical or strategic decision of trail counsel not to raise those issues. Further the
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affidavit of Bruce Bistline asserts that there would or could be no strategic reason as to omit of
recognize the importance of the March 25, 2008 date. Please see Exhibit C, and Exhibit D.
C. CONCLUSION

If the allegations are true, The facts at issues are material. Mr. Pentico was convicted of a
trespass in violation of Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) which is a violation of his substantive due
process rights because this statute cannot be applied to criminalize actions which are
constitutionally protected First Amendment rights. Further the idea that an individual can be
banned from public property for one year without regard to any meaningful or adequate due
process procedures is unconstitutional and a violation of Mr. Pentico's procedural due process
rights. Finally, Mr. Pentico was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by
the United States Constitution. The facts at issue are material, and if the allegations are true, this
court should deny the State's Motion for Summary Disposition and set this matter for an
evidentiary hearing.

Respectfully submitted this

J-D

day of May 2013.

Heidi Tolman
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to the:
ADA COUNTY PRSECUTING ATTORNEY
Stacy Langton
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Petitioner
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
PETITIONER,
vs.

Case No. CV PC 1300248
AFFIDAVIT OF
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO

STATE OF IDAHO,
RESPONDENT.

STATEOFIDAHO )
: ss.
)
County of Ada

CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of 18 and I make this affidavit based upon my own personal
knowledge.

2.

On March 25, 2008, I wanted to speak Representative Lenore Barrett with whom I had
recently spoken about my concerns about actions at Boise State University which was
discriminating among students and programs based upon religion. I wanted to talk to her
about my desire to obtain an opinion from the Idaho Attorney General's Office regarding
this issue. At the time, the Legislature was in session so I went to the interim Statehouse

Affidavit of Christopher A. Pentico
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(then known as the "Capital Annex"), which was at that time the former Ada County
Courthouse which occupies the entire block bounded by Sixth Street, Jefferson Street,
Fifth Street and State Street.
3.

I arrived at Representative Barrett's office shortly before noon. She was not there but I
spoke to her secretary who advised me that Representative Barrett would be back shortly
after the lunch hour. I discussed coming back at that time and left the Capital Annex
without, to the best of my recollection, any conversation with any other person.

4.

I went to get some lunch and returned about an hour later to make sure I was at
Representative Barrett's office in time to catch her before the afternoon schedule which
usually begins at about 1:30.

5

As I crossed the street and got to the sidewalk and reached the block on which the Capital
Annex is located, I was approached by a State Police Trooper who spoke to me and asked
me to wait for a moment to meet with another Trooper. After a few moments Trooper
Partis arrived and told me that I needed to leave the grounds of the Capital Annex and
that I was no longer approved to be at the Capital Annex, the Governor's Office, and the
Offices of the Department of Education. He also told me that I was not to contact any
legislators or even attempt to communicate with them by e-mail.

6.

I felt very uncomfortable with Trooper Partis standing there, but I did attempt to get an
understanding of why I was being ordered to leave and who ordered it. I was
stonewalled and not able to get any further information other than that my behavior was
making people nervous and uncomfortable. I peaceably left the Capital Annex grounds
for fear of being arrested at that time.

7.

On March 25, 2008, the only government office that I visited was the Capital Annex.

Affidavit of Christopher A. Pentico
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8.

13:16 myfax

(FAX)208+555+1212

P.002/002

During the time that Mr. Derr represented me, I believe that at one time or another I told
Mr. Derr everything that is set out above but I do not recall ever having a single

conversation in which we focused upon this information and discussed it in a complete
manner. Mr. Derr did assert that the events of March 25, 2008, were not a crime because
I never refused to leave the property, but other than that his arguments were focused on
the fact that the events of April 2, 2008, were not a trespass under either of the first two
complaints and not lawfully a trespass under the third complaint because I was engaged
in constitutionally protected activity. Mr. Derr and I briefly discussed the possibility that

my conduct on April 2, 2008, could not itself be a trespass if I had been

unconstitutionally ordered off of State property on March 2511, but that argument was
abandoned. Mr. Derr and I never discussed why he was abandoning that argument.
FURTHER Your Affiant Sayeth Not.
DATED this 20th day of May, 2013.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for the State of
Idaho, this

irf"day of May, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I placed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to the:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Stacy Langton
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u
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER PENTICO,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Criminal No. CV-PC-2013-248

AFFIDAVIT OF HEIDI TOLMAN

Heidi Tolman, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says:

1) I am an attorney who has been duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho since 2010.
2) I represented the Petitioner herein, Christopher Pentico in both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals appeal proceedings in State v. Pentico, CR-MD-2008-5321.
3) That I have read the post-conviction petition filed in this case.
4) I am attaching hereto portions of the appellant's brief to the Court of Appeals as Exhibit A in
which Constitutional arguments relating to substantive and procedural due process were
raised on direct appeal, however were never addressed by the Court in its opinion,
specifically as follows:
i) That the request that Mr. Pentico leave the Captial Annex grounds was itself
unconstitutional because he was there to exercise important and protected 1st
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Amendment Rights.

ii) That the portion of the statute which purports to criminalize the return to the property
for one year (and in this case the "conduct" upon which Mr. Pentico was convicted) is
unconstitutional as it pertains to entries onto State land which constitutes a
Traditional Public Forum or a Designated Public Forum both because it is an
impermissible prior restraint of protected I st Amendment activities and because it is a
prohibition which affords no procedural due process mechanism by which the citizen
can contest the initial "request to leave" or the duration of bar against returning.
This ends my affidavit.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

) ss.
COUNTY OF ADA

)

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me,

for

the

State

of

Idaho,

a Notary Public, in and

County of Ada,

on

this

6th day of

Notary Public.f

Residing at:_-{,1->,_._.;;_;'-r---:~e,-:;--.::.....:"""""-~
My commission expires:___,-=--~~~;....;;_~
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I placed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to the:
ADA COUNTY PRSECUTING ATTORNEY
Stacy Langton
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IV.
A.

ARGUivIBNT

Pentico cannot be convicted under Idaho Code 18-7008 because, based
upon the evidence allowed by the Trial Court, the State failed to prove all
elements of the crime and because the Court erred in preventing him from
providing evidence of an affirmative defense.

The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in four distinct instances when it found.
Pentico guilty of misdemeanor criminal trespass. The statute at issue states:
J.C. § 18-7008. Trespass-Acts constitution.-A. Every person who will:fully commits
any trespass, by either:
(8) except under landlord-tenant relationship, who first being duly notified in
writing, or verbally by the owner or authorized agent of the owner of real
property, to immediately depart from the same and who refuses to so depart, or
who, without permission or invitation, returns and enters said property within a
year, after being so notified.
1.

The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw when it concluded that Pentico
had been properly asked to leave State property without any regard for the
conduct which triggered that request.

I.C. § 18-7008(8) describes a crime which can occur in two ways. The first part of the
statute criminalizes a failure to leave property after a qualifying request (herein "asked to
leave") .. To qualify as an "ask to leave" the request must be made orally or in writing by the
owner or his agent. The second part (herein the "no return within one year" part) criminalizes
returning to same property within a year after there has been a qualified "ask to leave."
A crime can, as to private property, constitutionally arise under the "ask to leave" part
of the statute without regard to the behavior of the trespasser. State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27,
03 P.2d 528 (1990). "All that is required for an LC.§ 18-7008(8) violation is that the defendant
refuse to leave property that belongs to another after being so requested by the owner or
authorized agent." Id. However, it is apparent that the unconstrained right to direct a person to
Appellant's Brief

8

EXHIBI.T

A

000055

leave private property does not extend to public property. In State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69
P.3d 126 (2003), the defendant. who was behaving inappropriately was asked to leave public
property and was arrested when he refused to do so. Korsen stands for the proposition that an
inappropriately behaved citizen who has no legitimate business at a public office can be asked to
leave by the chief administrator of that office and arrested for refusing to do so. Thus, it would
appear clear that while a person can be asked to leave private property for any reason or no
reason at all that the same.cannot be said about public property.
The "no return within one year" portion of the trespass statute is the basis upon which
conviction was entered in this case. There are no cases on point regarding the second part of the
statute yet from the structure of the statute it is ciear that there can be no "no return within one
·, ;

year'' violation if there is no qualifying "ask to leave."

It is upon the occurrence of the

necessary "ask to leave", that the "no return within one year" provision is triggered. Thus, it
.

~-

.

would appear that in the context of public property, before a returning within one year violation
could be found, it would be necessary for the trier of fact to detemiine that there was a qualifying
"ask to leave" and that means, in the case of public property, a valid reason for the "ask to

In this matter, the Trial Court concluded so long as Pentico was asked to leave by an
authorized person a qualifying "ask to leave had occurred". This ruling precluded evidence
regarding Pentico's conduct and prevented the Court from having a foundation for :finding that
,.

i.!

there was anything about Pentico's conduct which would legally trigger a valid "ask to leave."
While Pentico objecte~ ~o this ruling the State did not. The State appeared quite content to
proceed to trial without being given the opportunity to demonstrate that·O:fficer Pattis had any
reasonable basis for asking Pentico to leave State land which citizens must have access to in

,.,

,,
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B.

Idaho Code§ 18-7008(8) violates the Idaho Constitution Art. 1 Sec 13 and the 5th
Amendment of the United States Constitution as applied to the State of Idaho
through the 14th Amendment and therefore cannot be constitutionally applied to
Pentico.

Where the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is challenged, the lower Court's
determination is reviewed de novo. State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 818, 10 P.3d 1285,
1287 (2000). The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of
establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption of
~-.

validity. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). Appellate Courts are
obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. Id. However, if a

I!'

statute "as applied" to a particular defendant infringes upon his or her First Amendment right of
freedom of speech, the defendant's convictiop. must be reversed without showing that such
infringement was substantial. State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 893, 88 P.3d 704, 712 (2004).
The trespass statute as applied under the circumstances of this case is unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague and therefore violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The statute in question LC. §18-7008(8) did not adequately notify Pentico about what conduct
gives a governmental agent legal cause to demand that Pentico leave a particular piece of public
property which is a·public forum at the risk of criminal prosecution. The statute does not provide
any procedural due process but if taken upon its face results in an automatic one year exclusion.
For this period the statute would, if taken on its face, create an impermissible prior restraint upon
subsequent attempts to enter a public forum to exercise constitutionally protected rights ..
Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) as it has been applied to Pentico is unconstitutional both
because it works to deny him substantive due process and procedural due process. Early in the
proceedings in this matter the Trial Court ruled that the Statute was constitutional as applied to
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Pentico and refused to allow either party to put on any eviclence regarding his conduct on or
before March 25, 2008 (date he was asked to leave). The District Court concluded that Pentico
had failed to preserve any constitutional challenge other than claim that he was engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct on April 2, 2008.

1.

Pentico should not be precluded from raising all relevant constitutional
challenges to the application ofl.C. § 18-7008 to his presence upon State
land which was a public forum.

a)

Pentico did what he could to raise his constitutional challenges to
the Statute but was precluded from adequately doing so by the
erroneous rulings of the Trial Court.

Pentico raised the constitutionality of that statute before the Trial Court. It is true that
, -·:

trial Counsel did not state the various constitutional challenges with the pr.ecision with which
they have been raised on appeal but he did raise the issue.. He cited from his brief a discussion
founded upon a quotation from State v. Korsen in-which the Supreme Court acknowledges that if
Idaho Code_§ 18-7008(8) was applied against a person on public property in order to exercise his
free speech rights then the statute could be challenged on an "as applied" basis.43 Trial Counsel
also called the Trial Court's attention to fact that the properties at issue in this case were all
public forums and that restrictions on the use of those properties requir~d strict scrutiny._44
At that point in the proceedings, the Trial Court found that the statue was constitutional
as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction (a odd finding conside~g he had and would

.-.
.·.··:
~

allow no evidence regarding the conduct that caused Pentico to be asked to leave) and he
thereafter consistently refused to allow any party to put on any _evidence regarding the events that_
lead up to the "ask to leave." Consistent with this ruling the Trial Court maintained that the only
43

44

TR Mtn 10:5-16
TR Mtn 16:3-26
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issues to be tried regarding the "ask to leave" were whether it happened and whether the person
who made the request had authority to do so.
From that point on, Pentico,.s Trial Counsel was, absent choosing to violate the Court's
order, confined to challenging application of the "no return within one year" prohibition to
Pentico's conduct. Trial Counsel did try one additional time to alert the Trial Court to the
constitutional problems inherent in the prosecution when he argued during closing argument at
trial that this case could not be treated as an ordinary simple trespass, that the initial trespass (ask
to leave) was not valid and that he had been precluded by the Court's orders from even going
into the "as applied" challenge to the statute. 45
On ~s record it is not appropriate to conclude that Pentico failed to make an attempt to
advise the Court that the prosecution was· unconstitutional as applied to Pentico because there
was no constitutionally valid "ask to leave." On this record it ·is appropriate to conclude that
Pentico has preserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute as it was being
applied on all due process grounds because (a) he had been asked to leave a· traditional public
forum where he had been exercising his First Amendment rights for no apparently adequate
.-.·.·.·

·-·.

f:'"'

')

reason and, (b) because without due process he was being precluded for a period of one year
I

from entering other traditional public forums to reasonably exercise his First Amendment rights.

b)

Even if the Court determines that Pentico has not preserved for
appeal all ofhis due process claims the Court can still address
those claims.

The Idaho Appellate Courts have generally held that the constitutionality of a statute will
not be considered for the first time o~ appeal. See State v. Fox, 130 Idaho ·385, 387, 941 P.2d
357, 359 (Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to consider whether an arson statute was unconstitutionally
I

45

TR Trial 60:19 to 62:21
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vague or overbroad where the defendant had failed to raise the issue before the Trial Court).
Tb.ere are, however, two exceptions to this rule:
First, an Appellate Court may address the constitutionality of a statute where the issue
has not been preserved if persuaded that it would be :fundamental error for the Court to allow a
defendant to waive the right at issue. State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 503, 36 P.3d 1287, 1291
(Ct.App.2001) (in the circumstances of that case the waiver of vagueness and overbreadth
challenges were not considered to be :fundamental error). "Error that is fundamental must be such
error as goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the
case or take from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no Court
could or ought to permit him to waive." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 716, 215 P.3d 414,

!~

436 (2009). In this case, the right implicated-the right to petition government for redress of

.:·:,
:;·.:

~

grievances-is a liberty safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and is intimately co~ected both in
origin and in purpose with other First Amendment rights of free speech and press. United Mine

Workers of America, Dist 12 v. lllinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). Moreover,
the impairment of that right which arises from Officer Partis' mandate that, for no apparent
permissible reason, Pentico should leave State land, which is a traditional public forum, goes to
,···,

the very foundation of the criminal charge in this case. On this basis, it is appropriate to review
on appeal under the fundamental error doctrine the merits of Pentico' s constitutional challenges
even if they were not raised at the Trial Court level.
The second justification for considering constitutional arguments for the first time on
appeal is in the event of ineffective assistance of c<;>unsel. State v. Y_akovac, 145 Idaho 437, 442443 (Idaho 2008). The constitutional arguments are, in the circumstances of this case, such an
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important aspect of the defense to this charge that it cannot be said there would be a valid
strategic reason for trial counsel to waive those arguments, (if he in fact did).
2.

Enforcement of LC. §18-7008(8) violates Pentico's Substantive Due
Process rights because it is, as applied to him under the circumstances of
this case unconstitutionally overbroad.

Any application of the Bill of Rights to limit State action falls within the rubric of
substantive due process. Most rights included in the Bill of Rights are incorporated against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The United States

Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to petition goverilment· for a redress of

I

grievance is a liberty safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and is intimately connected both in origin

i.

and in purpose with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and press. United Mine

I
I.

Workers ofAmerica, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,222 (1967).
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people to peaceably assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. Amend. I. Although this right is not

,~-

absolute and does not guarantee unlimited access to government property for expressive
purposes; restrictions must not be content based and the property designation must be taken into
consideration in determining whether any restriction is permissible.

a)
I.

'I'

The Trial Court erred as a matter of law when it failed to consider
Pentico's "as applied" overbreadth challenge

I

The concept of overbreadth of criminal laws rests on principles of substantive due
process which limits the obstruction of certain individual freedoms.

The principal issue is,. .

whether the language of the statute, given its normal meaning, is so broad that its sanctions may
apply to conduct protected by the Constitution. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct.

r
i
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665, 92 L.Ed. 840. The overbreadth doctrine is a means of challenging the constitutionality of a
statute on its face or as· applied to particular conduct. If the statute is being challenged "as
applied" then the application of the statut~ is unconstitutional if it infringes upon constitutionally
..'

protected conduct and does not serve to protect a significant state interest. State v. Poe, 139
Idaho 885, 893, 88 P.3d 704, 712 (2004).
LC. § 18-7008 has been held not to be overbroad on its face. State v. Korsen, 138
Idaho at 713. Examination of Korsen reveals the findings in that case were very fact specific and
that the District Court that initially reviewed the conviction in Korsen was prescient. The
District Court found the statute facially overbroad b_ecause the ~atute could be applied to people
entering the Capitol to meet with legislators. The District Court asserted that because the threat
of prosecution under the trespass statute "potentially chills such clearly protected activity, the
court finds that the statute is unconstitutional in a substantial portion of the cases to which it
applies." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 715. The. Idaho Supreme Court dismissed this concern and held
that the statute will not be invalidated for overbreadth merely because it is possible to come up
with a hypothetical situation in which the statute is unconstitutional as applied. Id., citing

-: : :

·-·~

... ·.

Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2126.

In this regard the U.S.

Supreme Court states that ''there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly
compromise recognized first Amendment protections of parties not before

the court." Id.

However, the Idaho Supreme Court did acknowledge that if a criminal trespass
prosecution was initiated pursuant to LC. § 18-7008(8) against a person on public property who
is exercising his or her free speech rights, the statute could be attacked as applied to that
constitutionally protected conduct.

Korsen, 138 Idaho at 716.

The scenario which was

considered too hypothetical to sustain an "in toto" oyerbreadth challenge in Korsen is now
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Korsen rather than supporting

before the Court in an "as applied" overbreadth challenge.

·-----· -··------ ·Pentie0!s-pr0seeuti0n-aetual-l-y-undermin.es-it.--· -·- -·--·-- -- .. -- -·-·-··· ···----·- ______ . ·--·--------........__ ··- . _________ .. ___________
Unlike Korsen, Pentico was cited based upon returning to State land after being asked
.

.

to leave State land on which he had been engaging in protected First Amendment activity. In the
absence of any evidence that he was, in the first instance, engaged in anything other than pure
and protected First Amendment conduct the Trial Court could not _foreclose the possibility that
the "ask to leave" pursuant to the statute was an unreasonable and therefore an unconstitutional
restriction upon Pentico's ri$hts with. the effect that the statute was overly-broad as being applied
to Pentico. Faced with the lack of any evidence to support a one year ban from State property
upon which Pentico might legitimately engage in First Amendment protected activity, the Trial
Court could not foreclose the possibility that the absolute one year ban pursuant to the statute
wa~ an impermissible prior restraint and therefore an unconstitutional restriction upon Pentico's
rights with the effect that the statute was overly-broad as being applied to Pentico.

In this case, Pentico's actions at the Capitol Annex, and in visiting the Governor's
office cannot, based upon the record, be said to be anything other than pure First Amendment

':;:l

speech. There is no need for a restriction upon these actions to be substantial in order for that

·/

restriction to be unconstitutional. State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 893 (2004). Clearly, the Trial

.

.

Court did not have an adequate record upon which to justify that the statute was constitutional as
it was being applied to Pentico.
-·
·.-:

b)

Appellant's Brief
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'-

-

When the appropriate legal analysis is utilized, it is appropriate to conclude that I.C.
·-·-·· ··· ··-··-····-S-ec-18·=-7008{8-)-eannot--be-eonstitutionally-applied--either-as-a--justi:fication-for-asking-Eentico-to. -··-· _ _
leave the Capitol Annex on March 25, 2008 nor for charging him with a crime for visiting the
Governor's office on April 1, 2008.

1.

Analysis of the permissibility of a governmental restriction
requires first a determination of what the restriction is.

The first step in determining whether a restriction is permissible is to know what the
restriction is. In this case there are two restrictions placed upon Pentico's First Amendment
Rights. First, as I. C. § 18-7008(8) was applied by the Trial Court, he was subjected to being
asked to leave public property
for any reason or no reason at all. The record with
respect to this
.
)
restriction is compromised by the Trial Court's decision to exclude testimony regarding
Pentico's conduct prior to being asked to leave and, as a consequence, the most that can be
discerned from the record is that some legislators were nervous about him. While this fact
appears to have nothing to do with the _Trial Court's application of that statute, it provides the
only evidence related to Officer Pattis' request that Pentico leave and not return.
. ••:•

Second, as I.C. § 18-7008(8) was applied by the Trial Court, Pentico was subjected
to a one year period during which he could not return to certain parcels of State land to exercise
his First Amendment rights for the sole reason that he had been, for no apparent valid reason,

·;

.:-•

asked to leave and not come back.

c)
..

.•
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Whether restrictions placed on access to public property imper:missibly infringe on free

-- ··--·-·-·-·· --··- speech-rights-depends-largely-on-the-nature-of the-preperty-at-issue;--:Pe-ny-Edue;--A-ss..!.n-v.-P-er-1:)J----·--

Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
The Supreme Court established in Perry a forum-based approach to classify public
property into three distinct categories: traditional, designated, and non-public forums. Id. at 4546.

"Traditional public forum" include places such as "streets and parks which have

immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, 8.I!d time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public·
questi9ns." Id. "Designated public forums" the government has opened with the intent that they
be used by the public as a place to engage in expressive activity. Id. at 45. Examples include
··;

university meeting facilities, municipal theatres, and school board meeting rooms. When the

. i

category is either "traditional" or "designated" individual exercise of First .Amendment rights can
be restricted only when it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the restriction is
narrowly tailored to achieve that end. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726, (1990).
Courts have long recognized that the capitol grounds as a whole meet the definition of
a traditional public forum: they are open to the public, and intended to be used in a way that is
•.

consistent with public expression. Lederma1J. v. United States ofAmerica, 291 F.3d 36, 41, (D.C.
Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the ~upreme Court has recognized that ''the primary purpose for which
the Capitol was designed is legislating" and that ''the fundamental function of a legislature in a
democratic society assumes accessibility to public opinion." Jeanette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of

Capitol Police, 409 U.S. 972, (1972). Thus the Capitol Annex, its interior offices and its ·
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grounds are presumptively a place where individuals are allowed and even encouraged to assert

-- ··---··---their-First-.Amenclment-righ~--The principles which cause spaces within the Capitol Annex to be traditional forum
apply equally to the Governor's office, The Governor is the chief executive officer of the State,
an elected public official. Historically in Idaho, the Governor's office is simply an extension of
the Capitol. The Governor is active in the legislative process consequently whatever rules apply
to the legislators and the capitol building should also apply to the Governor and his reception
area. Therefore, with respect to the Capitol Annex and the Governor's reception area ''the
government's ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited: It may enforce
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a
t·:'

significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication."

Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
To whittle away at a citizen's right to grieve government actions by restricting their
access to buildings and in effect their elected representatives without good reason to do so
needlessly chills free expression. Pentico was ordered off of a traditional public forum (the
.-:-:-:

Capitol Annex grounds) and the State would have him be consequently banned from all spaces
including (traditional public forums) in the Capitol Annex, the third and fourth floor of the Borah
Building (including the Governor's reception area), and the State Board of Education offices and
for a period of one year. All of these locations are traditionally open to the public; they are
encouraged to visit their elected representatives and to request action when they believe they ·
have a grievance.

46 There is no doubt that there are private spaces within the Capitol Annex, however, there is no evidence that
Pentico' s conduct violated any restrictions separating public forum from private space.
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Even if this Court finds that the Capitol Annex, the third and fourth floor of the Borah
...... __"__,o. .,r'-----""-a_ _ _ __
Burlcting-and-the-S-tate-b0arcl.-ef--edueati0n-0ffiG~are-no.t-a-:..'trad.itionaLpublic.....furum
"designated public forum" but "a non-public forum" the restrictions upon an individual's rights
can still be unreasonable. A "non-public forum" is public property not open by tradition or
designation to the public for expressive activities; it consequently is governed by different
standards for evaluating restrictions on expression. Perry, 460 U.S. 37 at 45. Jails, and military
bases are examples of non-public forums.

Both content neutral time, place, and manner

restrictions and "reasonable" content-based restrictions are permissible in non-public forums, so
long as the restrictions are "not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker's view." Id.
Reasonableness "must be assessed in light of the purpose of the forum and all the
surrounding circumstances." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 809
(1985). Furthermore the "existence of reasonable grounds for limiting access to a non-public
forum ... will not save a regulation that is in reality a fa.yade for view-point-based
discrimination." Id.

d)

Restrictions which are content-based are presumptively invalid
and will be upheld only ifnecessary to serve a compelling
governmental interest and.are narrowly tailored to achieve that
end

Content-based restrictions arise from governmental regulation of expression based on
what is being said.

If a government regulation is determined to be content-based, it is

presumptively invalid. When defending the use of a content-based restriction&, the gove~e1:1-~ .
.

.

must demonstrate that the communication falls into one of the categories of low-value speech or
must justify the regulation by showing that it is necessary to a compelling government interest.
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There are two ways in which a law can be determined to be content-based: "If on its face a
-----og,overnmenta:l-aeti-on-is-tru=geted-at-ieleas-0F-inform-atien-tb.at-gG-¥emm.etlt-seek.s..to..suppress,-ot-if....___ _ __
governmental action, neutral on its face, was motivated by an intent to single out constitutionally
protected speech for control or penalty." American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988).

If it is determined that government action is content based, then that action will be
held unconstitutional. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, (9th Cir. 1995). The Court in Bradley
dealt with the claim that punishing a prisoner for the contents of a grievance against prison
officials burdens the prisoner's ability to file grievances and impacted the prisoners
constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth and First Amendments because doing so
forced the prisoner to risk punishment in order to exercise his right to complain. Id The
evidence demonstrated that the prisoner had submitted a written grievance regarding a guard's
conduct (prisoner claimed the guard failed to retrieve him from his room for his law library callout

as the guard had promised).

Id. at 1278. The guar~ upon receipt of the complaint, filed a

disciplinary report against the prisoner for his use of disrespectful language in the complaint,
which was prohibited under Oregon Administration Rules. Id. The director of the prison argued
that the regulations did not hinder a prisoner from filing a grievance, only punished the prisoner
for the language used in t;he grievance. Id. at 1279. The Court held that whether the content of
_the grievance or the act of filing the grievance is deemed to be the actus reus of the offense, the
prisoner risks punishment for exercising the right to complain. Id.
:. :

./

e)

Appellant's Brief
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Even if it could be said that Pentico violated a knowable restriction leading to his being
-

----ordered-off-o-f-publie-land-where-he-was-e*e1:ei-sing-hl-s-F-irst-Arnen.dmet1.t-rightS-and-bannecLfor-..,___ _ __
year from returning without regard to the content of any future expression he may wish to engage
I

in upon· that land, those restrictions must still be a reasonable restriction on time, place and
manner. In this case, as applied to Pentico's conduct, the restrictions imposed upon him by I.C.

§ 18-7008(8) as applied by the Trial Court cannot, based on the record, be found to be reasonable
restrictions of time, place and manner.
·I

The application of this principal is illustrated in Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F. 3d 116,

·I

..

152 (2nd Cir. 2004). In that case a citation for trespass was issued to an individual wh:o went to
••

•

I
I

a courthouse to watch the day's proceedings. Huminski, 386 F.3d at 125. He also parked his

:•

vehicle in the parking lot with signs directly criticizing a judge of that courthouse. Id. Many

I

individuals at the courthouse were concerned about his presence, although he did not exhibit any
.

•

.... !

belligerent behavior or make any implicit or overt threats. Even so, he was provided written
notice of a trespass with the intent that he would thereafter be banned from every courthouse in

.

::}

)

Vermont. Id. at 129. The Huminski Court held that even if the trespass order was justified on
..
·::.:~.

that specific day in question, the order which banned him from all courthouses in the State of
Vermont, consisted of no tailoring and was invalid. Id. at 150. Furthermore, the Court stated·
that whatever threats ~ey may have reasonably feared from Huminski were wildly
disproportionate to the actual perceived threat. Id. The trespass notice was overbroad in light of
its duration, geographic scope, and scope of proceedings covered. Id. The Court held that the
exclusion was not ''tailored" and was therefore unconstitutional. Id.
Pentico's prosecution is similar but more troubling to that in Huminski. On March 25,
2008, Pentico was at the Capitol grounds to speak with a legislator who had already agreed to see
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him.

Pentico did not display any signs criticizing any legislator, there is no evidence he

---,exhibited-an:y-belligerent_:_behavi0r-0r-mad€-anY-ilnp1i~it-or-0-v"ert-tln:eats~\V-hen-he.....wa,s_ _ _ __
approached by Trooper Pattis who informed him that he was not welcome on the third or fourth
floor of the Borah Building, the Capitol Annex, or the Dep~ent of Education, Pentico was
courteous. The trooper reported that he was making "legislators nervous."
By giving this notice with no substantive foundation, Officer Pattis effectively created
for Pentico a no rights zone. Pentico was singled out without any basis for concluding that his
conduct reasonably distinguished him from others engaging in the same activity - meeting with
legislators to press their agendas. On their face, these circumstances suggest that the trespass
notice is unreasonable. If an individual"is being disruptive and interfering with the daily course
of business it may be that the government has a justification to ask that individual to leave. But
even such circumstances do not warrant a one year prior restraint upon the right to petition the
government for redress of grievance.
Unless a person imposes a real threat for violence or disruption or violates known and
reasonable regulations, it is not reasonable to order them to leave. Until it is clear that they
-;.,

cannot conform to a reasonable and articulated standards and regulations their access to their
elected representatives should not be limited into the future. An "ask to leave" for no reason
other than un-differentiated "nervousness," even in non-public forums, cannot be said to be
reasonable and it would necessarily and impermissibly impose a chilling effect on any person
who might wish to approach the Legislature or the Governor to exercise their- own First
Amendment rights. A subsequent absolute ban for one year after an "ask to leave" premised
upon undifferentiated nervousness of some people, cannot be seen as anything _other than

8:Il

unfounded and impermissible prior restraint on protected First Amendment rights. Indeed, it is
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questionable if even following a justifiable "ask to leave" an exclusion for one year thereafter
--------ean-be--a-tole:ra0le-pri0r-restr:aint.;-EeGause-th~r-estrictions-imposed-upon-P.entico-by-I.C_§_l8=------· - - 7008(8), as applied by the Trial Court, are not reasonable time, place and manner restrictions, the
statute as applied should be held unconstitutional.
Beyond the fact that these· restrictions were not reasonable, they were presumptively
content-based. Officer Pattis told Pentico that legislators were uncomfortable with his presence
and to go away and not come back. There is no evidence that these feelings had anyt:hiD;g to do
with Pentico's conduct as opposed to the content of his message. Ordering Pentico off the
property for breach of unspecified restrictions and for an unspecified period cannot be called a
1

Ii
1

conduct which is "neutral on its face." Even if the restriction was neutral on its face, it is
motivated by the intent to single out protected speech. Thus the restriction, whatever it is, can be
upheld only if it does not target content. Absent evidence that Pentico ever acted in a way that
interfered with the daily course of business, of which could be reasonably seen as inappropriate,
the Court can only conclude that the Legislators were uncomfortable with the content of his
I

•

speech. Thus, on this record it is impossible to conclude that Pentico, who was at ~e Capitol
Annex to exercise protected rights, was being banned for any reason other than the content of his
message. On this basis, contrary to the Trial Court's conclusion that the statute represented a
reasonable time, place and manner restriction, the statute must be held unconstitutional contentbased restriction as applied to Pentico.

3.

Appellant's Brief

Enforcement ofl.C. §18-7008(8) violates Pentico's Procedural Due
Process ~ghts both because it works a deprivation ~frights with no
meaningful remedial process and because it is, as applied to him under the
circumstances of this case unconstitutionally vague.

28
000071

As it has been applied to Pentico LC. §18-7008(8) works as a violation of his rights to
·.. ... -·· · ·· . . procedural due-process--in-twe- matecial--ways.-·-First,.-the-statu.te. . a:ffords..him.-with.. no ..meaningful . --·--· ·-·- .._.. __ _.
process to respond to an arbitrary "ask to leave" or obtain any review of the reasonableness of
"no return for one year" provision.

Second, the statute is, as applied to the circumstances

presented in this case impermissibly vague. In both respects, once Officer Pattis directed Pentico
to leave State property, he was faced with two alternatives.

Pentico could, if he could

understand that they were at stake, accept a forfeiture of constitutionally protected .liberty
interests or he could risk criminal prosecution. Citizens should not be placed in this position.

a)

Enforcement ofLC. §18-7008(8) under the circumstances ofthis
· case leads to the forfeiture ofprotected liberty interests.

Tue Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution provides that a state shall not
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." US Const, Amend
XIV. Determining whether a state action violates an individual's right of procedural due process
involves a two-part test: (1) whether the state deprived the individual of a liberty or property
interest; and (2) if so, what process was due pursuant to the deprivation. Logan v. Zimmerman

Brush Co., 455 US 422, 428, 102 S.Ct 1148, 71 L.ED 2d 265 (1982); see also Washington v.
Glucksburg; 521 US 702, 721, 117 S.Ct 2258, 138 L.Ed 2d 772 (1997) (noting that a particular
right qualifies as a protected liberty interest if it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition," and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Relevant to this case,. Pentico is invested with two protected liberty interests. P_en,tico
has a :fundamental liberty interest in petitioning his government for redress of grievances. See

McDonald v. Smith, 427 US 479, 485, 105 S.Ct. 2787 (holding that the right to petition
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,

government officials "was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the

·----·:freedoms-te-speak,publish,-ana-assemble::,.)--In-additiQn,l?entico-has.. a-fundamentaLliberty_ _ _ __
interest in traveling upon and accessing public property that all other members of the public are
.

.

free to travel upon and access. See Williams v. Fears, 179 US 270, 274, 21 S.Ct-128, 45 L.Ed
186 (1900) (holding that the "right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another
according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty''); see also Kentv. Dulles, 357 US 116,
126, 78 S.Ct 1113, 2 L.Ed 2d 1204 (1958) ("freedom of movement across :frontiers in either
direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. It may be as close to the heart
of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic
in our scheme of values.")

b)

Pentico cannot constitutionally be deprived ofprotected liberzy
interests withourprocedures which provide him with due process.

Because of Pentico's lil?erty interest involved, the State may not interfere with those rights
without afforclip.g him due process.

Logan, 455 US at 428. Determining what process is

sufficient to authorize such interference depends on weighing three factors:
"(l) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation _of such interest through the
procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional procedural
safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would
entail."

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319,321,332, 96 S.Ct 893, 47 L. Ed2d 18 (1976).
Under the Matthews test, application of LC. § 18-7008(8) to Pentico violates his right to
procedural due process. First, as explained above, the interests affected were fundamental liberty
interests. Second, while it is apparent that Pentico was ordered to leave a traditional public
forum for no adequate reason and that he was thereafter, if the statute applies, automatically
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precluded from returning for one year, LC. § 18-7008(8) affords citizens in this position with
-----absolutely-no-proeess-to-eha:H.enge-an--ar-bitrary-exelusi-On-0r-an-e-x-ees-sively-l-0ng-baF-agaiE.st-----returning. Third, while the State may be forgiven for less than full procedural safeguards where it
can show that the fiscal and administrative burdens of affording such safeguards would prove too
great a burden, the problem here is that there are no procedural safeguards at all. Considering the
gravity of the rights involved, the State cannot demonstrate that fiscal and administrative burdens
justify failing to provide for even a nominal administrative hearing in front of a neutral decisionmaker. Citizens who are about to lose the privilege to drive a car for at least 90 days because
they were caught driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 are given administrative hearings and
afforded a right to present evidence and to have a neutral hearing officer determine if a violation

has occurred. See LC. §18-8002A. A citizen who is being denied acknowledged and important
First Amendment rights, for a full year is entitled to at least as much protection.
Because, as it has been applied here, it is clear that 1 C. § 18-7008(8) generates_ a significant
'

deprivation of fundamental liberty interests without affording any procedure for assuring due
process it is unconstitutional.

c)

The lower courts erred as a matter oflaw when they failed to
consider an "as applied!' vagueness challenge.

Challenges to criminal statutes based upon vagueness derive from the constitutional
principal that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication.
If the scope of the power given to officials under a statute is so broad that the exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct depends upon the subjective views of those officials as to the
proprietary of the conduct, the statute is unconstitutional as a denial of due process. Lanzetta v.

New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939). The void-for-vagueness doctrine
Appellant's Brief

31

000074

requires that when defining criminal conduct, a statute must be worded in a manner that does not
allow-arbitrary-di-seriminatory--e:af-0Ieement.----:K0r-se-n,l~-8-Idab.G-at-7-1-1. .-Tu.~tatute-musLb...,__ _ __
worded with clarity and definiteness so that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited. Id Furthermore, a statute may be void-for-vagueness if it does not provide adequate
notice concerning the conduct that is being prohibited or if it fails to establish even minimal
guidelines so that the police do not have unbridled discretion to enforce the statute. Id. Finally,
due process requires that no one may be compelled, at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as
to the meaning of a penal statute. Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 847 n. 4 (9th
Cir. 1986)). To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that
the statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the
defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police
had unbridled discretion in making a determination concerning whether to arrest him. Korsen,
138 Idaho at 712.

It is well settled in Missamore that I.C. § 18-7008(8) does not require owners of private
property to have any reason for asking trespassers to get off their land. However, while it is not
clear what reasons are sufficient to support an "ask to leave'' as to public property it is clear that
some form of inappropriate behavior. coupled with an end to the business at hand will _be
,.

sufficient to support an "ask to leave" a State administrative office. See, Korsen supra. At least
as great a justification should be .warranted when the public property in question is the seat of
.

.

government. The Capitol Annex and the Borah Building have been the temporary home of the
legislature and the governor during capitol renovatj.ons and as such are unique pieces of property.
They are different from private property and administrative offices and should be treated as such.
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The Trial Court, as argued above, erroneously determined that Pentico could be asked
---to-leave-the-8apitel-.Annex-fer-any--reas0F1-0r-n0-I©asGn-at--all-and-fa.iled-to-gi.ve..an:y-recognitionJo~---the inherent differences between private property and State property. As a consequence of this
error and with the State's support, the statute has been applied to Pentico both with respect to the
"ask to leave" portion and the "no return for one year" portion without any regard for his conduct
or whether the statute can be said to provide reasonable notice to Officer Pattis and to Pentico
that his conduct warranted an "ask to leave" and a subsequent one year exclusion.
As applied in this manner the statute is unconstitutional. As the Trial Court recognized
"whatever happened that led to Trooper Pattis' exclusion was not criminal ... " and the exclusion
was based upon an exercise of "discretion.',47 The Trial Court failed to recognize that by not
examining the basis for that exercise of discretion it was affording Officer Pattis unbounded
discretion. By concluding that the enforcement of the statute could, in the circumstances of this
case, permissibly turn upon an unbounded exercise of discretion, the Trial Court reached a
conclusion which compels a determination that the statute is unconstitutional as applied in the
this case. In considering this problem the District Court justified the finding that I.C. §187008(8) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Pentico by flipp~g the burden of proof on
its head. The District Court asserted that "there is no indication that Trooper Pattis was acting
arbitrarily in citing Pentico for trespass." See Memorandum Decision and Order, p.9. However
this approach ignores the fact that there is no justification in the record to support a conclusion
that Pattis was anything but acting arbitrarily and exercising unfettered discretion.
When Officer Pattis directed Pentico to leave the Capitol Annex, on March 25, 2008,
because he was making some people nervous and that he was "not welcome" at certain other ·
locations he failed to give anyone any meaningful information that would permit 3: determination
47

TR Sentencing, 37:17-19.
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that he was acting in anything but an arbitrary manner and therefore in a manner which violated
---Pentiecfs-consti:tutional-rights-;-E-ven-if-he--was--n0t-being--arbitFary,hl~appI0ae-h-fails-t0-pr-0vidt=>-----any basis for determining that he was acting within the proper boundaries of his discretion. But
even if this were not the case there is nothing in the statute which announces to Pentico what
conduct triggered a lawful exercise of discretion and warranted his exclusion. The statute affords
.

~

him no notice of what he must avoid doing in order to avoid exclusion. When the Trial Court
refused to allow this clearly discretionary determination to be tested but chose instead to simply
consider that exercise of unfettered discretion as a basis for a criminal conviction, the Trial Court

.

.

applied the statue in a manner which violated Pentico's constitutional rights.
Beyond the problems presented by the fact that "as applied" in this case the statute
permits an arbitrary "ask to leave" there is the fact that Pentico was convicted for a violation of
the "no return for one year" portion of the statute. Pentico was told to go away and that he was
not welcome at or no longer authorized to be at identified locations. Pentico specifically asked
for guidance regarding this ban, which was not provided.

He was given no information

regarding the duration of the ban and while he is presumed to know the law, that presumption is
reasonable only if it is reasonable to think that he could have understood that I.C. § 18-7008(8)
applied to b,is circumstances. Here, to recognize that the statute applied, he would have had to
anticipate that a judge would have concluded that Officer Pattis could lawfully exclude him from
State land which was a public forum for any reason or no reason at all.. Since he was given no
information that would have allowed him to conclude that the Officer had a legitimate basis for
asking him to leave, it is not reasonable to conclude that he would have understood that LC. §
18-7008(8) actually could be applied to his situation. In this regard it should be noted th~t it took
the State three attempts to identify his crime as a violation of I.C. § 18-7008(8). If trained law
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enforcement officers and prosecutors could not identify the statute applicable to his conduct for
--~m
..... onths--after-it-happenea,hew-was-he-supp0seel-te-de-s0~-JJ.hs-s0uld--n0t-Fsas0-nabl-y-b~xp€Gt€d~----

to know that the statute applied then it is unduly vague as applied to his situation and he cannot
be prosecuted for returning within one year.
I:C. § 18-7008(8) fails to provide. fair notice that Mr. Pentico's conduct was
proscribed by the statute_ and it has been applied here in an arbitrary manner dependent
solely upon the unfettered discretion of a law enforcement officer. As applied to Pentico,
.\

the statute has lead to a criminal conviction without giving him fair warning that the

..:..

statute even applied to his conduct. In both respects it is unduly-vague as applied to
Pentico and to a citizen's presence upon State land which is a public forum. Beyond
these problems, the statute provides no meaningful guidelines regarding what behaviors
will be considered un-conforming and support and an "ask to leave" and a one year
exclusion. Moreover, the statute provides neither fair notice of its applicability nor
......

requires that Pentico be provided fair notice of the reason for the ban or the duration of

!.

the ban. For each and all of these reasons the statute should be held unconstitutionally
vague as applied to Pentico and to the use of State land which is a public forum.

I.

1.

-------
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Petitioner
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER PENTICO,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-248

AFFIDAVIT OF ALLEN R. DERR

Respondent.
_______________

).

STATE OF IDAHO )
County of Ada

)

Allen R. Derr, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says:

1.

I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho.

2. That I represented the Petitioner herein, Christopher Pentico at the trial level in State v.
Pentico, CR-MD-2008-5321.
3. That I have read the post-conviction petition filed in this case.
4.

I did not consciously choose not to assert that based upon the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution Mr. Pentico was engaging in protected activity in a lawful and
appropriate manner when he was asked to leave the Capital Annex grounds on March 25,
2008, and that as a consequence he could not be charged with a violation of LC.§ 18-

EXHlB·IT
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7008(8) for returning to one of the identified properties on April 2, 2008. At the time of
defending Mr. Pentico I did not recognize that was a challenge which could, based upon
testimony that would be given by Mr. Pentico, be asserted.

While I recognized and

accepted the inherent unacceptability of prosecuting citizens for taking, as Mr. Pentico
did, a letter to the Governor's office to protest grievances, I never really connected to the
concept that the trip to the Governor's office on April 2, 2008, could not itself be
criminalized if the original "request to leave" on March 25, 2008, was itself
unconstitutional.

I believe that this occurred because in the first two versions of the

charge the question of whether there was a violation turned entirely upon the events of
April 2, 2008, and when the State finally filed the charge under I.C.§18-7008(8) it appears
that I never shifted my analysis away from the constitutional issues related to charging
Mr. Pentico with trespass for delivering a letter to the Governor's office.
5. It never occurred to me that there were both Substantive Due Process and Procedural Due
process challenges that could be made based upon the fact that the one year exclusion
provision of LC. 18-7008(8) - the provision under which the State sought to criminalize
Mr. Pentico's visit to the Governor's office on April 2, 2008 - would as to First
Amendment rights constitute an impermissible prior restraint and a bar to exercise of
protected right for which there were not procedural due process protections.
6. The Motion in Limine which was filed on December 30, 2008, was not intended to
preclude any evidence of conduct on March 25, 2008, which led to the initial "request to
leave" but rather to specifically preclude I.RE. Rule404(b) evidence as to
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other events. This is a motion which is typically filed in a criminal defense matter
which is about to go to trial and in which the State has not given I.R.E. Rule 404(b)
disclosures. Since I was not focused on the legality of the "request to leave" I did not
consider the impact that such a motion would have on evidence of events of that day
leading up to the "request to leave."
FURTHER Your Affiant Sayeth Not.

.. , .. 7

,

•... /······

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this '}&___~ay of May, 2013.

~
~(,A..:0, ..0,.A,,

\

NoTary Public~o =Residing at:___,¥::i'--'o'cJ..~)I....,._.---~-+-=--+-My commission expires ( {·1..--0 ( 1/4 t 7
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I placed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to the:

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Stacy Langton
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER PENTICO,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-248

AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE S.BISTLINE

Respondent.
_______________
STATE OF IDAHO )
County of Ada

)

Bruce S. Bistline, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says:

1) I am an attorney who has been duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho since 1976.
I have actively practiced trial law for more than 34 years. During that time I have provided
representation to defendants in more than 150 criminal cases. While I have maintained no
specific record, I estimate that I have been involved in defending more than 20 criminal cases
that went to trial, and in the range of 40 that involved significant pretrial motion practice. I
have handled post-conviction relief proceedings and assisted with and handled as lead
counsel a drawn-out federal habeas corpus proceeding involving a death penalty conviction.
I have handled both civil and criminal cases in which constitutional rights were significant

Affidavit of Bruce Bistline, Page 1
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factors in the resolution of the matter.
2) I represented the Petitioner herein, Christopher Pentico in the both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals appeal proceedings in State v. Pentico, CR-MD-2008-5321.
3) I have read the post-conviction petition filed in this case.
4) I was asked to provide my opinions regarding any deficient performance of trial counsel
regarding the development of and preservation of critical First Amendment and Fifth
Amendment defenses to the charge upon which Mr. Pentico was tried and convicted.
5) In conducting my review of the trial and the proceedings leading up to the trial, I have
reviewed the following materials:
a) The Citation;
b) The Discovery Responses supplied by the State, 5/28/08;
c) The Defendant's Motions to Dismiss, 6/13/08 and 11/12/08;
d) The Memorandums filed in Support of the Motions to Dismiss;
e) The Amended Complaints filed by the State, 10/29/08;
f) The Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Request for Discovery and Supplemental
Response to Plaintiff's Request for Discovery;
g) The Defendant's First Supplemental Request for Discovery;
h) The Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint, 11/12/2008;
i) The Defendant's Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, 12/29/08;
j) The Defendant's Motion in Limine, 12/30/08;
k) The Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint. 12/30/2008;

Affidavit of Bruce Bistline, Page 2
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1) The State's Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine; 12/31/2008
m) The State's Proposed Jury Instructions 12/31/08;
n) The State's Motion to Exclude Or in the Alternative Request For Offer of Proof and
Hearing, 12/31/08
o) The States Objection to Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum In Support, 12/31/08
p) Defendants' Objection to Filing Second Amended Complaint, 01/02/09
q) The State's Response to Supplemental Request for Discovery 01/02/09
r) The Defendant's reply to the State's Objection to Defendant Pentico's Motion to Dismiss
and the States' Proposed Jury Instruction, 01/02/09;
s) The Defendant's Second Supplemental Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint, 01/05/09;
t) The Defendant's Third Supplemental Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint, 01/05/09
u) The Second Amended Complaint 01/06/09
v) The State's Motion In Limine/Motion for Clarification 4/16/09
w) The transcripts of Magistrate Court Proceedings, 10/29/08 01/06/09, 2/10/09, 4/21/09,
05/11/09;
x) The Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed in this matter;
y) The Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed in this matter;
z) The Answer filed by the State of Idaho;
aa) The State's Motion for Summary Dismissal;
bb) The State's Brief In Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal;
cc) The Briefs filed by the Parties in the Appeal proceedings before the District Court;
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dd) The Opinion of the District Court, 5/13/2010;
ee) The Briefs filed by the Parties in the Appeal proceedings in the Idaho Court of Appeals;
and,
ff) The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Pentico, Docket No. 37834.
6) I have interviewed Mr. Pentico and determined that he would testify under oath that on
March 25, 2008, he was very briefly at the Capital Annex but was not at any other
governmental buildings that day. He went there in order to speak to Representative Lenore
Barrett about a matter of concern involving State Government.

He visited her office,

discovered she was not in, spoke to her Secretary, determined a time when he could return
and probably have the chance to speak to Rep. Barrett an left the building and the grounds.
He had lunch and returned to the Capital Annex. He had just crossed the street onto the
grounds of the Capital Annex when he was approached by a State Patrolman who detained
him until Officer Pattis arrived to tell him to leave and that he was not welcome at the State
House (then Capital Annex); at the Governor's office and at the offices of the Department of
Education.
7) From my review of the documents it appears that Mr. Derr correctly recognized the need to
challenge the application of I.C. § 18-7008(8) as being unconstitutional but it is equally clear
that he did not make good use of the factual information that was available to him or that he
adequately framed the important constitutional issues so that they were preserved for appeal.
8) It appears that Mr. Derr either did not fully grasp Mr. Pentico's reasons for being at the
Capital Annex on March 25 or never really appreciated that one year exclusion portion of the
statute could not be triggered by an "ask to leave" which was itself an unconstitutional
'

application of the statute.

There is no conceivable strategy-based reason for this factual
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information not to have been presented or for failure to assert a constitutional challenge to
the application of LC.§ 18-7008(8) on the basis that there is nothing about Pentico's conduct
on March 25 th which can constitutionally provide the basis for asking a citizen to leave State
property (the foundational aspect of application of the statute is a "ask to leave").

Mr.

Derr's failure to know or to grasp the facts is evidenced in his Amended Memorandum In
Support of Motion to Dismiss, 11/12/08, in which Mr. Derr bases his arguments upon the
understanding that the State's evidence was that Mr. Pentico was engaged in harassing
behavior while visiting various government offices on March 25, 2008. See, Memorandum In
Support ofMotion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. 11/12/08, p.3. Moreover, he did identify

as a witness Representative Barrett's secretary.
9) Based upon my experience and the review of the above materials, it is my professional
opinion that trial counsel, Allen Derr, did not provide effective assistance of counsel as
required by Strickland v. · Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and its progeny in several
respects as set forth in more detail herein below:
a) He failed to present for the record either by testimony, affidavit or offer of proof, a clear
statement of the facts that would demonstrate that on March 25, 2008, Mr. Pentico was
engaged in constitutionally protected activity while at the Capital Annex and that he had
been at no other governmental buildings that day.
b) While filing a Motion In Limine to prevent the admission of 404(b) evidence was a
strategic decision that cannot be faulted, Mr. Derr, probably due to his lack of
appreciation for or understanding of the critical facts, failed to make clear to the Court
that the Motion was not filed to prevent evidence of Mr. Pentico's conduct on March 25,
2008, as that evidence is of fundamental relevance to a challenge to the "ask to leave"
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prong of the statute.
c) While he appreciated that any prosecution of Pentico under I.C.§72-7008(8) was subject
to substantial constitutional challenges, he failed to assert significant and relatively
obvious challenges as follows;
i) That the request that Mr. Pentico leave the Captial Annex grounds was itself
unconstitutional because he was there to exercise important and protected 1st
Amendment Rights. The failure to appreciate this argument contributed to the failure
to make a clear record of the facts and this in turn lead to the refusal of the appellate
courts to consider this challenge.
ii) That the portion of the statute which purports to criminalize the return to the property
for one year (and in this case the "conduct" upon which Mr. Pentico was convicted) is
unconstitutional as it pertains to entries onto State land which constitutes a
Traditional Public Forum or a Designated Public Forum both because it is an
impermissible prior restraint of protected 1st Amendment activities and because it is a
prohibition which affords no procedural due process mechanism by which the citizen
can contest the initial "ask to leave" or the duration of bar against returning.

The

failure to raise these arguments contributed to the fact that despite being raised on
appeal they were never addressed.
FURTHER Your Affiant Sayeth Naught.

"Bctu.,

~J ~ ( _ _ _

Bruce S. Bistline
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this&O day of May, 2013.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: {J;/J:L 7 /dffur
My commission expires ~

£2.I, t/.tJlg'

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I placed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to the:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Stacy Langton
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

CHRISTOPHER'D. RICH, Clerk
By SARA WRIGHT
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER PENTICO,
Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

__ c~s §.

No. CV-PC-2013-248

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Respondent.
______________

Petitioner, Christopher Pentico, asks this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 201(d), to take
judicial notice of the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record in the
case State v. Pentico, Ada County Case No. CR-MD-2008-5321, including the documents listed
in the Register of Actions attached hereto as Exhibit A.

Respectfully submitted this

;;)-D day of May 2013.

H
e1 1 'o d
man ' T ~ ~
Attorney for Petitioner

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I placed a true and corr~ct
copy of the foregoing in interdepartmental mail to the:
ADA COUNTY PRSECUTING ATTORNEY
Stacy Langton

Jennifer Vanderhoof
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Date: 5/Z0/2013

Fo

Time: 09: 18 AM

Judicial District Court - Ada County

User: PDTOLMHM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 5

Case: CR-MD-2008-0005321 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen
Defendant: Pentico, Christopher A

i,J:XHtsrr A

State of Idaho vs. Christopher A Pentico
Judge

Date

Code

User

4/15/2008

NCRM

PRFERGKE

New Case Filed - Misdemeanor

Magistrate Court Clerk

PROS

PRFERGKE

Prosecutor assigned Ada County Prosecutor

Magistrate Court Clerk

APNG

TCURQUAM

Appear & Plead Not Guilty/Derr

Magistrate Court Clerk

RQDD

TCURQUAM

Defendant's Request for Discovery

Magistrate Court Clerk

CHGA

TCOLSOMC

Judge Change: Adminsitrative

Kevin Swain

HRSC

TCOLSOMC

HRSC

TCOLSOMC
TCOLSOMC

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
Kevin Swain
07/21/2008 08:15 AM)
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/14/2008 08:30 Kevin Swain
AM)
Kevin Swain
Notice Of Hearing

4/21/2008
4/25/2008

4/28/2008

PROS

PRFERGKE

Prosecutor assigned Jeanne M Howe

Kevin Swain

5/29/2008

RQDS

TCURQUAM

State/City Request for Discovery

Kevin Swain

RSDS

TCURQUAM

State/City Response to Discovery

Kevin Swain

NOTC

TCURQUAM

Notice of Hearing

Kevin Swain

MOTN

TCURQUAM

Motion to Dismiss

Kevin Swain

MISC

TCURQUAM

Memo in Support of Motion to Dismiss

Kevin Swain

HRSC

TCEMERYV

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
07/11/2008 03:00 PM)
Notice Of Hearing

Kevin Swain

6/13/2008

6/24/2008

TCEMERYV
7/11/2008

7/21/2008

10/29/2008

HRVC

TCEMERYV

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on
07/11/2008 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

Kevin Swain

ORDR

TCEMERYV

Order Granting Stip Vacate Hearing

Kevin Swain

HRVC

TCEMERYV

Kevin Swain

CONH

TCEMERYV

HRSC

TCEMERYV

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 08/14/2008
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
07/21/2008 08:15 AM: Conference Held
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
10/29/2008 04:00 PM)

TCEMERYV

Notice Of Hearing

Kevin Swain

PROS

PRMETIMJ

Prosecutor assigned Stacy L Wallace

Kevin Swain

CONH

TCEMERYV

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on
10/29/2008 04:00 PM: Conference Held

Kevin Swain

HRSC

TCEMERYV

Kevin Swain

MISC

TCEMERYV

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
11/18/2008 09:30 AM)
Amended Complaint

TCEMERYV

11/12/2008

Kevin Swain

REDU

TCEMERYV

MOTN

MISC

Notice Of Hearing

Kevin Swain
Kevin Swain

Kevin Swain
Kevin Swain
Kevin Swain

TCKELLHL

Charge Reduced Or Amended (118-7008
Trespass)
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

TCKELLHL

Memo in Support

Kevin Swain

Kevin Swain
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Defendant: Pentico, Christopher A

State of Idaho vs. Christopher A Pentico
Date

Code

User

11/18/2008

CONH:

TCEMERYV

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
11/18/2008 09:30 AM: Conference Held

HRSC

TCEMERYV

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/06/2009 08:30 Kevin Swain
AM)

Judge
Kevin Swain

TCEMERYV

Notice Of Hearing

Kevin Swain

12/5/2008

RSDD

TCKELLHL

Defendant's Response to Discovery

Kevin Swain

12/10/2008

RSDD

TCURQUAM

Defendant's Response to
Discovery/Supplemental

Kevin Swain

12/15/2008

RQDD

TCBUCKAD

Defendant's Request for Discovery/Supplemental Kevin Swain

12/19/2008

MISC.

TCBUCKAD

Defend's Proposed Jury Instructions

Kevin Swain

12/22/2008

RSDD

TCBUCKAD

Defendant's Response to Discovery/2nd
Supplemental

Kevin Swain

12/29/2008

MISC

TCBULCEM

Defend's supplemental proposed jury instructions Kevin Swain

12/30/2008

MISC

TCBULCEM

Defend's 2nd supplemental proposed jury
instructions

Kevin Swain

MOTN

TCBULCEM

Motion in limine

Kevin Swain

MISC

TCBULCEM

supplen')ental memorandum in support of motion
to dismiss amended complaint

Kevin Swain

MISC

TCGOHNST

Response to defend's motion in limine

Kevin Swain

MOTN

TCGOHNST

Motion to exclude or in the altertive request for
offer of proof and hearing

Kevin Swain

MISC

TCASPIRA

Miscellaneous/ state's proposed jury instructions Kevin Swain

MISC

TCASPIRA

Miscellaneous/ objection to motion to dismiss and Kevin Swain
memorandum in support

MISC

TCASPIRA

Reply to the state's objection to the defendant
pentico's motion to dismiss and to the state's
proposed jury instructions

Kevin Swain

MISC

TCASPIRA

Objection to the filing of second amended
complaint

Kevin Swain

RSDS

TCKELLHL

State/City Response to Discovery/Supplemental

Kevin Swain

MISC

TCBULCEM

2nd supplemental memorandum in support of
motion to dismiss amended complaint

Kevin Swain

MISC

TCBULCEM

3rd supplemental memorandum in support of
motion to dismiss amended complaint

Kevin Swain

HRVC

TCEMERYV

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01/06/2009
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Kevin Swain

HRSC

TCEMERYV

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 02/10/2009
11:30AM)

Kevin Swain

TCEMERYV
TCEMERYV
DCTYLENI
TCEMERYV

Notice Of Hearing

Kevin Swain

12/31/2008

1/2/2009

1/5/2009

1/6/2009

MISC
1/13/2009

TRAN

2/10/2009

HRVC

2nd Amended Complaint

Kevin Swain

Transcript Filed (1/6/09)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 02/10/2009 Kevin Swain
000093
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Defendant: Pentico, Christopher A

State of Idaho vs. Christopher A Pentico
Date

Code

User

2/10/2009

HRSC

TCEMERYV
TCEMERYV

Judge
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/21/2009 08:30 Kevin Swain
AM)
Notice Of Hearing

Kevin Swain

4/16/2009

MOTN

TCRAMISA

Motion in Limine/Motion for Clarification

Kevin Swain

4/20/2009

MOTN

TCKELLHL

Motion to Add Witness for Defense

Kevin Swain

MISC

TCKELLHL

MISC

TCEMERYV

Def Waives Jury/ CT set

Kevin Swain

CTST

TCEMERYV

Hearing result for Court Trial held on 04/21/2009
08:30 AM: Court Trial St~rted

Kevin Swain

MISC

TCEMERYV

Def Found Guilty

Kevin Swain

HRSC

TCEMERYV

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 05/11/2009
11:00 AM)

Kevin Swain

4/21/2009

TCEMERYV

· Objection to the State's Requested Jury
Instruction

Notice Of Hearing

Kevin Swain

Kevin Swain

ORDR

TCEMERYV

Order Granting Approval to Video Record or
Broadcast of Court Proceeding

Kevin Swain

NOTC

TCBULCEM

Notice of filing

Kevin Swain

ORDR

TCEMERYV

Approving Request to Obtain Approval to
Broadcast and or Photograph a court hearing

Kevin Swain

CONH;

TCEMERYV

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 05/11/2009 Kevin Swain
11:00 AM: Conference Held

WHJD.

TCEMERYV

Withheld Judgment Entered (118-7008 Trespass) Kevin Swain

PROB

TCEMERYV

Probation Ordered (118-7008 Trespass) Probation Kevin Swain
term: Oyears 1 month O days. (Misdemeanor
Unsupervised)

STAT

TCEMERYV

STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Kevin Swain

SNPF

TCEMERYV

Sentenced To Pay Fine 0.00 charge: 118-7008
Trespass

Kevin Swain

APDC ·

TCRAMISA

Appeal Filed In District Court

Kevin Swain

CAAP

TCRAMISA

Case Appealed:

Kevin Swain

STAT

TCRAMISA

STATUS CHANGED: Reopened

Kathryn A. Sticklen

6/25/2009

ESTM

DCNIXONR

Estimate Of Transcript Cost

Kathryn A. Sticklen

6/29/2009

CHGA

DCTYLENI

Judge Change: Adminsitrative

Kathryn A. Sticklen

OGAP

DCTYLENI

Order Governing Procedure On Appeal

Kathryn A. Sticklen

7/10/2009

NOTC

DCNIXONR

Notice of Payment of Estimated Cost of
Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

7/21/2009

TRAN

DCNIXONR

Transcript Lodged

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NLT

DCNIXONR

Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal

Kathryn A. Sticklen

TRAN

DCTYLENI

Transcript Filed

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NOTC

DCTYLENI

Notice Of Filing Transcript On Appeal

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MISC

TCBULCEM

Objection to appeal transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen
000094
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Defendant: Pentico, Christopher A

State of Idaho vs. Christopher A Pentico
Judge

Date

Code

User

9/1/2009

MOTN

TCBULCEM

Motion to augment record

Kathryn A Sticklen

9/9/2009

AMCO

DCNIXONR

Amended Estimated Cost of Appeal Transcript

Kathryn A Sticklen

9/10/2009

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Re: Motion to Augment Record

Kathryn A Sticklen

MISC

TCRAMISA

Appellant's Motion to Extend Briefing Schedule
Pending Resolution of Motion Regarding Filing
Transcript on Appeal and Motion to Augment
Record

Kathryn A Sticklen

STIP

TCRAMISA

Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel

Kathryn A Sticklen

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Suspending Briefing Schedule and Setting
Status Conference (9/24/09 @ 1:00 p.m.)

Kathryn A Sticklen

HRSC

DCTYLENI

Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone
09/24/2009 01 :00 PM) Parties may appear by
TELE

Kathryn A Sticklen

9/17/2009

NOTC'

DCNIXONR

Notice of Payment of Amended Transcript

Kathryn A Sticklen

9/24/2009

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

Hearing result for Status by Phone held on
Kathryn A Sticklen
09/24/2009 01 :00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Parties may appear by TELE-50

9/29/2009

ESTM

DCNIXONR

Estimate Of Transcript Cost

Kathryn A Sticklen

9/30/2009

NLT

DCNIXONR

Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal

Kathryn A Sticklen

NLT

DCNIXONR

Lodging Transcript On Appeal

Kathryn A Sticklen

10/2/2009

STIP

TCBULCEM

Stipulation for the prep of official transcripts for
4/21/09 motion hearing and 4/21/09 court trial

Kathryn A Sticklen

10/6/2009

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Re: Stipulation for the Preparation of
Official Transcripts (for 4/21/09 Motions HEaring
and Court Trial)

Kathryn A Sticklen

10/8/2009

MISC

TCBULCEM

Supplemental disclosure to objection to appeal
transcript

Kathryn A Sticklen

10/9/2009

NOTC

DCNIXONR

Notice of Payment of Estimated Cost of Appeal
Transcript

Kathryn A Sticklen

10/21/2009

NOTC

TCRAMISA

Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiff/Appellee's
Objection to Appeal Transcript

Kathryn A Sticklen

10/27/2009

NOTC

DCTYLENI

Notice of Filing Transcript on Appeal (of 10/29/08, Kathryn A Sticklen
1/6/09, and 2/10/09)

TRAN·

DCTYLENI

Transcript Filed

Kathryn A Sticklen

NLT

DCNIXONR

Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal

Kathryn A Sticklen

LDGD

DCNIXONR

Transcript Lodged

Kathryn A Sticklen

11/24/2009

STIP

TCRAMISA

Stipulation for Briefing Schedule

Kathryn A Sticklen

11/30/2009

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Re: Briefing Schedule

Kathryn A Sticklen

12/8/2009

NOTC

DCTYLENI

Notice of FIiing Transcript on Appeal

Kathryn A Sticklen

TRAN

DCTYLENI

Transcript Filed

Kathryn A Sticklen

MISC

TCRAMISA

Appellant's Reply Brief

Kathryn A Sticklen
000095
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State of Idaho vs. Christopher A Pentico
Date

Code

User

2/22/2010

RSBR

JVWARDCM

Respondents Brief Filed

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/12/2010

MISC

TCBULCEM

Appellant's Reply Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/19/2010

NOTC

TCRAMISA

Notice of Oral Argument

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/31/2010

HRSC

DCTYLENI

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
04/02/2010 02:00 PM)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/2/2010

DCHH

CCCHILER

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held
on 04/02/201 O 02:00 PM: District Court Heari~g
Held
Court Reporter: Lisa Andersen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 200 pages

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/13/2010

DEOP

DCTYLENI

Memorandum Decision and Order

Kathryn A. Sticklen

6/24/2010

APSC

TCPETEJS

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Kathryn A. Sticklen

10/26/2011

MISC

CCTHIEBJ

Opinion - Supreme Court Docket No. 37834

Kathryn A. Sticklen

1/10/2012

REMT

CCLUNDMJ

Remittitur (Affirmed) -- Supreme Ct. Docket
#38834

Kathryn A. Sticklen

CCLUNDMJ

10 Day Notice of Intent to Release
Exhibits/Depositions

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/27/2012

Judge

5/7/2012

OBJE

TCTONGES

Defendant's Objection to the Release of Exhibits
and Depositions

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/16/2012

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order Re: Defendant's Objection to the Release
of Exhibits and Depositions

Kathryn A. Sticklen
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RECEIVED
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

··NO·-----;;~---:i,.....,,,..,__
FILED
A~----P.M
_40D
_ __

~~--1..-.~,~
··---:

MAY 2 0 2013
1:-.oa

County Clerk

~

'

---"__:___

CHRISTOPHER D.

RICH, Clerk

By VICKY EMERY
D!PUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER PENTICO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
.)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Criminal No. CV-PC-2013-248

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE

______________

THE COURT, having considered Petitioner's Motion, pursuant to I.R.E. 201(d), to take
judicial notice of the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record in the
case of State v. Pentico: Ada County Case No. CR-MD-2008-5321, including the documents
listed in the Register of Actions attached as Exhibit A to this Order, HEREBY TAKES
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED MATERIALS.
Dated this

I

· f

...J\Al"\e
day of.M-ay 2013.

Honorable Kevin Swain
Magistrate Judge

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Page 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

)

CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Petitioner,

.

)
'. )

",

vs.

'

.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

'.

Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248

. l )"'

:

)'

FILED
P.M _ _ __

'

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

. '')
)

JUN 13 2013

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By VICKY EMERY
OEPIJTY

On April 2, 2008 the Petitioner was cited for Trespass. On November 12, 2008 the
.

')

.

~

.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss challenging the constitutional application of l.C 187008 to the facts of the case. On January 6, 2009 the Trial Court heard and denied the
motion. On April 21, 2009 the Petitioner ·was found guilty after a court trial and was
sentenced on May 11, 2009.
Petitioner appealed to the District Court on June 22, 2009, and the District Court
affirmed the Trial Court's decision on May 13, 2010. An appeal to the Supreme was
filed on June 24, 2010. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's opinion
when it issued its Remittitur January 10, 2012. ·
Petitioner's first and second Causes of Action are restatements of the same issues
decided by the Trial Court and on direct appeal. The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. The Petition fails to raise any issue of
material fact with regard to the constitutional application of Idaho's trespass_ statute to the
facts of the case. To the extent Petitioner seeks to reframe the issue as one of substantive

1

000098

and procedural due process, re-litigation of those related constitutional issues is barred by
operation ofl.C.19-4901(b).
Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails to raise an issue of material
fact. Trial counsel properly raised a constitutional challenge to the application of the
statute to the facts of Petitioner's case. That challenge was not successful. It does not
follow that counsel's performance was deficient.
As the Petition fails to raise an issue of material fact and seeks to re-litigate issues
previously decided on direct appeal, Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal is
hereby, GRANTED.

DATED this 13th day of June, 2013

Kevin Swain - Magistrate Judge

2
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IN THE DISTkICT COURT OF THE FOURTt..... UDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

NO._

----

A.M.===-=--=--=-~FliteLeoo
P.M.- - - STATE OF IDAHO,

)

JUN 13 2013

)

Plaintiff,
Vs. Christopher A. Pentico,

)

CHA/STOPHER D

CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-00248

DEPUTY

)
)

Defendant.

8YKELLEWEG~~t·

)

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

)
)

I, Vicky Emery, the undersigned Court Clerk do hereby certify that I
have mailed, postage prepaid, by United States Mail, one copy of the notice
of intent to grant summary dismissal, to each of the parties of record in this
cause in envelopes addressed as follows:
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Juvenile Division / Attn: Stacy
Interoffice Mail
Ada County Public Defender's Office
Interoffice Mail

of June, 2013.

000100

Clerk

1

NO.= I
A.M,_""""(l_,_M..._U'-"'--'FILEO
P.M_ _ __
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant

JUL O5 2013

HEIDI M. TOLMAN, ISB #8478
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk
By JAMIE MARTIN
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248
NOTICE OF APPEAL

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent.
TO: . THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, GREG H. BOWER, ADA COUNTY
PROSECUTOR, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1)

The above-named Petitioner-Appellant appeals against the above-named
Respondent-Respondent to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District of the state of Idaho, in and for the county of Ada, from the final
Order Granting Summary Dismissal entered in the above-entitled action
on June 13, 2013, the Honorable Kevin Swain, Magistrate, presiding.

2)

That the party has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under and pursuant to ICR 54.1.

3)

This appeal is taking upon all matters of law and fact.

4)

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the PetitionerAppellant intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues
on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on
appeal, are:
a) Did the magistrate court, err in summarily dismissing the
appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief?

5)

Appellant does not request any additional transcripts in this matter, as no
proceedings in this matter were recorded or reported.

6)

Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard Clerk's record
pursuant to JAR 28(b)(l). The appellant requests the following documents

NOTICE OF APPEAL

/

1
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...

J\

.a

to be included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically
included under IAR 28(b)(1 ):
a) Any exhibits, affidavits, objections, responses, answers, motions,
orders, briefs or memoranda, including all attachments or copies of
transcripts, filed or lodged by the state, the appellant, or the court
in support of or in opposition to the dismissal of the PostConviction Petition.
7)

I hereby certify that:
a) The appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for
preparation of the clerk's record because he is an indigent person
and is unable to pay said fee. IDAHO CODE § 31-3220 and IAR
24(e), ICR 54.7.
b) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to ICR 54.4.

DATED, this

~~

day of June 2013.

HEIDITO~
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this
correct copy of the within instrument to:

5-f'1

day o f ~ 2013, I mailed (served) a true and

J""j

STACYL. WALLACE
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail

NOTICE OF APPEAL

\
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~,

r

\

'

'~,,
N

~,et0'11 =

~8

A.M_ _ _F_,'1'M

JUL O8 2013

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant

CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk

HEIDI M. TOLMAN, ISB #8478
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

By JAMIE MARTIN
0EPUTY

NO TRANSCRIPT
REQUESTED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent.
TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, GREG H. BOWER, ADA COUNTY
PROSECUTOR, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1)

The above-named Petitioner-Appellant appeals against the above-named
Respondent-Respondent to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District of the state of Idaho, in and for the county of Ada, from the final
Order Granting Summary Dismissal entered in the above-entitled action
on June 13, 2013, the Honorable Kevin Swain, Magistrate, presiding.

2)

That the party has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under and pursuant to ICR 54.1, IAR 1 l(a) and (c), and IRCP 83(a).

3)

This appeal is taking upon all matters oflaw and fact.

4)

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the PetitionerAppellant intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues
on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on
appeal, are:
a) Did the magistrate court err in summarily dismissing the
appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief?

5)

Appellant does not request any additional transcripts in this matter, as no
proceedings in this matter were recorded or reported.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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·,

6)

Clerk's Record. The appellant requests that pursuant to IRCP 83(n), the
entire court file including any minute entries and any exhibits be made
available to the District Court.

7)

I hereby certify that:
a) The appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for
preparation of the clerk's record because he is an indigent person
and is unable to pay said fee. IDAHO CODE § 31-3220 and IAR
24(e), ICR 54.7.
b) Service has been made on the court appealed from and on all other
parties to the action, as required by IRCP 83(e), IAR 20 and ICR
54.4.

DATED, this

$'

day of July 2013.

HEIDI TOLMAN
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this

_R__ day of July 2013, I mailed (served) a true and

correct copy of the within instrument to:

JUDGE KEVIN SWAIN
Ada County Courthouse
Chambers Room 2193
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
STACYL. WALLACE
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

3
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FILED
Tuesday, July 09, 2013 at 08:00 AM
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

July 9th, 2013.
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,

Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248

Petitioner-Appellant,

NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Responden~Respondent
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN That the above-entitled case has been reassigned to
the Honorable MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN.
DATED Tuesday, July 09, 2013

,,,,1111,,,,

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH ..,,,, .ffH JU'•,,,
Clerk of the Dis
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PoR AD~ e,O ,,,..

I hereby certify that on Tuesday, July 09, 2013, I have delivered'a1.tri.ueJ'ana'
accurate copy of the foregoing document to the following parties in the ~ethod indicated
below:

STACY L WALLACE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT-Civil
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NO·-----=~-----

#_.'j...,Q
__

A.M _ _ _ _F,_,LE·~--.....

JUL 1-7 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
ByAMYLYCAN
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Petitioner,

Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248

ORDER GOVERNING
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Res ondent.
Notice of Appeal having been filed herein, and it appearing that a transcript of all the testimony of
the original trial or hearing is required by Appellant to resolve the issues on appeal:
It is ORDERED:
1) That Appellant shall order and pay for the estimated cost of the transcript within 14 days after
the filing of the notice of appeal.
2) That Appellant's brief shall be filed and served on or before November 25 th, 2013.
3) That Respondent's brief shall be filed and served on or before December 23 rd, 2013.
4) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served on or before January 9th, 2014.
5) Oral Argument will be heard at the Ada County Courthouse, 200 W. Front Street Boise, Idaho
on January 23 rd at 2:00p.m.

Dated this 17th day of July 2013.
MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN
Senior District Judge

000107

ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
. This is an appeal from the trial court's order granting summary dismissal of Mr.
Pentico's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.
General Course of Proceedings
On April 2, 2008, Pentico was charged with trespassing, a misdemeanor violation
of I.C. § 18-7011. On June 13, 2008, Pentico filed a Motion to Dismiss because Pentico
had not committed a trespass as described in I.C. § 18-7011 as this sub-section is
based on lands which are "inclosed by fences of any description sufficient to show the
boundaries of the land inclosed." Furthermore, Pentico argued that the State failed to
state with any specificity facts that would support its trespass charge against him
especially because he was engaging in politically protected speech. This charge was
amended, twice, ultimately charging Pentico with trespass under I.C. § 18-7008(8) for
visiting the Governor's office to communicate constitutent concerns.
Pentico filed a second Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on November 12,
2008. A hearing was held on this Motion to Dismiss on Janyary 26, 2009. During the
course of that hearing Pentico, through counse, argued:
1.

Relying upon State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003), that it
· would be unconstitutional to apply I.C. § 18-7008 to a person who was on
property for the purpose of exercising constitutionally protected rights.

2. That Pentico had issues with the fact that he was asked to leave public
property in the first place on March 25, 2009.
3. That the property involved was a public forum and that an attempt to limit a
citizens access to such property must be strictly scrutinized.
2 Appellants Brief
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During this motion hearing Pentico also urged the Court to allow him to call the
Governor in order to demonstrate that he had an invitation to drop by the Governor's
office to obtain an appointment and to be allowed to call a legislator in order to
demonstrate that while Pentico could be persistent, he was not inappropriate in his
conduct at the Capitol.
The Trial Court appeared to appreciate that Pentico was making a due process
argument and that he had evidence to support his claim that he was not acting
inappropriately when he was asked to leave State land and with this knowledge the
Court ruled that:
1.

On its face, without regard to the evidence, Idaho Code § 18-7008 was a
very reasonable time, place and manner restriction.

2. Pentico was not being prosecuted for the content of his communication but for
his conduct.
3. The statute was constitutional as applied.
4. The scope of the trial would be very narrow, that neither the content of Mr.
Pentico's prior communications nor his prior conduct was relevant to the
proceedings and that the agent of the State who directed Mr. Pentico to leave
State property on March 25, 2008, did not need to have a reason for doing so.
Specifically the Court directed: "We are not going to have testimony from
either side about the history that lead up to the events of April 2nd ."
5. The Court also ruled that Pentico was precluded from calling the Governor to
present evidence that he had an invitation from him to come by the office and
set up an appointment to speak with him.

3 Appellants Brief
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Following the hearing of January 6, 2009, it appears that Pentico intended to
enter a ~onditional plea of guilty. The Court's minute entry reflects that the case was
"settled" and the matter was set for a sentencing· hearing.

On the date set for

sentencing, Pentico changed his mind and requested that the matter be set for trial. A
trial was set for April 21, 2009, and at that time, Pentico waived his right to a jury trial
and proceeded with a court trial. Prior to the beginning of trial, in the course of dealing
with a Motion in Limine, the Court again made clear that "We are not going to have
testimony about whether Mr. Pentico's actions were justified by the First Amendment."
The Court went on to say that there were two issues in the case: Was Pentico properly
advised to leave identified State land and was he subsequently on that State land. In
this regard, the Court made clear that neither party would be permitted to offer evidence
relative to the events that lead up to the initial exclusion. During the trial the Court, after
hearing testimony in the case and reviewing applicable law, found that the more
significant aspects of the case were legal issues which had previously been decided by
the Court. The Trial Court found Pentico guilty of the misdemeanor offense of trespass
on April 21, 2009.

Pentico was sentenced on May 11, 2009.

Pentico appealed to the District Court on June 22, 2009 and that District Court
affitrmed the Trial Court's decision on May 13, 2010. An appeal to the Supreme Court
was filed on June 24, 2010. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's
opinion when it issued its Remittitur January 10, 2012.
Pentico filed his verified Petition for Post-Conviction relief on January 4, 2013, in
which three causes of action are alleged.

The State filed its Answer, Motion for

Summary Dismissal and Brief in Support on March 26, 2013. The Trial Court filed its

4 Appellants Brief
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I
Notice of Intent to Grant Summary Dismissal on April 30, 2013.

Pentico filed his

Response to the State's Motion for Summary Disposition on May 20, 2013. The Trial
Court Granted Summary Dismissal on June 13, 2013. This appeal follows.

5 Appellants Brief
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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

Did the trial court err by granting Summary Dismissal without a meaningful
opportunity to be heard?

6 Appellants Brief
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ARGUMENT

It is well known that an application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. While an

applicant for post-conviction relief must eventually prove the allegations upon which the
application is based, summary disposition is not appropriate unless the applicant's evidence
raises no genuine issue of material fact. This Court should determine whether a genuine issue of
fact exists based upon the record of the criminal case along with the pleadings, and together with
any affidavits on file. In doing so, it must liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences
in favor of the non-moving party. However, until the allegations in a verified application for
post-conviction relief are controverted by the state, they must be deemed to be true for the
purpose of determining if an evidentiary hearing is to be held. Only if the alleged facts, even if
true, would not entitle the applicant to relief may the trial court dismiss the application without
holding an evidentiary hearing. Kelly v. State,_ Idaho_,_ p.3d _ , 2010 WL 2901795
*2 (2010).

A motion to dismiss, unsupported by affidavits, depositions or materials does not

controvert the allegations in the petition. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187,
1190 (1975). Thus the state's motion for summary disposition, which was unsupported by any
evidentiary material, did not controvert any of the allegations in the verified petition for postconviction relief. Mr. Pentico presented evidence which if true would entitle him to relief.
Therefore, the Trial Court erred when it granted summary dismissal without an evidentiary
hearing.
Summary dismissal of a petition for postOconviction relief is the procedural equivalent of
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56 and this Court must determine whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists, with inferences liberally construed in favor of the petitioner. Charboneau v.

State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). The applicant must prove the allegations

7 Appellants Brief
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in the request for relief only by preponderance of the evidence. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,
560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008). Further, when an appellant asserts the violation of constitutional
rights this court exercises free review over the trial court's determination as to whether
constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Pearce, 146
Idaho 241,248, 192 P.3d 1065, 1072 (2008).
There was a court trial in this case which ended in a conviction. Mr. Pentico filed an
appeal. He then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Pending before this Court is
the Trial Court's Order Granting Summary Dismissal of Mr. Pentico's Verified Petition for PostConviction Relief without a hearing.
1. Petitioner's asserted three causes of action for which relief can be granted.
(a) Constitutional causes of action.
Mr. Pentico asserted on direct appeal that the initial ask to leave was a violation of due

process .. His arguments addressed both substantive and procedural due process issues. Those
specific issues were never addressed by either the District Court or The Idaho Court of Appeals.
Mr. Pentico is entitled to have those claims addressed. The issues raised in post-conviction are

not the same issues decided by the trial court and affirmed on direct appeal. In fact the issues
raised were not addressed by the trial court due to ineffective assistance of counsel and therefore
were not addressed on appeal because they were not preserved by the trial counsel.
Mr. Pentico submitted the Affidavit of Christopher Pentico and Heidi Tolman in support
of the constitutional causes of action. Those affidavits raise genuine issues of material fact that
should have at the lease have been addressed at an evidentiary hearing.
(b)Ineffective assistance of counsel.

Mr. Pentico submitted the Affidavit of Bruce Bistline and Alan Derr in support of his

8 Appellants Brief
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claim for post-conviction relief. Those affidavits raise genuine issues of material fact that should
at the least have been addressed at an evidentiary hearing.
2.

Petitioner's allegations were not bare and conclusory.

As stated above the petitioner has supplemented the record with the affidavits of trial
counsel Alan Derr and appellate counsel Bruce Bistline. While it is true that this Court does not
need to accept the petitioner's conclusions the Trial Court should have addressed the facts that
were introduced, which when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party raise a
genuine issue of material fact that should have been addressed at an evidentiary hearing.
3.

Petitioner has previously and unsuccessfully raised the constitutional issues with
the trial court and on appeal.

The Trial Court in its order Granting Summary Dismissal state the first and second causes
of action are a restatement of the same issues decided by the Trial Court and on direct appeal.
However _it is Mr. Pentico's position that with respect to the first and second causes of action he
is not attempting to re-litigate the issues he is actually attempting to have the issues decided. On
appeal Mr. Pentico raised procedural and substantive due process issues specifically with respect
to March 25, 2008. Those issues were not decided by the trial court nor were they addressed by
the court on appeal. Mr. Pentico never waived these issues as the State claims because they were
raised on appeal, they just were never addressed by the court in its decision. The only issues
which was decided on appeal was with respect to Mr. Pentico's return to the Governor's office
on April 2, 2008 not the initial ask to leave and the Constitutionality of that request on March 25,
2008.
4.

Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel at trial in violation
of the Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Under
Strickland v. Washington.

9 Appellants Brief
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A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v.

California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance
of that counsel.

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985).

The Idaho Constitution also

guarantees a criminal defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; I.C. § 19-852.

In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance;
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id.
Courts will not attempt to second-guess trial counsel's strategic decisions unless those decisions
are made upon the basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho at 145, 139 P.3d at
747.
The Trial Court held that the Petitioner's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel failed
to raise an issue of material fact. Mr. Pentico supported his claims with affidavits which were
attached to his Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition.

The Trial Court also

seems to have overlooked the record of the trial proceedings, which establish the factual basis for

10 Appellants Brief

000118

most of the claims, which largely consist of errors of omissions at trial. Thus, Mr. Pentico has
done far more than make bare and conclusory allegations which entitled him to a hearing on the
merits of his claim
The United States Supreme Court has said that the duty of the defense lawyer "is to make
the adversarial testing process work in the particular case." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104
S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). Thus, it is defense counsel's specific performance in Mr. Pentico's
case which matters, not his body of work over a career or his reputation. The purpose of the
effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to castigate the lack of diligence or
talent of the mediocre lawyers or to lionize the career accomplishments of the best lawyers.
"The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 6809.
Mr. Pentico has shown that defense counsel rendered deficient performance in several
instances and the state did not controvert this evidence. The petitioner has supported this section
with affidavits demonstrating the evidence which was available at the time of trial, its
significance and the failure of the courts to address them on direct appeal because the issues were
not preserved for appeal by trial counsel. The Court of Appeals in its decision held that the
record on appeal was not adequate to allow it to review Pentico's claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, and it declined to do so. The affidavits provided to this Court with regard to March
25, 2008 and the Motion in Limine state that it was not a tactical or strategic decision of trail
counsel not to raise those issues. Further the affidavit of Bruce Bistline asserts that there would
or could be no strategic reason as to omit of recognize the importance of the March 25, 2008
date.

11 Appellants Brief
000119

...

~

.

...

CONCLUSION
The facts at issues were material and the State did not controvert the allegations by
affidavits, depositions or any other type of evidence. Talcing the allegations as true, and viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Pentico, he has demonstrated a material issue of
fact as to the deficient performance of counsel and that the performance resulted in prejudice Mr.
Pentico is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the matter.

Because In light of the above, the

Trial Court erred by granting Summary Dismissal without a hearing and this Court should
remand and order the Court to set this matter for an evidentiary hearing.

Respectfully submitted this

~5""'

day of November 2013.

HEIDITOL~
Attorney for Defendant
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This case is on appeal to the District Court from the Magistrate Court's decision that
Christopher Pentico (Pentico) is not entitled to post conviction relief following his conviction for
Trespass. The State argues that the Magistrate Court correctly dismissed the petition for postconviction relief because it failed to allege any genuine issues of material fact and contained issues
that have been, or should have been, brought on direct appeal.
Facts and Procedural History

On April 2, 2008, Pentico was cited for Trespass, which was ultimately amended to
Trespass pursuant to LC. § 18-7008.

On November 12, 2008, Pentico filed his Motion to

Dismiss Amended Complaint, raising constitutional issues regarding the application of LC. § 187008. On January 6, 2009, the Trial Court held a hearing on the motion and denied it, finding no
constitutional infirmities. In so holding, the trial court found that the statute placed reasonable
restrictions on the time place and manner in which constitutional rights could be exercised. State

v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906,910,265 P.3d 519, 523 (Ct. App. 2011). Subsequently, Pentico filed
a motion in limine that sought to limit testimony regarding any of his prior bad acts or wrongs.

Id. This motion was granted by the Magistrate as it pertained to any prior dealings Pentico had
with government officials on days other than April 2, 2008. Id.
A court trial was held on April 21, 2009. Pentico was found guilty of Trespass under LC.

§ 18-7008, and was sentenced on May 11, 2009.
Pentico filed his appeal with the district court on June 22, 2009. Judge Kathryn Sticklen
affirmed the Trial Court's decision in a Memorandum Decision and Order filed on May 13, 2010.
Pentico appealed this decision to the Idaho Supreme Court on June 24, 2010.

3

000124

On October 17, 2011, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming Judge Sticklen's
decision .. Pentico, 151 Idaho at 909, 265 P.3d at 522. The Supreme Court denied review, and
remittitur was issued on January 10, 2012.
Pentico filed his Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Petition) on January 4,
2013. On June 13; 2013, the trial court issued an Order Granting Summary Dismissal. In the
order, the trial court held that to the extent that Pentico seeks to relitigate constitutional issues,
such relitigation is barred by LC. § 19-4901(b). Additionally, the trial court held that the Petition
failed to raise an issue of material fact, and that the constitutional challenge was previously
raised, unsuccessfully, on direct appeal.

ISSUE ON APPEAL
The State rephrases the sole issue on appeal.
1. Whether the trial court erred by granting Summary Dismissal without a hearing on the
Petition for post-conviction relief.

Standard of review
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature. Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the
applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief is based. Unlike
the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application for postconviction relief must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the
claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an
applicant for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within
the personal knowledge of the application. The application must include
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why
such supporting evidence is not included.
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the
applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. On review of a
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing,
this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will
,liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true,
but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. When the alleged facts, even if
true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the
4
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application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Allegations contained in the
application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly
disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a
matter of law.

Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).
Argument

In the Petition, Pentico alleges three causes of action. The First Cause of action is that
Pentico's Due Process Rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution were violated. The Second Cause of action
likewise deals with violations of the same rights, but for different conduct. The Third Cause of
action alleges that Pentico was denied the right to fully challenge the constitutionality of LC. §
18-7008(8) as applied to this case.
Although there is only one overarching issue on appeal, there are multiple subparts that
need to be addressed.

There are three reasons why the Magistrate's decision to summarily

dismiss the case without hearing was correct. Specifically those are: the Petition did not raise
any allegations of material fact; the issues raised in the Petition were previously and
unsuccessfully raised at trial and on direct appeal; and that to the extent any of the issues in the
Petition are different than those previously asserted, those issues are forfeited due to LC. § 19490l(b).
A. The trial court did not err in dismissing Pentico's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
without a hearing because the allegations raised no material issue of fact.

As stated above, summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate
if the applicant's evidence raised no genuine issue of material fact:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

5
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LC. § 19-4906. Absent a genuine issue of material fact, a petition for post-conviction relief may
be properly dismissed without a hearing. LC. § 19-4906(b).
To fully analyze whether a genuine issue of material fact has been alleged, it is necessary
to view the alleged facts in light of the case law. "A material fact has 'some logical connection
with the consequential facts[,]' Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." State v. Yakovac,
145 Idaho 437,444, 180 P.3d 476,483 (2008).
Therefore in this case, it is necessary to analyze whether the alleged facts would create a
genuine issue in the context of the applicable law. Idaho Courts have previously adopted the
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). See Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 525, 164 P.3d 798, 805 (2007). However, the
nature of this appeal does not reach the prongs articulated in Strickland. Rather, this appeal is
dealing with the threshold issue of whether any of the alleged facts might rise to the level of
material fact. Given this, it is more pertinent to analyze the nature of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim:
When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not
second-guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a
basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings
capable of objective review.

State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476,483 (2008) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho
581,584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000)). The holding in Yakovac clearly narrows the possible scope of
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and, accordingly, limits the facts that might be
material or consequential.

6

000127

The facts as alleged in the Petition do not fit within the scope of an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. What the Petition alleges to be failures, can more accurately be deemed tactical
decisions made by counsel. For example, Pentico filed a Motion in Limine to prevent evidence
of other bad acts from coming into evidence at trial. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded
that this tactical decision limited the testimony before' the Magistrate Court, and ultimately
limited the record on appeal. State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906,913,265 P.3d 519, 526 (Ct. App.
2011). Such a decision does not constitute inadequate preparation or ignorance of the law, but
rather a calculated decision in the context of a trial.
Additionally, as discussed below, many of the Constitutional issues were addressed on
direct appeal and should not be at issue on post-conviction. It appears that the majority of the
issues presented in the Petition fall into this latter category, and for that reason, any facts related
to previously litigated, issues are not material for purposes of post-conviction relief. Therefore,
the magistrate court correctly held that summary dismissal was appropriate.

B. The issues raised in the Petition were previously and unsuccessfully raised at the
trial court and on direct appeal.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has previously held that "[g]enerally speaking, a claim or
issue which was or could have been raised on appeal may not be considered in post-conviction
proceedings." Whitehawkv. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1989).
Going further, the Court of Appeals held that "[a] convicted defendant may not simply relitigate
the same factual questions in his application, in virtually the same factual context already
presented in a direct appeal." Id. This holding is consistent with I.C. § 19-4901(b) which states
in part:
This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction. Any
issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and
may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the
7
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court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or
otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence,
have been presented earlier.
The bulk of the Petition is clearly an attempt to relitigate the constitutional issues
previously decided at the trial court and on direct appeal to the Court of Appeals. For example,
the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether I. C. § 18-7008(8) is facially
unconstitutional. State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 913, 265 P.3d 519, 526 (Ct. App. 2011).
Additionally, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the statute was unconstitutional as applied
to Pentico. Id., at 914,265 P.3d at 527. On this point, the Court of Appeals held that the statute
was not unconstitutionally overbroad as it applied to Pentico's conduct on April 2, 2008. Id. On
the issue of vagueness, the Court of Appeals first noted that the issue was not properly preserved
for appeal, but went on to analyze the statute and determined that the statute is not vague as
applied. Id., at 915, 265 P.3d at 528. 1
Because many of the issues in the Petition are either attempts to relitigate or rephrase
issues, the State respectfully asked the trial court to dismiss the Petition.

C. To the extent that any issues in the Petition are different than those previously
asserted, Pentico has forfeited his right to pursue those issues under J.C. § 194901 (b ).
All three of the causes of action alleged by the Petition touch on constitutional issues that
previously asserted at a different stage of litigation. However, to the extent that the issues raised
in the Petition differ from those previously asserted, those issues have been procedurally waived
by operation ofl.C. § 19-4901(b) as applied by the Court of Appeals in cases like Whitehawk.

1 It

should be noted that the Court of Appeals' analysis of this issue effectively mitigated any
potential ineffective assistance of counsel related to the preservation of an issue on appeal.
8
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Conclusion

It is clear that the Magistrate Court correctly granted summary dismissal on the Petition
without a hearing. Many of the issues brought on post-conviction dealt with matters previously
addressed by the trial court or the Court of Appeals. As such, addressing those issues here would
amount to a second bite of the apple in contravention of I.C. § 19-4901(b). For any of the
remaining issues, there are no alleged genuine issues of material fact that would necessitate a
hearing on the Petition. Therefore, we ask that the Court affirm the decision of the Magistrate
Court.

DATED this

23 day of December 2013.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

B~~
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I.

INTRODUCTION
The State's defense of the Summary Dismissal entered in this action for Post-

Conviction Relief, attempts to perpetuate the failure of the State's attorney, the Trial
Court and Mr. Pentico's Trial Counsel to appreciate that guilt for a violation of I.C. § 187008(A)(8) requires the occurrence of two distinct events which must occur in a
prescribed order such that the lawful occurrence of the first is a necessary predicate to
the criminality of the second.

Either one of these events is, in the context of public land

which is a traditional public forum, open to challenge upon Constitutional grounds.
Before a person can be prosecuted for being on a parcel of land which he has
previously been asked to leave he must return to that parcel within one year of being
there and being asked to leave.

Obviously, if the first event, the "ask to leave," is

defective for some reason then the second event, "the return," is not criminal conduct.
An ongoing lack of recognition that these two very distinct and separate events warrant
independent factual, legal and Constitutional analysis allows the State's arguments to,
at first blush, seem to be rational. But, when the events are analyzed separately, as
they must be, it is apparent that the State's assertion that Mr. Pentico's Constitutional
challenges have all be addressed is erroneous.

As these unresolved Constitutional

challenges could not be made on appeal because they were not recognized, raised, or
preserved by Trial Counsel; the claim that Mr. Pentico has failed to frame an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is equally erroneous.
I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8), at least facially, is focused upon the rights of private
property owners.

Because of the lack of clear application to public land (which has

custodians but no owners), it is possible to understand, though not accept, Trial
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Counsel's failure to appreciate the issues which surround the "ask to leave" when the
statute is applied to public property. It is clear beyond question that the "ask to leave"
could, as to private property, be defective if the person making that request was not the
owner or an authorized agent of the owner or if the person being asked to leave was not
on the property (and thus unable to "depart"). It is also clear and appropriate that, as to
private property, there is no need for there to be any reason for asking a person to leave
other than their mere presence.
The limits, upon the power to "ask to leave" are a good deal less clear when it
comes to public property. To this point much, indeed an excessive amount of, reliance
has been placed by the State and the Courts upon State v. Korsen 138 Idaho 706, 69
P.3d 126 (2003).

It is true that the Idaho Supreme Court determined in Korsen that a

person exercising protected rights could under the circumstances present in that case
(business being conducted on State property was

complete and Mr. Korsen had

become loud and threatening) be asked to leave State administrative offices. However,
Korsen cannot be read as holding that a person who is upon State property which is a
traditional public forum (affording greater protection than visits to administrative offices)
for the purpose of exercising protected rights can, at risk of prosecution, be asked to
leave that property for any reason or no reason at all (a substantially lower standard for
the request that was present in Korsen).
Thus, where I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) is being applied to public land which is a
traditional public forum and consequently open to the public for the exercise of the
freedoms guaranteed to them by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
the "ask to leave" itself must be based upon conduct which is sufficient to truncate the
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protected exercise of those rights. In other words, while an "ask to leave" can occur on
private property for any reason or no reason at all, an "ask to leave" on public property
must perforce be based upon a justification which is constitutionally sufficient.

The

State is not capable of citing any authority to the contrary.
In the criminal proceedings at issue here no one seems to have given any
consideration to the question of whether there was a constitutionally sufficient basis for
anyone to ask Mr. Pentico to leave the grounds of the interim Statehouse when he was
there to speak to a legislator about a matter of concern to him. Yet, if this conduct was
constitutionally protected, as it clearly is, than, either the statutory authority to "ask to
leave" is constitutionally defective (overbroad and vague as applied) and not
enforceable or the "ask to leave" was itself defective. If the "ask to leave," on March 25,
2008, was defective then the "return within one year," on April 2, 2008, was itself not a
violation of the statute.

Mr. Pentico's Trial Counsel clearly not recognize these issue

and as a consequence he did not raise them.
The failure to recognize that criminality under the statute turns upon the
succession of two significant and separate events lead to the failure to raise additional
constitutional arguments.

As they were not raised they were not considered and

addressed on appeal. First, even where it true that a person can be asked to leave a
traditional public forum for any reason or no reason at all (a proposition for which there
is not one iota of authority), that statute is facially overbroad to the extent that it provides
for an automatic exclusion from that parcel for a full one year following the ask to leave
without any regard for the otherwise protected rights being exercised on the return (in
other words and impermissible prior restraint of speech).

Second, even if the "ask to
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leave" were not defective and if, as the Court of Appeals concluded, an "ask to leave"
parcel A where the intruder is standing can be extended to allow exclusion form parcels

8 and C, how can the unambiguous language of the statute be read as providing
constitutionally sufficient notice of the criminality of a subsequent entry onto parcel 8 or
C (in other words a vagueness as applied problem that was never raised or decided).
Third, even if the "ask to leave" were not defective, how, in the absence of any
procedural due process can the "ask to leave" be applied to preclude subsequent entry
for constitutionally protected purposes onto public land which is open to the public for
the exact purpose for which it was subsequently used.
None of these challenges were presented to the Trial Court and none were
resolved by the Trial Court.

They were not presented because trial counsel did not

appreciate their role and as a consequence he did not develop the record to include, at
least by offer of proof, the available facts that would have supported argument on these
issues and he did not raise these issues by motion, briefing or argument.
Thus, in sum, Mr. Pentico was wrongfully convicted because he received
inadequate assistance of Counsel and because the extent to which I. C. § 18-7008(A)(4)
is Constitutionally defective as applied in this case to public land was never fully
presented to or considered by the Courts.
II.

ARUGMENT

A.

The Verified Petition and Supporting Documents Present the Court with Material
Facts Which if Taken as True, Support the Relief Requested.

Faced with Mr. Pentico's Verified Petition setting forth the events, the actions, the
omissions and the claims being made based on these events, actions and omissions
accompanied by Trial Counsel's affidavit detailing his thought process and the defenses
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that he did not recognize and an affidavit of Mr. Pentico's expert detailing the errors
made by Trial Counsel, the Trial Court concluded Petitioner had failed "to raise an issue
of material fact." Order Granting Summary Dismissal pp. 1 & 2. This is, of course, not
the standard by which the Petition should be judged. The question to be evaluated is
whether the Petition and the supporting documents present facts which, if taken to be
true, would entitled the Petitioner to the requested relief and are material to the
requested relief. Fenstermaker v. State 128 Idaho 285, 287,912 P.2d 653, 655 (Ct.App.
1999) (overruled on other grounds State v. Porter, 2005 Ida. App. Lexis 1).
The State has not controverted any of the facts or opinions placed into the record
by Petitioner.

The State has not challenged the facts and claims set forth in the

Petition or sought to strike or otherwise challenge the affidavits filed by Mr. Pentico.
The State has not demonstrated that Mr. Pentico's Constitutional challenges are without
merit. The State merely appears to contend that the facts and opinions placed in the
record by Mr. Pentico are not material for the reason even if taken to be true they do not
warrant the relief sought. This is a bit of a curious position given that the State also
argues that Mr. Pentico cannot raise Constitutional arguments because they are barred
by I.C. 4901(b) which applies to issues which could have been but were not raised
below.

If these unchallenged Constitutional arguments are barred because they were

not raised by Trial Counsel is that not in and of itself material and substantial evidence
of ineffective assistance of counsel? In any event the States claim that the record is
devoid of material facts is contrary to the record.
The Verified Petition and the supporting affidavits demonstrate a factual basis for
an argument that there was no legally and constitutionally sufficient "ask to leave" and
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thus the return could not be itself criminal conduct. For the purpose of this proceeding it
must be assumed that Mr. Pentico had, immediately prior to the "ask to leave" just
arrived upon the grounds of the interim Statehouse for the purpose of speaking with a
Legislator to seek help in getting an Attorney General's Opinion. There is no evidence
that he had behaved inappropriately or in a manner that would truncate his rights as a
member of the public to go to the Statehouse for exactly that purpose. This argument
was raised on appeal but, the State's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding,
Respondent's Brief, p.8, the Court did not address, as in resolve, this issue. Indeed the
Court specifically stated: "Therefore, the only challenge preserved for appeal is whether
the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Pentico on April 2 when he delivered a
letter to the Governor's Office." State v. Pentico 151 Idaho 906, 913, 265 P.3d 519,526
(Ct.App.2011 ).
The record reflects that Trial Counsel, has acknowledged that he did not see or
consciously choose not to raise this defense because he was instead focused on what
he considered to be the wrongfulness of charging Mr. Pentico for what he considered to
be protected activity on April 2. 1 Mr. Pentico's expert, opined that there was, based on
an interview with Mr. Pentico, and adequate factual basis for a legal and Constitutional
challenge to the "ask to leave" and that the failure to make a record of the facts and to
assert this defense was not based upon any conceivable strategy decision and
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.2 . Neither the Trial Court nor the State

1

Affidavit of Allen R. Derr, Filed with the Court as Exhibit C to Petitioner's
Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 4 (hereinafter Aff. Derr).
2

Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline, Filed with the Court as Exhibit D to Petitioneros
Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition, pp. 7, 8, 9(a) (hereinafter Aff.
Bistline)
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have demonstrated how these facts are not sufficient to warrant the relief requested; a
new trial based upon Trial Counsel's failure to provide an effective defense by
challenging the legality of a predicate event and by creating an adequate records to
support raising and preserving important factual, legal and Constitutional defenses. 3
The Verified Petition and the supporting affidavits demonstrate that even if there
was a legally sufficient and Constitutional "ask to leave," the statute was, for reasons
not raised before the Trial Court, constitutionally defective when applied to a visit to the
Governor's office on April 2, 2008.

The identified defects are a lack of procedural due

process associated with an automatic 1 year exclusion of the identified properties even
though those properties are open to the public and commonly used for the exercise of
Constitutionally protected rights and the lack of substantive due process associated with
the fact that the statute did not, given its clear and unambiguous language, give fair
notice that an "ask to leave" occurring upon one property could be extended to
properties other than the one upon which the ask to leave occurred. The claim to these
challenges and the failure to raise them are set forth in the Verified Petition. 4 The State
erroneously claims that these arguments were resolved by the Court of Appeals. The
The State does argue that all of Mr. Pentico's constitutional challenges have
been previously presented to and resolved. It is true that Mr. Pentico's arguments
regarding his claim that the trip to the Governor's office on April 2 was protected speech
were resolved; but they are not raised again. It is equally true that Mr. Pentico
attempted to raise his other constitutional arguments relative to the "ask to leave," the
one year exclusion, and the vagueness of the statute to the extent it was applied to
allow the "ask to leave" to be extended from the property on which it occurred to other
properties. These are the arguments raised here. See, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of
Heidi Tolman, itself Exhibit A to Petitioner's Response to State's Motion For Summary
Disposition. But the State cannot point to any judicial determination of these issues,
other than the determination that they had not been preserved in the record and could
not be raised on appeal.
3

4

See, Verified Petition, Second Cause of Action
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Court of Appeals did not even discuss the procedural due process issues but only
concluded that as applied to Mr. Pentico's trip to the Governor's office it was not
overbroad. Id. 914, 265 P.3d at 526.
The Court did, in dicta (having already decided the issue was not preserved for
appeal) discuss the vagueness challenge.

However, the Court's conclusion in that

regard is, like much dicta, not fully reasoned out. In this instance, the Court relied upon
its earlier, and completely inappropriate, "construction" of the clear and unambiguous
language of I.C. §18-7008(A)(8) in a manner that allowed a person being asked to leave
the property upon which he was standing, to be simultaneously excluded from other
properties upon which he was not standing at the time of the "ask to leave." This
"construction" of the statute resulted from the Court's conflation of the rules of statutory
"interpretation" with the rules of statutory "construction" applicable only when there is an
ambiguity. As a consequence the Court perceived that it had the power to read the
clear and unambiguous language of the I.C. §18-7008(A)(8) to mean something other
than what it clearly states so as to avoid a judicially perceived absurdity. This approach
has been soundly and clearly discredited by the Idaho Supreme Court. Verska v. St.
Alphonsus Regional Med. Ctr. 151 Idaho 889, 895-896, 265 P.3d 502(505-506) (2011 )).

However, since the issue of the Constitutionality of applying such a strained reading to
otherwise clear language was not preserved for Appeal, Mr. Pentico has, as yet not had
the chance to challenge this statute, read in this manner, as void for vagueness.
The failure of Trial Counsel to assert these procedural and substantive due
process claims is set forth in the Third Cause of Action, 26(e)(ii) and (iv).

Trial

000140

Counsel acknowledged that he did not recognize these due process based challenges. 5
Mr. Pentico's expert opined that these were readily recognizable defenses which should
have been raised. 6 Neither the Trial Court nor the State have demonstrated how these
facts, if true, are not sufficient to warrant the relief requested; a new trial based upon
Trial Counsel's failure to provide an effective defense by creating an adequate record to
support raising and preserving important constitutional defenses.

B.

Dispositive Constitutional Issues Were Not Decided Below

The Magistrate Court has, without explanation, concluded that the Verified
Petition seeks to raise the same Constitutional issues that were decided by the Trial
Court, that the Verified Petition fails to raise "any issue of material fact with regard to the
constitutional application of Idaho's trespass statute to the facts of the case ... " and that
an attempt to "reframe the issue as one of substantive and procedural due process" is
barred by operation of I.C. § 19-4901(b). Order Granting Summary Dismssal pp. 1-2.
Apparently the Magistrate Court does not recognize, as the Court of Appeals did, that
the events of March 25th present different issues than are presented relative to the
events of April 2.

While the Court of Appeals understood that Mr. Pentico sought to

challenge the "ask to leave" and the subsequent one year automatic exclusion from
both the property on which the "ask" occurred but on properties other than the one on
which the "ask" occurred, it ruled that Trial Counsel had failed to properly preserve this
for appeal and that they could not therefore be considered on appeal.

5

Aff. Derr p. 5

6

Aff Bistline pp. 7, 9(b).
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The State attempts to justify the Magistrates conclusion that the Constitutional
arguments asserted in the Verified Petition were resolved in the criminal proceedings by
pointing to portions of the Court of Appeals decisions, discussed above, in which the
Court "addressed" (but having ruled it was not preserved did not resolve) over breadth
as to March 25, ruled that statute was not overbroad as applied to April 2 (which is not a
resolution of that question as to March 25) and discussed vagueness in clear, and as it
turns out incorrect, dicta. What the State does not do is to show how the Constitutional
arguments being asserted in this proceeding, either have been resolved in any part of
the criminal proceeding involving Mr. Pentico or in any other action in this State. Nor
does the State provide any basis upon which this Court could conclude that these
Constitutional arguments are not substantial and dispositive. For the purpose of this
proceeding those arguments, standing as they are uncontroverted, must be taken as
valid.
The State also makes no attempt to demonstrate how the facts presented
relative to Mr. Pentico's conduct on March 25, taken as true, are not material to and
sufficient support for the Constitutional arguments which he contends preclude a
conviction for trespass in violation of I.C. §18-7008(A)(8)
The State, while willing to jump on the band wagon relative to the Magistrates
reliance on I.C. §19-4901(b), makes no attempt to explain how the matters which Mr.
Pentico is, in the Courts eyes, seeking to reframe as procedural and substantive due
process issues are not either issues which, to the extent they preclude conviction, he is
entitled to have resolved now, or alternatively, if they really should have been raised
earlier, issues which were waived by virtue of ineffective assistance of counsel.

In any
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event the mere suggestion that there are issues which are precluded now because they
should have been presented in the criminal proceeding is an admission that there are
issues which were not resolved in the criminal proceeding and which were waived by
virtue of Trial Counsel's lack of awareness of them.
In any event, Mr. Pentico has clearly stated constitutional issues which he is
entitled to have resolved and which were expressly not resolved in any proceeding to
this point.

He has provided a factual record to support those challenges.

He has

alleged that asking him to leave a traditional_ public forum on March 25, 2008, when he
was using that forum for the exact purpose for which it was intended is an
unconstitutional predicate event for a violation of I.C. 18-7008 (A)(8). 7 He has alleged
that applying the statute in a manner which allows for absolute and automatic exclusion,
for 1 year, from public properties identified during the "ask to leave" which was open to
the public for the exact purpose for which Mr. Pentico sought use it is a violation of
substantive and procedural due process both facially and as applied to him. 8
The State, other than attempting to ignore these issues, has not demonstrated
how or where these issues have been heard and decided in any judicial proceeding.
All that has happened to this point is that the Court of Appeals recognized the desire to
have the challenges addressed and then specifically concluded that Mr. Pentico could
not raise his challenges relative to the "ask to leave" on March 25 th .

He was precluded

from doing so both because they were not preserved for appeal by Trial Counsel and

7

Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief, First Cause of Action pp.3-4,
(hereinafter the "Petition.") and Affidavit of Christopher A. Pentico pp. 2-6 (hereinafter
"Aff Pentico").
8

Petition, Second Cause of Action.
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because the record developed by Trial Counsel was inadequate to permit that
determination that either challenge could be treated as a fundamental error. State v.
Pentico 151 Idaho 906,913,265 P.3d 519,536 (Ct.App. 2011).

C.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel is Manifest on the Face of the Record.
l.

Trail Counsel's representation ofMr. Pentico was ineffective.

The circumstances of this case presented obvious and for the purposes of this
proceeding presumptively dispositive Constitutional and legal challenges to a
prosecution of Mr. Pentico for a violation of I.C. §18-7008(a)(8).

Because those

challenges were not made; no record of the available evidence was created. Because
there was no record Mr. Pentico could not get the issues addressed on Appeal.
Because the issues were not raised in the Trial Court or preserved for Appeal, Mr.
Pentico has never had the benefit of asserting the challenges and protecting his rights.
This series of events was set in motion because, Trial Counsel, as he admits, did
not recognize those challenges and was focused entirely on a challenge arising from
the claim that Mr. Pentico's trip to the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008, was itself
Constitutionally protected activity.

Trial Counsel may well have been knocked off the

track by the State's multiple attempts to find a law under which it could prosecute Mr.
Pentico, but that does not change the fact that Trial Counsel only represented Mr.
Pentico with respect to one half of the elements of the charge upon which he was tried
and consequently failed to raise and preserve over half of the critical defenses.
2.

Trial Counsel's deficient representation was not the byproduct ofstrategic
decisions.
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Trial Counsel's failure to present substantial and material defenses was not a
byproduct of a strategic decision. Indeed it could not be the byproduct of a strategic
decision because by definition, a strategic decision involves recognition of the options
and a conscious election to set one or more of the options aside. Trial Counsel having
not recognized the options9 could not make a conscious election to set one or more of
them aside.
The State, taking the lead of the Court of Appeals, seeks to frame Trial Counsel's
conduct as the consequences of a strategic choice.

This frame job will not sustain

scrutiny. The potential impact of the Motion in Limine was raised sua sponte by the
Court of Appeals. As a consequence the theory was not briefed and not fully analyzed
and it is, for several reasons, wrong.

First, it is not at all clear that the Trial Court

intended to preclude evidence of Mr. Pentico's activities at the time he was "asked to
leave" because it is not clear that either party intended to present such evidence.
Moreover, it appears that the Court was ruling to exclude evidence of protected first
amendment activities on April 2, based on its prior ruling and not based on the Motion in
Limine and that it was specifically not intending to preclude evidence relative to March
25, 2008. 10

In any event, a Rule 404(b) based Motion in Limine could, properly applied,
never work to preclude evidence relative to the events of March 25, 2008. That Rule
pertains to evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" which are offered to prove a
person's character or that the conduct subject to trial was in conformity with prior
9

Aff. Derr p. 6

Trial Transcript, April 21, 2009, pp 5-7. In fact the Court specifically ruled that
evidence regarding March 25th would be allowed.
10
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conduct.

Evidence relative to the conduct of March 25, 2008, which subjected Mr.

Pentico to the "ask to leave" is not evidence pertaining to a different crime than the one
charged. As evidence pertaining to the predicate event to the conduct on trial, the
events of March 25, 2008 are an integral part of the crime charged. Moreover if offered
to demonstrate that the "ask to leave" was legally sufficient or insufficient it would not be
precluded by Rule 404(b ).

Because Trial Counsel did not appreciate the importance of

challenging the predicate event, the "ask to leave" on factual, legal and Constitutional
grounds he did not even contemplate the possible confusion that might be generated by
a Rule 404(b) Motion and having not contemplated it he did not take steps to challenge
a misapplication of the rule, if one was in fact occurring, to excluded the evidence
invalidating the predicate event. 11 Similarly he did not take steps, by offer of proof, to
protect the record if he was incorrectly barred from presenting evidence about
Constitutionally protected conduct which invalidated the "ask to leave."
3.

The record, taken as true, is sufficient to demonstrate by objective review,
that Trial Counsel failed to provide Constitutionally sufficient
representation.
I

To present triable ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mr. Pentico needs only
to demonstrate that this record, if taken as true, is sufficient to support an objective
review of the competency of the conduct of Trial Counsel and that the deficient
performance prejudiced Mr. Pentico. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) as
applied by State v. Yakovac 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.3d 476 (2008).

For the purposes of

this proceeding the assertion that the Constitutional challenges precluded prosecution
remains unchallenged and therefore prejudice must, for the purposes of a Summary

11

Aff. Derr p. 6, Aff Bistline p. 9(b)
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Dismissal, be taken as a given.

The question then is whether the failures of Trial

Counsel can on objective review establish by a preponderance of the evidence to have
been constitutionally deficient. The Magistrate and the State have failed to challenge
the veracity of the demonstrated omissions. Neither the Magistrate nor the State have
made any attempt to explain how the omissions are excusable or defend them as lying
with the boundaries of reasonable professional performance. The State has attempted
to attribute at least some of the problems to a strategic decision but Trial Counsel's own
admissions refute this assertion.
What the records shows is that, for whatever reason, a normally competent
lawyer, failed to recognize all of the elements which must be proven by the State to
support the conviction and as a consequence failed to bring the force of his skills to
bare upon the weakest link in the criminal charge that was ultimately brought against his
client.

On this record, it is not possible to conclude that Mr. Pentico has failed to

demonstrate a triable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that this Court should
remand this matter to the Magistrate for an evidentiary hearing.

Respectfully submitted this

_cg-=-_ day of January 2014.
HEIDI~
Attorney for Defendant

16 Appellants Brief
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and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above-captioned matter to:

Ada County Prosecutor's Office

By interdepartmental mail
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Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone:
(208) 287-7400
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(208) 287-7419

FEB O4 20f4
CHRISTOPHER D. AICH, Clerk
By JAMIE MARTIN
DEPUTv

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

CHRISTOPHER PENTICO,
Appellant.

COMES NOW,

Defender's Office,

CV PC 2013 248

MOTION TO CONTINUE

the above-named Defendant,

by and through his Attorney of

moves

Criminal No.

Record,

Christopher Pentico,

the Ada

County Public

Heidi Tolman,_ han.¢1.ling attorney,
"

this Honorable Court

~

'

for

and hereby

its Order to continue the Oral

Argument now scheduled for the 6th day of February, 2014, at the
hour

of

4: 00

pm.

-In

support

of

this

motion,

the

defendant

states as follows:
The Appellant's Counsel is in a 2 day drug DUI

jury trial

in front of the Honorable Judge James Cawthon beginning at 9 am
on February 6, 2014.

MOTION TO CONTINUE, Page 1
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DATED, this

__i_

day of February, 2014 .

.. ~

Heidi To man
Attorney for Defendant

,'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this ± d a y of February, 2014,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the:
Ada County Prosecutor

by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

MOTION TO CONTINUE, Page 2
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CV PC 2013 248
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Court
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Defendant's MOTION TO CONTINUE.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

Argument

is
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2014, at the hour of

DATED, this
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\

'6--tY'day
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the Oral
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3~ ~
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Mclaughlin Ellis 021314.mbee

-

Courtroom401

Speaker
Time
Note
Penclto v. State CVPC13-00248 Oral Argument
03:36:40 PM
Heidi
counsel for Petitioner
03:59:00 PM
Tolman
··o"rs·9:os PM Christopher counsel for State of Idaho
Mccurdy
!

03:59:22 PM Court

appeal from Petitioner raising constitutional issues regarding
offense charged as well as final claim raising ineffective assistance
of counsel. Court believes Ms. Tolman may want to focus on
ineffective claim.
2 Distinct events, (1) Asked to Leave 3/25 and (2) Return 04/02.
No valid Asked to leave, don't believe can charge constitutionally on
the Return. Fundamentally wrong to be asked to leave. Question is
whether the petition and supporting documents support the facts.
April 2nd has been addressed. March 25 is the issue. Asked to
leave was never challenged.

04:01:33 PM Heidi
Tolman

04: 12:26..PM Christopher Forfeiture of Issues. 19-4901 argued. Facts to petition were late
Mccurdy
and waived. Should be dismissed.
04:21:28 PM Heidi
tolman
04:26:25 PM Court
04:26:39 PM End Case

2/13/2014

'

response. Language in Korsen that if issue brought up would have
chilling effect. March 25 was engaging in protected conduct.
Argues ineffective assistance.
will take under advisement and enter written decision

1 of 1

000152

·i

,.I>

::::-=.:::·1'1-_~:.-M-.

J.....,...'

...,f-'l_..

FEB 1 9 2014
CHRiSTO~ 0. ~ . Clerk
a~~/\BBOTT
8i:M-Y

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,

Petitioner-Appellant,

Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248

vs.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: HEIDI TOLMAN
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: STACY LANGTON

This case is before the Court on the Petitioner's (Mr. Pentico's) appeal from the
decision of Magistrate Judge, Hon. Kevin Swain, summarily dismissing his petition
seeking post-conviction relief. For the reasons that follow, Judge Swain's decision will
be affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following procedural statement is taken from Mr. Pentico's brief and appears
to essentially be undisputed:
On April 2, 2008, Pentico was charge~_w.i~h trespassing, a misdemeanor
violation of I.C. § 18-7011 ... A trial was set for April 21, 2009, and at that
time, Pentico waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded with a court trial
Memorandum Decision and Order 1
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. . . The Trial Court found Pentico guilty of the misdemeanor offense of
trespass on April 21, 2009. Pentico was sentenced on May 11, 2009.
Pentico appealed to the District Court on June 22, 2009 and the District
Court affirmed the Trial Court's decision on May 13, 2010. An appeal to
the Supreme Court was filed on June 24, 2010. The Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed the District Court's opinion when it issued its Remittitur January
10, 2012.
Pentico filed his verified Petition for Post-Conviction relief .on January 4,
2013, in which three causes of action are alleged. The State filed its
Answer, Motion for Summary Dismissal and Brief in Support on March 26,
2013. The Trial Court filed its Notice of Intent to Grant Summary Dismissal
on April 30, 2013. Pentico filed his Response to the State's Motion for
Summary Disposition on May 20, 2013. The Trial Court Granted Summary
Dismissal on June 13, 2013. This appeal follows. Appellant's Brief, at 2-5.
Beginning in 2007, the Idaho Capitol closed to the public for renovation
and the Governor's office was temporarily moved to the third floor of the
nearby Borah Building. On March 25, 2008, an officer stopped Pentico on
state property, in the vicinity of the Capito.I Annex, and informed Pentico
that he was no longer authorized to be at the Capitol Annex, the third and
fourth floors of the Borah Building, and the department of education. On
April 2, 2008, Pentico visited the Governor's office on the third floor of the
Borah Building. After Pentico left the Borah Building, he was cited for
trespass in violation of I.C. § 18-7011. Months later, the state filed an
amended complaint charging Pentico with trespass in violation of I.C. §
18-7008. State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 909, 265 P.3d 519 (Ct. App.
2012). 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving
a trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court .

.

',•

" 1The

record is somewhat sparse as to the reason for Pentico's exclusion from those properties. This is
so, in part, because the magistrate granted Pentico's motion in limine, prohibiting references to other
crimes, wrongs, or acts of Pentico. We note, too, that such evidence was ruled irrelevant by the
magistrate because of a determination that I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) was not unconstitutional as applied. On a
portion of a video recording, the officer referred (outside of Pentico's presence) to Pentico as having been
'harassing people at the Governor's office.' This part of the recording was disregarded by the magistrate
at Pentico's request. At sentencing, there were references to Pentico having been involved in causing a
disturbance at the department of education and that he had recently become persistent in contacting
members of the Governor's staff regarding his issue with the department of education.'' Pentico, 151
Idaho at 909 n.1, 265 P.3d at 522 n.1.
Memorandum Decision and Order 2
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.
State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of

law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller,
134 Idaho 458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000).
"When reviewing a . . . court's decision to grant or deny a petition for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing, this Court will not disturb the ...
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. A claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law. When faced with a
mixed question of fact and law, the Court will defer to the ... court's factual findings if
supported by substantial evidence, but will exercise free review over the application of
the relevant law to those facts." Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260
(2011) (internal citations omittedf
"A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal,
proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Like plaintiffs in other civil
actions, th_e petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon
which the request for post-conviction relief is bas·ed. A petition for post-conviction relie~
differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, in that it must contain more
than 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that would suffice for a complaint under
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). The petition must be verified with respect to facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits, ·records or other evidence supporting its
allegations must be attached, or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is
not included. In other words, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible
evidence supporting its allegations, or it will_ be subject to dismissal." Schultz v. State,
153 Idaho 791, 795-96, 291 P.3d 474, 478-79 (Ct. App. 2012).
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"Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for
post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own
initiative, if 'it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions and agreements of facts, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.' I.C. § 19-4906(c). When considering summary dismissal, the district
court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner's favor, but the court is not required
to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of law. Moreover, because the district court
rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary hearing, the
district court is not constrained to draw inferences in the_ petitioner's favor, but is free to
arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Such inferences
will not be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify
them." 153 Idaho at 796, 291 P.3d at 479.
"Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly
disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented
evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the
petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law. Thus, summary dismissal
of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate· when the court can conclude, as a
matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts
construe~ in the petitioner's favor. For this reason, summary dismissal of a postconviction petition may be appropriate even w~en the State does not controvert the
petitioner's evidence." Id.
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..
"Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition
allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim
may not be summarily dismissed. If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an
evidentiary hearing must be- conducted to resolve the factual issues." 153 Idaho at 79697, 291 P.3d at 479-80.
"On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards
utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence
asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Over questions of law,
we exercise free review." 153 Idaho at 797, 291 P.3d at 480.
"To prevail on an ineffective assistance· of counsel. claim, the defendant must
show that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was
prejudiced by the deficiency. To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of
showing ' that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. To establish prejudice, the·. applicant must show a reasonable

,
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different." Id.
ANALYSIS

In this appeal, Mr. Pentico asserts that Judge Swain erred by granting summary
dismissal "without a meaningful opportunity to be heard[.]" Appellant's Brief, at 6.
Judge Swain stated the following in his order granting summary dismissal:
Petitioner's first and second Causes of Action are restatements of the
same issues decided by the Tria! Co_urt and on direct appeal. The Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act cannot be· used as a substitute for appeal.
The Petition fails to raise any issue of material fact with regard to the
constitutional application of Idaho's trespass statute to the facts of this
case. To the extent Petitioner seeks to reframe the issue as one of
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substantive and procedural due process, re-litigation of those related
constitutional issues is barred by operation of I.C. 19-4901 (b).
Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails to raise an issue
of material fact. Trial counsel properly raised a constitutional challenge to
the application of the statute to the facts of Petitioner's case. That
challenge was not successful. It does not follow that counsel's
, performance was deficient.
As the Petition fails to raise an issue of material fact and seeks to relitigate issues previously decided on direct appeal, Respondent's Motion
for Summary Dismissal is hereby, GRANTED. Order Granting Summary
Dismissal, at 1-2.
1. First and Second Claims

Mr. Pentico's petition for post-conviction relief asserted the following grounds: (1)
"a conviction for a violation of Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) which is premised upon the
demand that a citizen leave public· property which is otherwise open to the public for the
.

·:.

same purposes for which it is being used by the citizen in question and which is made in
the absence of evidence of any inappropriate conduct, is a violation of due process
protections afforded by Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5th
Amendment of the United States Constitution." (Verified Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief, at 3); (2) "a conviction for a violation of Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) which was
premised upon the fact that a citizen, having been ordered to leave public property
which was otherwise open to the public for the same purposes for which it was being
used by the citizen in question arid which

w~s made in the absence of any inappropriate

conduct, subsequently reentered public property is a violation of due process
protections afforded by the Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5th
Amendment of the United States Constitution." (Id., at 5); and (3) "petitioner was denied
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the right to fully challenge the constitutionality of Idaho Code§ 18-7008(8) as applied to
his conduct." (Id., at 6). 2
Judge Swain did not err in summarily dismissing Mr. Pentico's first two
contentions. As noted by Judge Swain, the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act
specifically provides:
This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident
to the proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or
conviction. Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but
was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction
proceedings, unless it appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial
factual showing by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted
basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding
of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been
presented earlier. Except as otherwise provided in this act, it
comprehends and takes the place. of all other common law, statutory, or
other remedies heretofore available for 9hallenging the validity of the
conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them. I.C. §
19-4901 (7)(b).
Mr. Pentico has not shown that these claims raise a substantial doubt about the
reliability of the finding that he was guilty of trespass and that these claims, in the
exercise of due diligence, cou_ld not have been ·pr~~ente~ earlier. 3

also Affidavit of Heidi Tolman, at 1-2 ("[T]he request that Mr. Pentico leave the Capital Annex
grounds was itself unconstitutional because he was there to exercise important and protected 1st
Amendment rights ... That the portion of the statute which purports to criminalize the return to property
for one year (and in this case the 'conduct' upon which Mr. Pentico was convicted) is unconstitutional as it
pertains to entries onto State land which constitutes a Traditional Public Forum or a Designated Public
Forum .... "); Affidavit of Christopher Pentlco, at 1-2 ("On March 25, 2008, I wanted to speak [to]
Representative Lenore Barrett with whom I had recently spoken about my concerns about actions at
Boise State University which was discriminating among students and programs based upon religion ...
so I went to the interim Statehouse ... the 'Capital Annex', which was at that time the former Ada County
Courthouse .... ").
2 See

3The

Idaho Court of Appeals essentially found, notwithstanding Mr. Pentico's assertions in these two
claims that his due process rights were violated because of "the absence of evidence of any inappropriate
conduct," that the only "inappropriate conduct" required is the trespass itself. "[W]hile Pentico asserts that
only an inappropriately-behaved citizen who has no legitimate business at a public office can be asked to
leave and then be arrested for refusing to do so, Idaho cour:ts have construed the [trespass] statute to not
require that public or private property owners provide a reason for asking a person to leave their land."
State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 911-12, 265 P.3d 519, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2012).
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2. Third Claim - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mr. Pentico's third contention is based upon his assertion that he received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel as follows:
(a) "[counsel] failed through testimony or offer of proof to develop an
adequate record that [he] had entered the grounds of the Capital Annex
on March 25, 2008, for the purpose of finding and speaking to
Representative Lenore Barrett in hopes of securing her advi[c]e and
assistance with a matter of governmental action which was of concern to
[him;] (b) [counsel] failed through testimony or offer of proof to develop an
adequate record to demonstrate that prior to being confronted by officers
on the grounds of the Capital Annex, on March 25, 2008, Mr. Pentico had
done nothing more than cross the street and start to walk in the direction
of the entrance to the building with the intent of speaking to a legislator in
hopes of securing her advi[c]e and assistance with a matter of
governmental action which was of concern to [him;] (c) [counsel] failed
through testimony or offer of proof to develop an adequate record to
demonstrate that [he] chose to visit the public reception area of the
Governor's Office on April 2; 2008, to·· hand deliver his letter to the
Governor (as opposed to mailing it) for"the specific purpose of making a
statement both about the importance of the· matters addressed in the letter
to Mr. Pentico and about his opposition to what he perceived was an
unconstitutional attempt to bar him from accessing public property in the
same manner as and for the same reasons (some of which are
co'nstitutionally protected rights) that the property in question was open to
all other members of the public[;] (d) [counsel] failed to inquire into the
specific basis upon which Officer Pattis relied for contending he was the
· authorized agent of the owner of the property and to determine whether
there was any basis in fact to support a conclusion that Officer Pattis even
knew about let alone had been vested with sufficient authority to override,
the Governor's standing invitation for Mr. Pentico to visit the Governor's
office[;] (e) [counsel] failed to timely raise a claim that Idaho Code § 187008(8) could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's
entry into the Governor's office on April 2, 2008, because:
.

,:1

i. there was no constitutionally ~ufficient basis for asking Mr.
Pentico, on March 25, 2008, to leave the traditional public forum of
the seat of the legislature (the 'ask to leave') where is he entitled to
go to speak, observe, and to petition his government for the redress
of grievances, and, if the 'ask to leave' is not lawful, then the 'do not
return for 1 year' prong of the statute cannot be triggered and the
visit to the public reception area of Governor's office on April 2,
2008 cannot be treated as trespass under I.C. § 18-7008(8)[;] ii.
even if the 'ask to leave' was itself not constitutionally defective, the

a
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statute could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr.
Pentico's subsequent entry on to property other than the property
upon which he was standing at the time that the 'ask to leave'
occurred. The language of the statute provides no sufficient notice
that it could be applied to criminalize a subsequent entry onto
property other than property upon which an individual was standing
at the time the 'ask to leave' occurred. Given the inherent
vagueness of the statute relative to its application to Mr. Pentico's
conduct, using it to criminalize his visit to the public reception area
of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008, would violate the
procedural due process protections afforded to Mr. Pentico by Art.
I, Sec. 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5th Amendment of the
United States Constitution[;] iii. even if the 'ask to leave' was itself
not constitutionally defective and the statute could be permissibly
extended to criminalize a visit to the property other than the
property on which the 'ask to leave' occurred, the statute could not
constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to the
public reception area of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008,
because that visit was, based upon facts not placed in the record,
more than mere conduct and was thus constitutionally protected
speech; and iv. even if the 'ask to leave' was itself not
constitutionally defective, -and the. statute could be permissibly
extended to criminalize. a visit to _the property other than the
property on which the 'ask to leave' occurred, the statute could not
constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to the
public reception area of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008. The
statute works an impermissible deprivation of rights by precluding
any person and Mr. Pentico in . particular, who has not done
anything more than approach the functioning Capital Building for
the purpose of speaking to a legisl~tor, from thereafter exercising
substantial rights and liberties (including constitutionally protected
rights) available to all other citizens for a period of one year and
provides no meaningful remedial process for challenging either the
exclusion or the duration of the exclusion. Given the lack of any
meaningful due process to provide protection from arbitrary,
unreasonable and material exclusions from public property, the
statute in general ahd as applied to'_ry'lr. Pentico, violates procedural
due process protections afforded to· citizens, includin~ Mr. Pentico,
by Art. I, Sec. 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5t Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
The failure to make an evidentiary record precluded Mr. Pentico from
demonstrating that his communications with the Governor were in fact
relevant to the proceeding because, if Officer Pattis was not aware of the
standing invitation for Mr. Pentico to visit the Governor at his office and
was not vested with the authority to override that invitation, then, he was in
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fact not the 'authorized agent for the owner' with respect to his direction
that Mr. Pentico stay away from the Governor's office.
The failure to make an adequate evidentiary record precluded Mr. Pentico
from demonstrating to the Trial Court and the Appellate Courts that the
statute was unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Pentico.
The failure to raise all constitutional defenses precluded Mr. Pentico from
demonstrating to the Trial Court and the Appellate Courts that the statute
could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to the
Governor's office on April 2, 2008. Verified Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief, at 6-11. 4
As previously noted, Judge Swain concluded Mr. Pentico's "claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel fails to raise an issue of material fact. Trial counsel properly
raised a constitutional challenge to the application of the statute to the facts of
Petitioner's case. That challenge was not successful. It does not follow that counsel's
performance was deficient." Order Granting Summary Dismissal, at 2.
As also previously noted, "[a] claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to
summary dismissal if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie
case as to each essential element of the claims upon which the petitioner bears the
burden of proof. Thus, summary dismi$sal is permissible when the petitioner's evidence
has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor,
would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented,

4The

Idaho Court of Appeals noted "Pentico asserts that his trial ·counsel was ineffective because he
failed to adequately raise Pentico's constitutional challenge to the statute as it applied to him on March
25. When Pentico's trial counsel filed a motion in limine to limit any testimony regarding other crimes,
wrongs or acts of Pentico, he thereby prevented evidence from coming in regarding the events that led up
to his being asked to leave the Capitol Annex on March 25. Filing this motion may have been a tactical or
strategic decision of trial counsel, but there is no evidence in the record. Similarly, there is no evidence in
the record, and Pentico does not assert that his counsel's decision was based on inadequate preparation,
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings c~p?~!e. ~f objective evaluation. The record is not
adequate to allow us to review Pentico's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and we decline to do
·
so." Pentico, 151 Idaho at 914,265 P.3d at 527.
Memorandum Decision and Order 1O
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an evidentiary hearing must be conducted." State v. Hoffman, 153 Idaho 898, 902, 277
P.3d 1050, 1054 (Ct. App. 2012).
"To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must
show the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced
by the deficiency. To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing
that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of 'competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' Because of the distorting effects of hindsight
in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong
presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance-that is, sound trial strategy.'' Id.
"To justify an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must tender a factual showing
.

.

based on evidence that would be admissible c;1t the hearing.
·:

The petitioner must

"';-,,

support the petition with written statements from witnesses who are able to give
testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge or otherwise based upon
verifiable information.'' 153 Idaho at 903,277 P.3d at 1055.
In support of his contention that he .received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, Mr. Pentico submitted the affidavit of his trial counsel, Allen Derr, and the
affidavit of another attorney, Bruce Bistline.
In his affidavit, Mr. Derr states:
I did not consciously choose not to assert that based upon the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution Mr. Pentico was engaging in
protected activity in a lawful and appropriate manner when he was asked
to leave the Capital Annex grounds on March 25, 2008, and that as a
consequence he could not be charged with a violation of I.C. § 18-7008(8)
for returning to one of the identified properties on April 2, 2008. At the
time of defending Mr. Pentico I did not recognize that was a challenge
which could, based upon testimony that .wo_uld be given by Mr. Pentico, be
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asserted ... the provision under which the State sought to criminalize Mr.
Pentico's visit to the Governor's office on April 2, 2008 - would as to First Amendment rights constitute an impermissible prior restraint and a bar to
exercise of protected right . . . The Motion in Limine which was filed on
December 30, 2008, was not intended to preclude any evidence of
conduct on March 25, 2008, which led to the initial 'request to leave' but
rather to specifically preclude I.RE. Rule 404(b) evidence as to other
events. "5 Affidavit of Allen R. Derr, at 1-2.
The problem with Mr. Derr's affidavit is that even assuming that such an
argument was not previously raised, and it appears that it essentially was, and that
counsel erred in failing to assert this argument before Judge Swain, there is nothing
indicating a reasonable probability that this argument would have been successful and
led to a different outcome. See, e.g., Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 89, 190 P.3d 905, 908
(Ct. App. 2008) ("In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to
pursue a motion in the underlying· ·criminal ~qti9r,i, the district court may consider the
·.
.... .
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's
inactivity constituted incompetent performance. Where the alleged deficiency is
counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not
have been granted by the trial 66urt, is generally determinative of both prongs of the
Strickland test.

In this case, Piro is arguing he received ineffective assistance of

counsel for his attorneys' failure to argue Fourth Amendment grounds on his motion to
suppress. Therefore, a conclusion that the motion would have been denied and the

..

appeal affirmed is determinative of Piro's ineffective
. , assistance of counsel claim.") .
.,.'

•,

'

.

5It

appears that Mr. Derr filed the motion to limine to prevent the state from making inquiry concerning
whether Mr. Pentico was restricted from certain areas because he was viewed as harassing state workers
and officials (see n.1, supra (referencing harass~ent as~e~ions against Mr. Pentico)). See a/so n. 7, infra.
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"In Korsen [State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003)], the Idaho
S_upreme Court concluded that Idaho's trespass statute is not aimed at regulating
speech or communication in any form ... and the facts of this case do not provide a
situation where the exercise of free speech was impinged . . . Pentico was cited for
trespass for his conduct ... not for the content of any communication. Additionally,
physical presence, even in a public building dedicated to public uses for the purposes of
communicating ideas, is not 'pure speech' and may not be protected under the First
Amendment." Pentico, 151 Idaho at 914, 265 P.3d at 527. 6
The same is true of the affidavit of Bruce Bistline, which asserts that "Mr. Pentico
was engaged in constitutionally protected activity while at the Capital Annex" (Affidavit
of Bruce Bistline, at 5) and "[t]hat the request that Mr. Pentico leave the Capital Annex
grounds was itself unconstitutional becau~e he· was there to exercise important and
protected 1st Amendment rights" (id., at 6). 7

6 See

.
.
.
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711-15, 69 P.3d at j31-35 ("Idaho Code Section 18-7008(8) makes criminal

the continued presence of an individual on property that belongs to another after being notified to depart
from the property by the owner or agent ... the statute informs the public of the prohibited conduct, that
is, remaining willfully on property belonging to another after having been asked to leave . . . Korsen
argues that the district court correctly interpreted the statute as seeking to curb constitutionally protected
speech, specifically his right to petition the government for redress of grievances ... as provided by the
express language of the First Amendment. He asserts that I.C. § 18-7008(8) sweeps too broadly and
includes otherwise lawful activities and speech traditionally accorded protection in public places . . .
Idaho's trespass statute is not aimed at regulating speech .or communication in any form ... Physical
presence in a public building dedicated to public uses other than that of a public thoroughfare, even
presence for the purpose of communicating ideas, is not 'pure speech.' Not all conduct claimed to have
communicative purpose is protected as speech by the First Amendment ... The statute is also capable of
application to government-owned nonpublic forums, such as government office buildings or portions of
college campuses that, unlike traditional public forums such as a public street, public park or sidewalk, or
the steps of the state Capitol building, are not open to the public for expressive activities.").

also January 6, 2009 Hearing Transcript, at 26-30 ("[W]ith respect to the constitutional issue, it is
well settled that any constitutional right is subject to reasonable restrictions in the time, place and manner
in which those rights can be exercised .. It seems to this court that the provisions of Idaho Code 18-7008
are very reasonable restrictions. I'll also note that in nq_ Y:Jay is Mr. Pentico being prosecuted for the
content of his communication but, rather, for his conduct and that is an important distinction. So I'm going
to deny the motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds. I think Idaho Code 18-70[0)8 is constitutional as
7 See
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...
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, the district court hereby affirms Judge
Swain's summary dismissal of Mr. Pentico's petition seeking post-conviction relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this /

1

day of February 2014.

Michael McLaughlin
Senior District Judge

'

,,

applied in the circumstances ... Because of this ruling, the focus of this trial is extremely narrow. The
content of the communication and prior dealings Mr. Pentico may have had with other government
officials is not relevant in this case ... That brings us to Mr. Derr's motion in limine which seeks to limit
any testimony regarding other crimes, wrongs or acts of the defendant ... So the motion to that extent is
granted and it cuts both ways. We're not going to have testimony from either side about the history that
led up to the events of April 2nd • We're going to try this case on what happened on April 2nd and that
needs to be everybody's focus.").

Memorandum Decision and Order 14

000166

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed,
by United States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice
pursuant to the Idaho Rules to each of the parties of record in this cause in envelopes
addressed as follows:

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER A.PENTICO,
Petitioner,
~

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-13-248

PETITION FOR REHEARING RE:
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER

-----------~)

COMES NOW PETITIONER-APPELLANT, by and through his attorney of record, and
hereby Petitions the Court, pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 83(x) and I.A.R. Rule 42, to Rehear the
above captioned matter, by reconsidering the Memorandum Decision and Order entered on
February 19, 2014, in which the Court affirms Judge Swain's summary dismissal of Mr.
Pentico's petition seeking post-conviction relief.
This Motion is based upon the record and will be supported by the Petitioner's

Memorandum In Support of Petition for Rehearing Re: Memorandum Decision and Order,
which will be filed in accordance with LR.A. Rule 42(B).
The Plaintiff intends to request a hearing on this Motion and will notice that hearing at
the time of submitting his supporting Memorandum.

Respectfully submitted this

ID

day of March 2014.

HEIDIT~
Attorney for Defendant

PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 10th day of March 2014, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document in the above-captioned matter to:
Ada County Prosecutor's Office

By interdepartmental mail

PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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Friday. March 14. 2014 at 11: 19 AM
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC~HK OF THE COURT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHRISTOPHER A PENTICO, PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff, ,

)
)

Vs.

)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-PC-2013-00248

)
STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT
Defendant.

---------------

NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Motion Hearing
Judge:

Thursday, April 24, 2014
02:00 PM
Michael McLaughlin

ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing
entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice
were served as follows on the 14th March, 2014.

Petitioners' Attorney:
Heidi Tolman
Ada County Public Defender
Interdepartmental Mail

X

Hand Delivered

X

Hand Delivered- Faxed

- - Faxed- -

Respondent's Attorney:
Christopher Mccurdy
Ada County Prosecutor

Interdepartmental Mail

--

Dated: Friday, March 14, 2014

NOTICE OF HEARING
Court Reference CV-PC-2013-00248
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-00248
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING RE:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

COMES NOW PETITIONER-APPELLANT, by and through his attorney ofrecord, and
hereby submits to the Court, Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Rehearing
Re: Memorandum Decision and Order.
I.

INTRODUCTION
In State v. Korsen the Idaho Supreme Court holds that § 18-7008(8) can in some

instances be constitutionally applied to support a trespassing charge against a person, who while
on state land, is asked to leave state land and then fails to do ~o. The Court also acknowledges
that there might well be circumstances in which the statute could not be constitutionally applied
to support a trespassing charge against a person on state land. As will be explained below, none
of the constitutional challenges that were available to Mr. Pentico, but not raised by his trial

J
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counsel, were addressed in State v. Korsen. Korsen provides no meaningful guidance relative to
the resolution of those issues nor does the resolution of those issues urged by Mr. Pentico
change, alter or undermine the power to "trespass" a citizen who improperly utilizing state land.
II.

ARGUMENT
In the criminal proceeding in this matter, Mr Pentico's trial counsel challenged the

constitutionality of the statute but of the 5 constitutionally based challenges that should have
been raised, he only appreciated and raised (and therefore preserved) 1 of them.

Moreover,

despite the efforts of his appellate counsel to raise and seek resolution of all 5 of these
challenges, the only one which was resolved on appeal was the sole defense raised by trial
counsel. These constitutionally based challenges are:
1.

The statute cannot be applied to prevent a "return within one year" unless there is
a predicate "ask to leave" that conforms to the statute and that since LC. § 187008(8) could not be constitutionally applied, based upon Mr. Pentico's conduct
on March 25, to legitimize the "ask to leave" on that date then Pentico could not
be prosecuted for the "return within one year."

2.

Even if the "ask to leave" was legally sufficient, the "return within one year"
portion of the statute is facially unconstitutional because it constitutes an
impermissible prior restraint on the exercise of protected 1st Amendment rights.

3.

Even if the "ask to leave" was legally sufficient, the "return within one year"
portion of the statute is both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as
applied in this case because it affords no meaningful procedural due process

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Page 2
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protection before imposing a substantial restri_ction upon the exercise of protected
1st Amendment rights and other privileges of citizenship.
4.

Even if the "ask to leave" was legally sufficient, the "return within one year"
portion of the statute is impermissibly vague as applied to Mr. Pentico's conduct
because the clear and unambiguous language of the statute does not give a citizen
fair notice that an "ask to leave" occurring on property A can be extended by any
conduct on the part of the landowner to property B.

5.

Assuming that the "ask to leave" was legally sufficient, the "return within one
year" portion of statute could not be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's conduct
on April 2, 2008.

Of these defenses, only Defense #5 has been litigated to resolution.
Defense #1 was raised by Mr. Pentico as a basis for post-conviction relief (Ground #1,
Verified Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, p. 3-5. Defense #1 was not raised by Mr. Pentico's
trial lawyer. Idaho v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 913, 265 P.3d 519, 526 (2011). Defense #1 was
raised by Mr. Pentico's appellate counsel. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Heidi Tolman filed in
response to the State's Motion for Sumrriary Dismissal (Copy of excerpts from Mr. Pentico's
Brief on Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, pp.14-25) (hereinafter Appellate Brief).

The

..

factual basis for Defense #1 (that Pentico was on the Capital Annex grounds on March 25 th to
speak to a Legislator about an issue he had with State government) was not presented to the
Court by Mr. Pentico's trial counsel. Pentico, supra. Moreover, the Court of Appeals perceived
that presentation of a factual basis for the "ask to leave" was precluded by a motion in limine

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION
Page 3
AND ORDER
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filed by Mr. Pentico's trial counsel. Despite Mr. Pentico's efforts (asserting fundamental error
and asserting ineffective assistance of counsel) Defense #1 was not taken up or resolved by the
Court of Appeals because the factual basis was not evident in the trial record and the Court of
Appeals could not rule out that trial counsel's failure to develop that record was not a matter of
tactics. Id. pp. 913-914, 526-527.

The sworn statements of Mr. Pentico's trial counsel make it

clear beyond debate that neither the failure to provide a factual basis for challenging the "ask to
leave" on constitutional grounds nor the filing of a motion that might have precluded evidence of
the factual basis of (or lack thereof) the "ask to leave" were the product of a strategic decision.
Instead, both were the result of the failure to appreciate the issues.

Affidavit of Alan R. Den-,

filed May 20, 2013, ~ 4 and 6.
This record does not support the determination that Defense # 1 was raised before the
Trial Court or that it could have been resolved on direct appeal in the criminal proceeding
(Pentico made every conceivable effort to do so and was rebuffed, see, Appellate Brief pp. 14,.
16). The record contains substantial and un-rebutted factual basis for concluding that Defense #1
was not raised due to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline, filed
May 20, 2013, ~~ 6,7, 8, 9(a) and 9(b). Defense #1 raises issues which are not resolved by any
existing decision of the Idaho appellate courts but which the Court in Korsen acknowledge may
arise and may lead to a finding that the statute is unconstitutional as applied. Under these
,.

circumstances, the record does not support Judge Swain's determination that there is not
substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt. Either Mr. Pentico could not raise
this challenge despite diligent efforts or alternatively he was precluded from doing so by

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION
Page 4
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ineffective assistance of counsel.

Either way, Defense #1 directly undermines the conviction

and justice requires that he be afforded the opportunity to have it litigated.
Defenses## 2, 3, and 4 were raised by Mr. Pentico as a basis for Post-Conviction Relief
(Ground #2, Verified Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, pp. 5-6). The record is devoid of any
evidence that Defenses #2, 3, and 4 were raised by Mr. Pentico's trial counsel. See, Idaho v.
Pentico, supra., 151 Idaho at 910, 265 P.3d at 523.

Despite Mr. Pentico's efforts to ha~e

Defenses #2 and 3 considered by the Court of Appeals, See Appellate Brief pp. 28-31, the Court
of Appeals did not even acknowledge that these Defenses were asserted.

Obviously, Mr.

Pentico's appellate counsel raised Defense #4 as the Court of Appeals specifically ruled that it
had not been raised by Mr. Pentico's trial counsel and therefore not preserved for Appeal. Id. pp.
528, 915 and Appellate Brief pp. 31-35. Defenses## 2, 3, and 4 were not taken up or resolved
by the Court of Appeals. 1

The sworn statements of Mr. Pentico's trial counsel make it clear

beyond debate that Defenses ## 2, 3, and 4 were not raised because trial counsel did not
appreciate the issues. Affidavit of Alan R. Derr, filed May 20, 2013, ,r 4 and 5.
This record does not support the determination that Defenses ## 2, 3 and 4 were raised

1 Defense

#4 was, in dicta, partially discussed by the Court of Appeals. The Court, while
acknowledging that the statute specifically provides that the "return within one year" provision
pertains to .the property on which the "ask to leave" occurred, arrives without explanation at the
conclusion that the statute gives fair notice that the "return within one year" provision also
applies to other properties specified at the time of the "ask to leave." Such an expansive reading
of a clear and unambiguous statute is completely contrary to the decisions of the Idaho Supreme
Court. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896, 265 PJd 502, 509
(2011). But even were permissible to read the statute so expansively, the Court of Appeals
wholly fails to address the Defense that the statute does not give fair notice that such a reading of
the statute is possible.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Page 5
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before the Trial Court or that any of them could have been resolved on direct appeal in the
criminal proceeding (Pentico made every conceivable effort to do so and was rebuffed). The
record contains a substantial and un-rebutted factual basis for concluding that Defenses## 2, 3,
and 4 were not raised due to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline,
filed May 20, 2013, ~~9(c) and 9(d). Defenses## 2, 3 and 4 raise issues which are not resolved
by any existing decision of the Idaho appellate courts and which were not even relevant to the

Korsen Court.

Under these circumstances, the record does not support Judge Swain's

determination that there is no substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt.
Either Mr. Pentico could not raise these challenges despite diligent efforts or alternatively he was
precluded from doing so by ineffective assistance of counsel. Either way Defenses## 2, 3, and
4 directly undermine the conviction and justice requires that he be afforded the opportunity to
have these Defenses litigated.
III.

CONCLUSION
While it would be correct to say that the four constitutional challenges which Mr. Pentico

has addressed above could have been raised before the Trial Court in the initial proceedings, it
would be incorrect to conclude that either Mr. Pentico has not been trying to raise valid
. challenges ever since his conviction or that those challenges were not raised in before the Trial
Court because of any conscious process on the part of trial counsel.

The matters are serious

constitutional challenges which are not resolved by any reported decision in Idaho and that, if
resolved in his favor, make a conviction both unjust and impossible.

There are in this record,

unrebutted and material facts not previously presented that, in the interest of justice, militate iri

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION
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favor of granting a new trial. The record provides a substantial showing that the conviction is
contrary to established constitutional protections. Moreover, it is clear that the facts and legal
challenges that should have been put into the record are not in the record due to oversight by trial
counsel which had nothing to do with strategic decisions. These oversights are not, based upon
unrebutted evidence, consistent with effective assistance of counsel.
Mr. Pentico is entitled, in the interest of justice, to a new trial but for now he will settle
for the opportunity to be allowed to proceed upon his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
DATED thi4day of March, 2014.
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

Heidi~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thi~ay of March, 2014, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document in the above-captioned matter by the method indicated
below and addressed to the following:
Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front Street, Ste. 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702

_}{__ HAND DELIVERY
- - U.S.MAIL
- - OVERNIGHT MAIL
FACSIMILE: 287-7700
_
Interdepartmental Mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)

CHRISTOPHER A PENTICO,
Plaintiff,

Case No: CV-PC-2013-00248

)
Vs.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

)
)

NOTICE OF HEARING

)

----------

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Motion Hearing
Judge:

Thursday, May 01, 2014
02:00 PM
Michael McLaughlin

ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing
entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice
were served as follows on the 28th March, 2014.
Petitioner's Attorney:
Heidi Tolman
Ada County Public Defender
Interdepartmental Mail_h_

Hand Delivered _ _ Faxed _ _

Respondent's Attorney:
Christopher Mccurdy
Ada County Prosecutor
Interdepartmental Mail-A-

Hand Delivered _ _ Faxed _ _

Dated: Friday, March 28, 2014

NOTICE OF HEARING
Court Reference CV-PC-2013-00248
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Christopher C. McCurdy
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER PENTICO,
Defendant.
________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

C)JCase No. ~PC-2013-00248
STATE'S RESPONSE TO
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Christopher C. McCurdy, Deputy

Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, and states response to petitioner's memorandum in support
of petition for rehearing, for the following reasons:
Analysis

In the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Petition), Pentico alleged three causes of
action.

The First Cause of action is that Pentico's Due Process Rights under the Fifth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution
were violated. The Second Cause of action likewise deals with violations of the same rights, but
for different conduct. The Third Cause of action alleges that Pentico was denied the right to fully
challenge the constitutionality of LC. § 18-7008(8) as applied to this case. The Petition alleges
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that the denial stemmed from ineffective assistance of counsel rendered by the original trial
counsel.
In its memorandum decision and order, the district court addressed Pentico's first and
second claims together in section one, and the third claim in section two. As to Pentico's first
and second claims, the district court held Judge Swain did not err in summarily dismissing Mr.
Pentico's first two claims. "Mr. Pentico has not own that these claims raise a substantial doubt
about the reliability of the finding that he was guilty of trespass and that these claims, in the
exercise of due diligence, could not have been presented earlier." Mem. Decision & Order, 7.
As to the third claim, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the district court began
by analyzing the affidavits from Allen Derr and Bruce Bistline. Mr. Derr's affidavit addressed
his motion in limine, and that he was unaware of any constitutional challenge flowing from the
March 25, 2008 interaction. In addressing Mr. Derr's affidavit, the district court held that:
"[t]he problem with Mr. Derr's affidavit is that even assuming that such an
argument was not previously raised, and it appears that it essentially was, and that
counsel erred in failing to assert this argument before Judge Swain, there is
nothing indicating a reasonable probability that this argument would have been
successful and led to a different outcome."
Mem. Decision & Order, 12. The district court clearly provided two reasons for its holding.
First, that the argument was essentially made previously, and properly adjudicated on the direct
appeal. Then the district court went further, by assuming that the argument was not already
made, but that the case law weighed against its success.
Pentico's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Rehearing Re: Memorandum Decision
and Order (Pentico's Memorandum) breaks down these issues differently.

In Pentico's

memorandum, the argument is arranged into five constitutional arguments. From the State's
reading, the first four arguments appear to be various phrasings of an as applied and facial
challenge to the constitutionality of LC. § 18-7008(8).
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As a starting point, Pentico concedes that the fifth argument has been adjudicated fully.
However, full adjudication is not the appropriate standard in cases like this. The Idaho Court of
Appeals has previously held that "[g]enerally speaking, a claim or issue which was or could have
been raised on appeal may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings." Whitehawk v.
State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1989). This holding is consistent
with LC.§ 19-4901(b) which states in part:
This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction. Any
issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and
may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the
court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or
otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence,
have been presented earlier.
Therefore, in consideration of the legal standard and the holding by the district court, the proper
starting question is whether Pentico's arguments were previously raised or should have been
raised on direct appeal. If the answer is no, then the next question is whether there would be a
reasonable probability of success on the argument. See Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 89, 190 P.3d
905, 908 (Ct. App. 2008).
The bulk of the Petition and Pentico's Memorandum are attempts to relitigate the
constitutional issues previously decided at the trial court and on direct appeal to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether I. C. § 18-7008(8) is facially
unconstitutional. State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 913, 265 P.3d 519, 526 (Ct. App. 2011).
Additionally, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the statute was unconstitutional as applied
to Pentico. Id., at 914, 265 P.3d at 527. On this point, the Court of Appeals held that the statute
was not unconstitutionally overbroad as it applied to Pentico's conduct on April 2, 2008. Id. On
the issue of vagueness, the Court of Appeals first noted that the issue was not properly preserved
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for appeal, but went on to analyze the statute and determined that the statute is not vague as
applied. 1 Id., at 915,265 P.3d at 528.
Pentico now focuses on his first interaction at the Capitol on March 25, 2008, and the
constitutional issues that may arise from there. As the district court correctly notes, the Court of
Appeals decision on this case did address these points, though perhaps indirectly. See State v.

Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 911-12, 265 P.3d 519, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2012).

Also, the State

continues to argue that any inability to address these issues was due to a strategic determination
by trial counsel. See Respondent's Br., 7.
Conclusion

The State's position in this case remains unchanged. Because many of the issues in the
Petition are either attempts to relitigate or rephrase issues, the State respectfully asked the trial
court to dismiss the Petition. To the extent that the issues raised in the Petition differ from those
previously asserted, those issues have been procedurally waived by operation of LC. § 19490l(b)

1

This addresses defense #4 in Pentico' s Memorandum. Dicta or not, the Court of Appeals
analysis here indicates that likelihood of success for Pentico on this point.
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DATED this

21_ day of April 2014.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the j_

°'-

day of April 2014, I caused to be served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing document to: Heidi Tolman, Ada County Public Defender, by
the method indicated below:
NOTIFIED AVAILABLE FOR PICK UP
_ _ U.S. MAIL (Postage Prepaid)
FAX TRANSMISSION
- x- - HAND DELIVERY

\

Legal Assistant
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Judge Michael Mclaughli!ic Nelson - Dianne Cromwell - 05/-~

Courtroom400

Note
Speake
Time
Pentico vs. State of Idaho Motion
Calls CV-PC-2013-00248
2:10:10 PM Judge
Hearing
Christopher McCudy present
2:10:35 PM State
Attorney
.
2:10:51 PM Plaintiff Heidi Tolman Present
Attorney
..............
court reviws, inquires
2:10:58 PM Judge
comments
2:11:16PM State
Attorney

2:11:19PM Defense no need to responds
Attorney
.........
2:11:40 PM Plaintiff approaches with a clean copy, will hear oral arguement
Attorney
....................

2:12:06 PM Plaintiff hands court a chart
Attorney
reviews on record,
2:12:33 PM Judge
2:12:58 PM Plaintiff argues
Attorney
..............

2:16:04 PM Plaintiff comments on the amended complaint, comments regarding the
Attorney summary dismissal
......
inquires on the petitioner
2:17:29 PM Judge
2:19:00 PM Plaintiff continues arguments
Attorney

scope of the prohobition
2:20:28 PM Judge
2:20:40 PM Plaintiff continues arguements,
Attorney

.........

oral aguments, on the court of appeals oppion,
2:23:35 PM State
Attorney
........................................
comments on the Motion in Limine
2:26:00 PM State
jAttorney

i:
2:28:41 PM Plaintiff

response

Attorney
..........

2:31:32 PM Judge

5/1/2014

comments

1 of 2
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Judge Michael Mclaug hli!ic Nelson - Dianne Cromwell - 05.4

Courtroom400

2:31:40 PM Plaintiff continue response
Attorney
2:32:15 PM Judge
2:32:44 PM

5/1/2014

re-evaluate earlier decission, will take under advisement
End

2 of 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

~"""""'

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,

Petitioner-Appellant,

Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Respondent.

ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: HEIDI TOLMAN
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: CHRISTOPHER MCCUDY
This case is before the court on the Petitioner's, (Mr. Pentico's), motion for
reconsideration of the court's February 19, 2014, memorandum decision on appeal from
the decision of Magistrate Judge, the Honorable Kevin Swain, summarily dismissing his
petition seeking post-conviction relief. This court will affirm its earlier decision in this
matter.
Pentico's petition for reconsideration asserts five constitutional issues. Pentico
admits that the fifth constitutional argument has been adjudicated fully. The Idaho Court
of Appeals previously has held that a claim or issue which was or could have been
raised on appeal may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings.

See

Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1989).
MEMORANDUM DECISION - 1
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Mr. Pentico's case was heard by the Court of Appeals as cited in State v.
Pentico, :151 Idaho 906, 265 P.3d 519 (Ct. App. 2011).

The Court of Appeals

addressed the issue raised whether Idaho Code§ 18-7008(8) is facially unconstitutional
or unconstitutional as applied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the statute was not
overly broad.

The Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of vagueness and

determined that the statute was not vague as applied.
The thrust of Pentico's reconsideration motion is his conduct on March 25, 2008,
and whether or not any constitutional issues may arise from that incident. The Court of
Appeals' decision in Pentico is clear that the March 25, 2008 issue was not preserved
for appeal. However, as stated earlier, the Court of Appeals did address these points
indirectly at pages 911-12 of the decision. As noted earlier in this court's decision, there
is nothing in Mr. Derr's affidavit that establishes, based upon the undisputed facts in the
record, that there was a reasonable probability that this argument would have been
successful and led to a different outcome.
For these reasons and those set forth in the court's earlier memorandum
decision of February 19, 2014, the motion for reconsideration will be denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

-

/~

day of May 2014.

MEMORANDUM DECISION - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed,
by United States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice
pursuant to the Idaho Rules to each of the parties of record in this cause in envelopes
addressed as follows:

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

Date:
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JUN 2 0 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATRINA THIESSEN
DePUTV

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant
HEIDI M. TOLMAN, ISB #8478
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Case No. CV-PC-2013-000248
Petitioner-Appellant,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1) The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named respondent to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final decision and order entered against
him in the above-entitled action on May 20, 2014, the Honorable Michael R.
McLaughlin, District Judge presiding.
2) That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under, and pursuant to, IAR 11 (a)(1-9).
3) A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Appellant then
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal
shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal is:
a) Did the trial court err by granting summary dismissal without a
meaningful opportunity to be heard?

NOTICE OF APPEAL

SM

1

000189

l:.

~

'

"

4) Reporter's Transcript. The Appellant requests the preparation of the entire
reporter's standard transcript as defined by IAR 25(c). The Appellant also
requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's transcript:
a) Oral Argument held February 13, 2014 (Court Reporter: Susan Gambee.
Estimated pages: 100).
b) Oral Argument held May 1, 2014 (Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell.
Estimated pages: 50).
5) Clerk's Record. The Appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant
to IAR 28(b )(1 ). In addition to those documents automatically included under
IAR 28(b)(1), Appellant also requests that any briefs, statements or affidavits
considered by the court, and memorandum opinions or decisions of the court
be included in the Clerk's Record.
6) I certify:
a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court
· Reporter(s) mentioned in paragraph 5 above.
b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because the Appellant is indigent. (1.C. §§ 313220, 31-3220A, IAR 24(e)).
c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal
case (I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 23(a)(10)).
d) Ada County will be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript,
· as the client is indigent (1.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 24(e)).
e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to IAR 20.
DATED this

it/;

day of June 2014.

Heidi M. Tolman
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this

J.j__ day of June 2014, I mailed (served) a true

and correct copy of the within instrument to:
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Division
Joe R. Williams Bldg., 4th Fir.
Statehouse Mail
Susan Gambee
Court Reporter
Interdepartmental Mail
Dianne Cromwell
Court Reporter
Interdepartmental Mail
Stacy Langton
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail
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TO:

A.M.

Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720
(208) 334-2616

FILED
P.M, _ _ _ __
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AUG 2 1 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIES
DEPUTY

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Docket No. 42242
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent.
X

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 29 PAGES LODGED
Appealed from the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Ada,
Michael R. McLaughlin, District Court Judge.
This transcript contains hearing held on:
February 13, 2014
DATE:

July 11, 2014

~

Susan G. Garn ee, Official Court Reporter
Official Court Reporter,
Judge Deborah Bail
Ada County Courthouse
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 18
Registered Merit Reporter
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AUG 2 1 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIES

Stephen W. Kenyon
Clerk of Supreme Court
451 W State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720

DEPUTY

In re: Penitco v. State of Idaho, Docket No. 42242

Notice is hereby given that on Wednesday, August 20, 2014, I lodged a
transcript of 20 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District.
The following files were lodged:
Proceeding 04/30/2014

David Cromwell
Tucker & Associates
cc: sctfilings@idcourts.net
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Supreme Court Case No. 42242
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
STA TE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 21st day of August, 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Supreme Court Case No. 42242
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
STA TE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

AUG 2 1 2014
Date of Service: - ------CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO,
Supreme Court Case No. 42242
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
20th day of June, 2014.

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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